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1. EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
This report comprises the findings of CREST funded research into organisational change and 
insider threat. It outlines the individual, social and 
organisational factors that over time, can contribute to 
negative employee perceptions and experiences.
These factors can produce a reduction in an employee’s 
psychological attachment to, and trust in, their 
employing organisation which then allows them 
to undertake Counterproductive Work Behaviour 
(CWB). CWB concerns action which threatens the 
effectiveness, or harms the safety of, an employer and 
its stakeholders.
It can develop from small scale discretions (e.g., time 
wasting, or knowledge hiding) into serious insider 
threat activities (e.g., destroying systems or exchanging 
confidential information with malicious others).
Following past research linking CWB to both 
organisational change and trust breach, the aim of the 
study was to produce a (dis)trust based framework for 
predicting, identifying and mitigating counterproductive 
work behaviour and insider threat within the context of 
organisational change.
We posed the following research questions:
1. What effect does organisational change have in 
relation to counterproductive work behaviour 
(CWB) and insider threat acts?
2. What role does (dis)trust play in CWB during 
organisational change?
3. What preventative measures can be taken by 
organisations to help mitigate CWB and insider 
threat in organisational change initiatives?
To address these questions, we collected empirical data 
from a case study organisation undergoing change: two 
sets of interviews, i.) with selected managers and staff 
outlining the key changes in the organisation, ii.) with a 
range of stakeholders involved in/privy to one of three 
insider threat case studies in two different departments, 
iii.) a review of HR and security paperwork on the 
insider threat cases, and then, iv.) anonymous surveys 
of the workforce in the same two departments in 
which our case studies occurred. Using these methods, 
we explored individuals’ cognitions and emotions 
to understand why while some employees remain 
engaged, loyal and trusting during change, others 
become disengaged, distrusting and behave in deviant 
ways.
1.1 EFFECTS OF 
ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE
Employees are not passive recipients of change, instead 
their experiences of change can form the crucible for 
individual revenge and collective retaliation in the form 
Fig.1.1 - Negative impacts produced by organisational change.
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of CWB. This report highlights how organisational 
changes are being experienced within our case study 
organisation, ‘Plan B’. We outline the insider threat 
risks and show how these threats manifest through the 
following factors:
 y Ineffective use of organisational systems
 y Unintended consequences of security culture
 y Moral disengagement and passive group-level 
insider threat
 y Staff disengagement due to changes
Further, we demonstrate that change can produce four 
main negative impacts.
First, it makes the work environment less predictable. 
Therefore, employees’ attention becomes diverted 
to detect what is changing and to understand if it is 
different from what they have been told is changing.
Second, changes are often accompanied by inadequate 
communication, characterised by information which 
may be incomplete, inaccurate or untimely. As a result, 
misunderstanding and rumours can emerge.
Third, changes in organisations are often accompanied 
by leadership changes. This might be confined just to 
the top of the organisation, but equally it can cascade 
down to all levels.
Further, the way leaders are used in the organisation 
might change (e.g., through restructuring), meaning the 
types of behaviours expected from both leaders and 
employees may change in line with the new direction 
and with individual leadership styles.
Finally, in undertaking these transformations, there 
will be those who feel the process or the outcome of 
change is unfair; this is particularly likely for those who 
have lost power and influence.
1.2 THE ROLE OF (DIS)
TRUST IN CWB DURING 
ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE
The diagram on below (Figure 1.2) exemplifies the 
dynamics that can be triggered during organisational 
change, commencing with a trust breach and 
culminating in CWB and insider threat.
Fig.1.2 - Role of distrust in CWB within an organisational change context
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When perceived promises (or the psychological 
contract) are broken, the integrity and overall 
trustworthiness an individual considers their employing 
organisation and its leaders to have, declines. This 
low trust or distrust (through a process of attribution) 
changes the explanations employees make for events 
that have occurred in the past, those in the present and 
for the future. Consequently, individuals become more 
cynical towards the organisation and its leadership, 
perceiving a significant injustice to have occurred, 
which is potentially likely to re-occur.
This cynicism then triggers their moral disengagement 
towards work tasks and work colleagues; individuals 
who morally disengage from their work environment 
identify less with their role and organisation, which 
lowers their organisational citizenship behaviours. 
Individuals are, however, also more likely to become 
passive or active insider threats.
These individuals can retaliate through uncivil 
behaviours, such as anti-social behaviour and 
aggression, and through passive responses such as 
withdrawal of cooperation and depleted investment 
in resources. Both types are significant threats to any 
organisation, not least one that forms part of the critical 
national infrastructure like Plan B.
1.3 PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 
TO HELP MITIGATE CWB 
AND INSIDER THREAT IN 
ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE 
INITIATIVES
Through our study, we have produced the following 
strategies (FOCAL) to help mitigate against the threat 
of CWB and insider acts in organisational change 
initiatives across a variety of contexts. These are 
aimed primarily at organisational managers/leaders 
and are explored further throughout this report and in 
a standalone fashion in The Manager’s Guide (www.
crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/cwb-managers-guide) 
and Practitioner Toolkit (www.crestresearch.ac.uk/
resources/cwb-toolkit).
Be fair & consistent with HR procedures and managing 
people during times of change and stability. This will 
leave employees more resilient to the turbulence of 
organisational change and trusting in the vision that the 
projected change outcome.
Organisational Citizenship: Make CWB reporting 
part of employee safeguarding. Reporting is likely to 
be increased through creating an organisational value 
system in which reporting CWB or unusual activities 
Fig.1.3 - Core skills for managers: FOCAL
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among colleagues is considered a protective, rather 
than punitive, measure for the potential perpetrator and 
others around them. A key enabler in this approach is 
that all employees consider it their responsibility to 
report concerns, rather than solely managers, HR or 
security staff. Another is that good practice security 
norms must be made explicit and clear to all staff, 
rather than based on assumptions of understanding. 
The process for reporting concerns should also be 
made clear and easy for staff as well as confidential and 
non-discriminatory.
Communicate change initiatives transparently, 
consistently, regularly and collaboratively. Engage 
staff of all levels at an early stage in change initiatives. 
Early dialogue and collaboration with individuals on 
change projects will enable them to feel more in control 
of their working life, less vulnerable, and will reduce 
the sense of unpredictability change provokes.
Lead by example. Leaders act as role models for the 
organisation, demonstrating acceptable behaviours 
and morals which act as guides for employees in their 
everyday lives. When leaders consistently demonstrate 
concern for their employees and the kinds of citizenship 
behaviours which engender trust, employees build up 
resilience in the face of change.
Assess your various individual, local (team) and 
organisational environments for their vulnerabilities 
& tailor change initiatives accordingly. Change 
has different impacts on different individuals. This is 
due to both individual differences and an individual’s 
particular vulnerabilities, as well as the particular 
dynamics and challenges existent in any given team. 
Impact assessments should be conducted prior to 
change instigation which enables the identification 
of the particular support mechanisms which may be 
required across an organisation.
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2. LITERATURE 
REVIEW
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Organisations within the UK are experiencing an 
unprecedented level of unpredictability and change. This 
is due in large part to significant economic pressures 
(e.g., financial crisis, austerity measures, technological 
developments and demands for innovation), recent and 
ongoing political developments (e.g., Brexit) and social 
change (e.g., an increasingly diverse and cross-cultural 
population).
Another wider dimension is the heightened threat posed 
to organisations by radicalisation, increasing extremist 
sentiment and terrorist groups whose aims include the 
infiltration of organisations important to the national 
infrastructure (BaMaung et al., 2017). Sources of 
organisational change therefore comprise both external 
and internal sources that can impact on employees to 
create real and perceived threats and pressures that 
make them sensitive and vigilant to what lies ahead 
(Fugate et al., 2012) triggering different, often negative, 
kinds of work behaviour.
Employee experiences of work are amongst the most 
central antecedents for their level of commitment 
to an organisation (Meyer and Allen 1997; Meyer et 
al., 2002). Individuals’ experiences of change can 
cause breaches in their psychological contract with 
an employer which undermine their commitment to 
an organisation (Solinger et al., 2015), and alter their 
identities as employees (Ashforth and Schinoff, 2016).
In this way, experiences of change can form the crucible 
that leads to instrumental and hostile retaliations 
by individuals and collective protest in the form of 
Counterproductive Work Behaviour (CWB) (Kelloway 
et al., 2010), thereby making them an insider threat. 
In the maelstrom of uncertainties that accompany 
change, organisations may be particularly vulnerable 
to exploitation by employees or other insiders. Thus, 
change can make organisations and employees 
particularly vulnerable to internal threats, as well as 
those external to the organisation.
As a result there is an urgent need to develop new 
understanding of the risk posed by insider threat in order 
to improve its detection, mitigation and prevention. 
Fig. 2.1 - (Dis)trust based framework: CWB and Organisational Change 
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This research proposes that one way of doing so is by 
considering the relationship between trust, CWB and 
organisational change. While business and management 
scholars have long appreciated the impact of trust on 
organisational success and safety, the security field has 
yet to fully appreciate its role.
Clearly, it is imperative that organisational managers 
and security practitioners can identify the factors that 
make individuals more likely to become a potential 
insider threat during organisational change. Following 
our past research into professional misconduct in health 
and social care (Searle et al., 2017a), we have developed 
a conceptual framework (see Figure 2.1) which guides 
our approach to both this literature review and our 
overall project.
The rest of this review is structured as follows. First, 
we define CWB and insider threat. Then, using our 
conceptual model above, we outline the main impacts 
of organisational change, before presenting the key 
individual, social and organisational factors which our 
review indicates are important triggers of CWB and 
insider threat during organisational change.
2.1.1 COUNTERPRODUCTIVE WORK 
BEHAVIOUR (CWB)
Over the past decade, incidents of wrongdoing within 
organisations, including fraud, corruption and other 
unethical acts, have risen, increasingly becoming 
headline news (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 
2005; Moore, 2015). These actions can be collectively 
termed ‘Counterproductive Work Behaviour’ (CWB), 
defined as a voluntary form of action which violates 
significant organisational norms and threatens the 
wellbeing of organisations and those working there, 
and/or those receiving services from them (Robinson 
and Bennett, 1995).
CWB includes acts which potentially or actually harm 
organisations and/or individuals, either by affecting 
the organisation’s normal function or its property, or 
through impairing employee effectiveness or safety 
(Fox et al., 2001).
It therefore has a detrimental impact on both the 
organisation and its members (Fida et al., 2015; Spector 
and Fox, 2005). CWB occurs when individuals lack 
the motivation (or capacity) to comply with normative 
expectations or organisationally-prescribed codes, 
or when individuals seek to exploit either vulnerable 
organisational systems or individuals for their own self-
gain.
The rise in incidents and their contextual scope 
highlights how wrongdoing can take place in virtually 
every type of organisation and that it is not a rare 
occurrence (Anand et al., 2004).
2.1.1.1 Types of CWB
CWB can develop from small-scale indiscretions (e.g., 
time wasting or knowledge hiding) into more serious 
insider threat activities (e.g., destroying systems or 
divulging confidential information to malicious others).
Counterproductive work behaviour has been closely 
related to, or even used interchangeably with, a number 
of workplace problems, including anti-social behaviour 
(Giacalone and Greenberg, 1997); interpersonal 
conflict, including verbal aggression towards co-
workers (Spector and Jex, 1998); delinquency (Hogan 
and Hogan, 1989); deviance (Hollinger, 1986; Robinson 
and Bennett, 1995); retaliation (Skarlicki and Folger, 
1997) and revenge behaviours (Bies et al., 1997); 
mobbing/bullying (Zapf et al., 1996); and withdrawal 
(Carpenter and Berry, 2017).
Research into CWB has differentiated two forms 
of actions: those which are deliberate and include 
instrumental or premeditated actions, and those 
which are impulsive and not necessarily intentional 
(Berkowitz, 1993).
Taxonomies of CWB have categorised these types of 
behaviour using three distinct dimensions, including 
a behaviour-focused categorisation investigated in a 
recent meta-analysis (Marcus et al., 2016). The most 
renowned is Spector et al.’s (2006) work, which 
presents a five-factor model of production deviance, 
sabotage, theft, withdrawal and abuse of others.
There is also Gruys and Sackett’s (2003) eleven factor 
structure comprising: (1) theft and related actions; 
(2) property destruction; (3) information misuse; (4) 
time and resources misuse; (5) unsafe actions; (6) 
attendance; (7) quality of work; (8) use of alcohol; (9) 
use of drugs; (10) inappropriate verbal behaviour; and 
(11) inappropriate physical behaviour.
13
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A further dimension examines the target of CWB, 
distinguishing between behaviour directed towards 
the organisation (CWB Organisational Deviance, 
‘CWB-O’), from behaviour directed towards other 
people within the organisation (Interpersonal Deviance, 
‘CWB-I’) (Fox and Spector, 1999; Robinson and 
Bennett, 1995). Recent meta-analysis (Marcus et al., 
2016) reveals that a third category of target needs to be 
investigated here: self-destructive actions.
The final dimension used to categorise CWB focuses 
on impact, ranging from minor to severe implications 
(Robinson and Bennett, 1995). These different 
dimensions and the distinct types of CWB are captured 
in Figure 2.2.
Organisation-directed CWB can manifest in three main 
ways.
1. Production deviance concerns how job tasks and 
work roles are done (Hollinger, 1986), and includes 
deliberate actions which deviate from contracted 
obligations and requirements, such as deliberately not 
following standard instructions, poor record keeping 
and deliberately wasting resources. Such organisational 
misconduct contravenes the formal output and process 
controls of the organisation (Weibel et al., 2016), 
and the impacts can range from minor to severe. 
Production deviance can include active and passive 
behaviour, as well as those which are designed to 
directly or indirectly harm the organisation. Studies 
of CWB have revealed that this form of transgression 
helps perpetrators counteract the effects of perceived 
unfairness, specifically distributive and procedural 
injustices (Krischer et al., 2010).
2. Withdrawal is a more minor, organisation-focused 
CWB category, which includes the intentional avoidance 
of or disengagement from the work environment, job 
tasks, or the organisation as a whole. Importantly 
such actions are not motivated by a desire to harm the 
organisation (Carpenter and Berry, 2017), but instead 
involve a “lack of attendance, attention, or effort” by an 
employee (ibid., p. 837) and may be used as a coping 
strategy in response to working in high stress contexts. 
Historically, withdrawal has been investigated under a 
different route from other CWB; instead of focusing 
on negative work behaviour, its origins lie in the study 
of job satisfaction. This includes employees’ potential 
physical actions which are designed to remove them 
from their current work context. Such actions include 
daydreaming, taking excessive breaks while at 
work, working on personal matters rather than work 
duties, making efforts to stay away from work with 
unnecessary periods of absence, such as pretending to 
be unwell, or actions linked to timekeeping matters, 
such as frequent tardiness or finishing the day early. 
While such withdrawal actions include the withholding 
of effort (Fida et al., 2014), they may also include the 
withholding of key information (Connelly et al., 2012).
3. Property deviance is a more severe category of 
organisation-focused CWB (Robinson and Bennett, 
1995), which centres on the deliberate misuse of the 
organisation’s resources. This includes: the intentional 
taking of organisational property for personal purposes 
or financial gain; fraud; the wrongful or criminal acts of 
deception concerning the exploitation of organisational 
assets for financial or personal gain and sabotage, 
which involves the deliberate destruction, damage, or 
Fig. 2.2 - Types of CWB,
Adapted from Robinson and Bennet (1995) and Spector et al., (2006)
MINOR SEVERE
ORGANISATIONAL
PRODUCTION DEVIANCE 
WITHDRAWAL
PROPERTY DEVIANCE
INTERPERSONAL POLITICAL DEVIANCE INTERPERSONAL AGGRESSION
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obstruction of organisational processes or property 
with the intention to harm the organisation (Spector et 
al., 2006).
By contrast, interpersonally-directed CWB (CWB-I) 
includes less severe actions often called ‘political 
behaviour’, which comprises deliberate social interaction 
intended to gain personal or political advantage over 
another individual. It includes favouritism of key 
others, as well as gossiping about and undermining 
others in order to succeed in some strategic ‘game’. 
More severe CWB-I behaviour includes interpersonal 
aggression (Robinson and Bennett, 1995; Spector et 
al., 2006), which focuses on intentional physical and 
verbal aggression and incivility designed to be hostile 
towards or to harm or endanger another individual. 
This category also comprises physical attacks, which 
could include sexual harassment or assault; verbal 
insults and incivilities, such as deliberately being rude 
to another; bullying; spreading false rumours; making 
fun of others; playing pranks and jokes on a specific 
individual; and racial slurs. CWB-I can also include 
individual targeted theft, which is the same definition 
of theft as that noted earlier, except the target is another 
individual’s property.
2.1.2 INSIDER THREAT
Insider threat is closely related to, and arguably 
synonymous with, CWB. Insider threat refers to threat 
from a type of individual who has, due to their internal 
position in the organisation, a privileged level of access 
to the networks, systems or data of an organisation 
(Nurse et al., 2014). Insiders can include current or 
past employees, contractors or trusted third parties. 
Insider threat is arguably the most severe form of CWB 
and comes in two distinct forms: 1) malicious and 2) 
accidental/unintentional (ibid). In the case of malicious 
insider threat, the individual intentionally utilises 
their granted authorisation to access confidential or 
available organisational information and resources 
for a particular counterproductive purpose (Cappelli 
et al., 2012). The motivation is often to exploit one’s 
privileged access for personal or financial gain, or for 
the purpose of retaliation or revenge (Band et al., 2006). 
Such activities are perceived as the most common type 
of threat. The second form, accidental/unintentional 
or non-malicious threat, also causes harm or increases 
the prospect of future harm to the organisation’s assets 
or resources (confidentiality, integrity, availability) 
through non-malicious action or non-action. This type 
of insider threat activity includes both human error 
and mistakes, along with a range of non-malicious 
actions that may compromise the organisation, such as 
inadvertently leaking sensitive information on social 
networking sites, the loss of work devices, or falling for 
phishing and malware attacks. In addition, through the 
findings of the present research, we further differentiate 
between:
Active insider threat – behaviour carried out by 
someone with inside access to an organisation which 
threatens to harm the organisation and/or its members. 
This can include intentional and malicious, or 
unintentional and accidental behaviour; and
Passive insider threat – which includes the passive 
actions of an individual insider, such as the withdrawal 
of full effort from work tasks, as well as the unintentional 
behaviour of those around an insider which facilitates 
or tacitly condones the insider’s behaviour and 
consequently threatens or harms the organisation and/
or its members.
Importantly, the triggers of such actions can follow 
significant events for employees, such as dismissal, 
disputes with employers, personal family issues (health, 
marital issues), new job opportunities (headhunting) 
or training (Claycomb et al., 2012). At the same time, 
research suggests that specific events do not have to 
actually occur in order to trigger an insider threat; for 
example, poor general organisational climate can be 
sufficient to cause an attack (Nurse et al., 2014).
The thread inherent in all of these issues is often that 
something has changed for individuals which triggers 
new behaviour or perceptions, impacting on their 
working lives. CWB and insider attacks regularly occur, 
for instance, following perceptions and experiences of 
inequality and injustice (Colquitt et al., 2001) during 
which trust in the organisation is broken (Restubog et 
al., 2008), and where there is a climate of stress (Chen 
and Spector, 1992). These issues are particularly likely 
to occur during times of organisational change.
We explore the role of these triggers further below, 
starting first with an overview of the importance of 
trust to CWB and insider threat, and the impact of 
organisational change.
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2.2 TRUST, ORGANISATIONAL 
CHANGE AND ITS IMPACTS
Research demonstrates that organisations should be 
motivated to increase commitment, loyalty and trust 
among their staff (Rousseau, 1998). Linked to the 
same nomological net as organisational psychological 
attachment, are organisational commitment, 
organisational identity and organisational trust (Ng, 
2015). While often viewed as separate, harnessing 
their interrelationships is essential for organisations if 
they are to retain the skilled workers needed to navigate 
increasingly turbulent and mobile economies (Briscoe 
et al., 2012).
Trust is defined as a psychological state that creates 
the willingness to be vulnerable based on positive 
expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another 
party (Mayer et al., 1995; Nooteboom et al., 1997; 
Rousseau et al., 1998). Vulnerability arises as a function 
of (inter)dependence and risk in a given situation. 
Trust therefore involves a decision to accept the risks 
associated with this dependence, based on the positive 
expectation that the other party will act beneficially or 
at least not inflict harm (Boon and Holmes, 1991). It 
comprises affective, cognitive and behavioural elements 
(Dietz, 2011).
Research attests to the benefits of having staff with 
high levels of trust in their employer. Such staff are 
more committed and remain with the organisation 
for longer, work harder and more cooperatively, share 
knowledge and problem solve more effectively (e.g.,, 
Coyle-Shapiro et al., 2002; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012; 
Tremblay et al., 2010; Whitener, 2001). In addition, 
trust in the employer enhances high performance work 
practices by moderating the effects of HR practices on 
justice perceptions and feelings of commitment (Alfes 
et al., 2012).
Those who feel trusted by their managers are more 
likely to share their knowledge and expertise with others 
in their workgroups (Nerstad et al., 2017). By contrast, 
those who do not trust their employer are more likely 
to reduce the effectiveness of their work (Dirks and 
Ferrin, 2001), to engage in CWB, through obstruction 
or revenge (Bies and Tripp, 1996), or to simply decide 
to leave their organisation (Robinson, 1996).
Conceptualizations of organisational trust use a 
variety of referents including individuals (e.g., trust 
in one’s supervisor), groups (e.g., management), the 
organisation and inter-organisational relationships 
(e.g., suppliers) (see Schoorman et al., 2007). Trust in 
these different targets is conceptually and empirically 
distinct, with differing antecedents and consequences 
(Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012; Searle et al., in press; 
Zaheer et al., 1998). Trust in the organisation differs 
from interpersonal trust in terms of the referent and 
source(s) of confidence and vulnerability; there are 
also more diffuse risks associated with this kind of trust 
(Weibel et al., 2016). It concerns trust in a collective or a 
system, rather than a single person. It has been defined as 
‘an individual's expectation that some organized system 
will act with predictability and goodwill’ (Maguire 
and Phillips, 2008:372). In line with this, Giddens 
(1990:34) stresses that trust in organisations involves 
‘reliability and faith in the correctness of abstract 
principles’. Gillespie and Dietz (2009:128) propose 
that employees’ trust in their employing organisation 
is based on assessments of the organisation’s collective 
competencies and characteristics that enable it to 
reliably meet its goals and responsibilities (i.e., ability), 
combined with organisational actions that signal 
both genuine care and concern for the well-being of 
stakeholders and adherence to commonly accepted 
moral principles, such as honesty and fairness (i.e., 
intentions). Thus, employees' trust in the organisation 
is built on both competence based trust relating to 
expectations of ability, and affect based trust relating 
to expectations of care and respect (benevolence) and 
integrity behaviours (Colquitt et al., 2012; Searle et al., 
2011) .
Distrust, by contrast, is broadly concerned with the 
absence of confidence in others. It involves pervasive, 
negative suspicions regarding the motives, intentions 
and actions of others who are considered to be harmful 
or malicious in a way which implies little or no regard 
for the welfare of others (Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2015; 
Grovier, 1994). Initially distrust was conceptualised 
as antithetical to trust, with each occupying opposing 
ends of a single continuum (Bigley and Pearce, 1998); 
however, there is a growing consensus that distrust 
is distinct from trust (Lewicki et al., 1998; Saunders 
et al., 2014). Recent research has demonstrated that 
distrust represents a ‘tipping point’ which precludes 
the existence of trust altogether due to the pervasive 
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negative expectations associated with the other party 
(Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2015).
Those studying distrust have identified the importance 
of situational factors and institutional frameworks, such 
as culture, legalistic mechanisms (e.g., formal control 
or contract processes), networks, normative practices, 
socialisation and structural constraints (Shapiro, 1987; 
Schoorman et al., 1996; Wekselberg, 1996). These 
shape the agency between actors, forging prevailing 
norms of a culture legitimising and promoting either 
trust or distrust.
A significant difference between trust and distrust 
is the enduring quality of the latter’s impact (Searle 
and Ball, 2004). Some argue that distrust is a durable 
psychological characteristic (Hardin, 1993), while others 
contend that the impact of dispositional antecedents 
can reduce after gaining personal knowledge of others 
(Rotter, 1980). Attention towards trust has tended to 
focus on the rational cognitive elements (Lewicki and 
Bunker, 1996), with common dimensions including 
competence, integrity and benevolence (Mayer et al., 
1995).
Distrust, by contrast, is argued to be less rational in both 
its origins and consequences (Deutsch, 1973; Kramer, 
1994; 1998; 2004). Researchers have distinguished 
between a flexible, responsive and rational distrust, 
versus an inflexibility which is characterised by 
irrationality or paranoia (Kramer, 2004). Distrust 
creates hyper-attention on negative situations, such as 
the omissions and failures of direct supervisors, and 
thus could arguably be related to the psychological 
contract.
Critically, once established, distrust appears difficult for 
individuals to change (Gambetta, 1988). For example, 
staff who have experienced perceived contract violation 
(grounds for suspicion), and then are made redundant 
(confirmation of suspicion), can find themselves unable 
to trust their subsequent employers (Pugh et al., 2003).
Trust is therefore a fragile entity, yet few attend to its 
unravelling (Gillespie and Dietz, 2009; Lewicki and 
Brinsfield, 2017). Developments in trust research over 
the last twenty years, however, show organisational 
change can impact on trust which may be central to 
CWB (Kelloway et al., 2010; Fox et al., 2012). The 
next four sub-sections outline the key impacts of 
organisational change in this respect.
2.2.1 SENSEMAKING AND 
SENSEBREAKING
Employees’ identities are multifaceted and 
interconnected in relation to their employing 
organisations (Searle et al., in press). Change can affect 
or even threaten an individual’s identity by creating 
ambiguity about ‘who we are’ and ‘who we are going 
to be’ (Corley and Gioia, 2004). These experiences can 
jar with past identities to create a ‘sensebreak’ resulting 
in an intense disengagement from the organisation 
(Ashforth et al., 2014), and can therefore drive CWB 
(Aquino and Douglas, 2003). Such experiences then 
trigger powerful ongoing and substantive sensemaking 
processes (Maitlis and Sonenshein, 2010).
The process of sensemaking involves a search for 
possible explanations for these experiences and the 
desire to better understand the nature of the potential 
threat, before ultimately developing a positive or a 
negative stance towards it (Bartunek et al., 2011). 
These processes are cognitive coping mechanisms 
which reduce uncertainty (Gioia and Thomas, 1996). 
For some individuals there can be a particular defining 
event or ‘shock’ resulting in a discontinuous shift 
(Ballinger and Rockmann, 2010), while for others 
there might be a steady accrual of changes to reach a 
threshold which might not necessarily be so salient to 
other groups in the same organisation (Morgeson et al., 
2015).
At the heart of these experiences are surprises, 
unforeseen circumstances and contrasts between what 
is new and what was formally considered ‘normal’, 
initiating a conscious process of sensemaking (Louis, 
1980). Change causes unpredictability that can leave 
employees feeling that a situation is simply beyond 
their control (Gibson and Callister, 2010). It can be 
result in vulnerability which starts the sensemaking 
process (Maitlis and Sonenshein, 2010). Change can 
also involve previously ‘taken for granted’ trust in 
an employer becoming questioned, as a gulf widens 
between what trust was felt to be about before and how 
it appears to be now (Searle et al., 2016). Throughout 
these processes different sources and levels of 
vulnerability can emerge which cause shifts in both 
employee trust and distrust.
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2.2.2 PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT 
BREACH
A crucial way that trust is altered through change is in 
terms of the psychological contract. The psychological 
contract is a set of beliefs that guide how individuals 
understand the exchange arrangement between them 
and their employer (Rousseau, 1995; 2011). A breached 
commitment by either side can constitute a violation 
of the psychological contract, with many employees 
having to remain in the employment relationship 
regardless (Tomprou et al., 2015). The impact of these 
changes on trust can vary according to the type and 
level of change occurring (e.g., technological, structural 
and work role).
The types of change that are most likely to make 
trust salient are those which are characterised as 
novel, critical and disruptive (Morgeson, et al., 2015). 
Morgeson et al.’s (2015) model outlines how events 
can originate anywhere in a hierarchy but their effects 
can reach beyond that level and travel both within and 
outside of the organisation. Situations where contract 
breach is inevitable include downsizing (Skarlicki et 
al., 2008), or those involving large scale organisational 
change, such as restructuring in response to significant 
budget cuts (Conway et al., 2014). Extant evidence 
reveals that such violations create negative emotional 
responses, typically in the form of distress and anger 
(Robinson and Morrison, 2000). Often the level of 
perceived violation makes individuals feel unable to 
rely on the organisation afterward. Some employees 
in this situation adopt an approach-orientated strategy 
with problem-focused coping designed to resolve the 
contract discrepancy, and emotion-focused coping 
to resolve their own negative feelings (Tomprou et 
al., 2015). In contrast, those without the support and 
access to a ‘voice’ that would allow them to resolve 
their concerns (Holland et al., 2016) tend to pursue 
a strategy designed to avoid the stressor but which 
nevertheless creates negative emotions (Lazarus and 
Folkman, 1984). This latter strategy produces both 
cognitive and behavioural disengagement, including 
becoming cynical about the organisation (Pugh et 
al., 2003) and diverting attention into other non-
work activities (Tomprou et al., 2015). Studies show 
that employees’ values, notably their public service 
motivation, can play an important role in facilitating 
their acceptance of change (Wright et al., 2013).
Behavioural disengagement following organisational 
change includes strategies such as the withdrawal of 
discretionary effort; where possible, individuals often 
exit the organisation (Leana et al., 1998; Spreitzer 
and Mishra, 2002). At the core of these behavioural 
responses is a departure from previous work behaviour 
and a new directive to restore the lost equity caused 
by unfair treatment or to demonstrate the rejection 
of perceived unacceptable new working conditions 
(Withey and Cooper, 1989). Evidence shows that 
while strategies of avoidance rarely endure, they can 
have long term consequences for individuals and 
organisations. As a result of their experiences, people 
feel less obligated towards their employer (Eisenberger 
et al., 2001) and can become distrustful of current and 
future employers (Pugh et al., 2003). They are more 
likely to morally disengage, and behave in ways which 
cause the breakdown of their work relationships, such 
as undertaking revenge (see section 2.2. 4) or neglecting 
their work duties (Barclay et al., 2005; Restubog et al., 
2008). However, their actions can be finely calibrated 
and directed towards those they attribute as responsible 
for the situation. For example, a study of psychological 
breaches showed employees directed their retaliation 
by reducing their citizenship behaviour towards the 
organisation, while concurrently maintaining their 
commitment to co-workers and service users (Conway 
et al., 2014). The involvement of staff in major 
transitions can help ameliorate the negative impact of 
organisational change. For example, a large Australian 
study (Morgan and Zaffane, 2003) revealed that in 
addition to the type of change, the level of employee 
participation in change-making was a critical feature. 
Structural change was found to be the most corrosive 
for employees, with senior management playing a 
critical role, often with little direct consultation with 
staff.
2.2.3 INJUSTICE
The role of justice in the workplace is a dominant theme 
of organisational behaviour (Ambrose, 2002; Gelfand 
et al., 2007), with perceived injustice associated with 
organisational change (Smollan and Sayers, 2009) and 
considered a trigger of CWB (Fox et al., 2001). Over 
time, individuals who work together form a contextual 
and collective view of their organisation regarding 
justice that informs their subsequent attitudes, norms 
and deviant behaviours (Thornton and Rupp, 2016). 
Contexts with perceived injustice can provoke intense 
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reactions from individuals towards wrongdoing or 
perceived harm to another (Bies, 2005). As events 
themselves vary in duration and timing so too can 
their impact; events can also strengthen their perceived 
power as they are shared with others (Morgeson et al., 
2015). The sharing of events can give them renewed 
salience, changing their energy, even when the matter is 
resolved for the affected individual, their treatment can 
become a concern for others and affect how they view 
the organisation. Indeed, violations of employee trust 
can occur without an obvious infraction arising such 
as from an employee witnessing their colleague being 
poorly treated, even without them having been badly 
treated themselves (Searle et al., 2011). Thus breach can 
spill over to affect those not directly involved (Kim et 
al., 2004). Critically, in unjust contexts those with high 
moral identities have been found to be more sensitive 
and likely to respond to injustice through deviant 
behaviour as a means of correcting a perceived wrong 
(Thornton and Rupp, 2016). Extant research shows 
those with a high moral identity are more attentive to 
injustice (ibid), and are more likely to perceive employer 
information about organisational changes as untimely 
and inadequate (Skarlicki et al., 2008).
Two major forms of justice have been directly linked 
to CWB: distributive and procedural (Fox et al., 2001). 
Distributive justice is related to individuals’ perceptions 
concerning the fairness of outcomes relative to their 
contributions, compared to the contributions and 
outcomes of others. In contrast, procedural justice 
involves the fairness of the process used to make 
decisions (Folger and Greenberg, 1985; Levanthal et 
al., 1980). Fair procedures can strengthen relationships 
and play a key role in relationship repair mechanisms. 
Injustice in either the process or the outcome can result 
in the loss of trust in a supervisor who is perceived to be 
responsible for the injustice (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996), 
and trigger longer-term dysfunctional relationships 
and reduced future performance (Worthington and 
Drinkard, 2000). Therefore organisations with strong 
procedural justice climates can help channel and 
mitigate desires for revenge during change by instead 
creating a context of reconciliation and forgiveness 
(Andiappan and Treviño, 2010). For example, 
hallmarks of well-managed downsizing processes 
include transparent communications and fairly applied 
procedures, which can actually enhance trust in an 
employer (Hope-Hailey, et al., 2012). Studies show 
the enduring and pernicious impact of organisational 
mistreatment on people’s lives, regardless of whether 
employees stay in or leave the organisation concerned 
(Pugh, et al., 2003). Research suggests that all three 
forms of fairness – distributive (which concerns 
outcomes), procedural (which concerns the fairness of 
procedures) and interactional (which relates to fairness 
regarding interpersonal interactions and information) – 
are important in maintaining trust, but also the level 
of trust in top management, which can in turn affect 
the retention of remaining staff (Spreitzer and Mishra, 
2002).
2.2.4 REVENGE
Accordingly, organisational change can create a 
context for employees to undertake various forms 
of revenge (Skarlicki et al., 2008), which can have 
serious consequences for an organisation and its other 
employees. Revenge has been defined as an effort by 
an individual to inflict damage, injury, discomfort or 
punishment on a party judged responsible for causing 
harm (Aquino et al., 2001; 2006). Acts of revenge 
include theft, workplace aggression and employee 
sabotage (Barclay et al., 2014). Counter-retaliation 
can also occur as a result of revenge, extending and 
escalating the period and level of conflict (Kim and 
Smith, 1993). Central to the decision to seek redress 
is an attribution that another party is responsible for 
injustice and unfairness (Barclay et al., 2014; Gouldner, 
1960). For example, a study of an organisational 
downsizing process that had low levels of procedural 
justice revealed more negative actions from those 
who were told that their employer had tried to remove 
certain employees (dismiss condition) than for those 
who were told they had tried to retain certain staff 
(keep condition) (Brockner et al., 1995).
In understanding revenge behaviour, two further 
important factors have been found. The first concerns 
the prior perceived trustworthiness (integrity) of the 
employer, where those with low prior integrity are 
more likely to experience greater levels of retaliation 
(Skarlicki et al., 2008). These negative effects can be 
reduced through enhanced interactional justice in the 
form of timely and adequate explanations to staff; 
however, the impact of such information provision is 
mediated by its perceived sincerity (De Cremer and 
Tyler, 2007). A second factor concerns the moral 
identity of employees, which itself has two distinct 
functions. First, as noted above, moral identity can 
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impact on an individual’s sensitivity to violations of 
moral norms concerning how people should be treated 
(Thornton and Rupp, 2016). Such perceived treatment 
violates the right of staff to be treated with dignity, 
an important factor in positive self-regard (Rawls, 
1971). Disregarding such a norm can produce powerful 
reactions and motivate retaliation (Bies, 2001). Second, 
moral identity provides a motivational justification for 
individuals that allows those undertaking reprisals to 
disengage from their usual normative framework. Thus 
when individuals focus on issues which are important 
to them, their moral identity triggers revenge responses 
towards the wrongdoers (O’Reilly and Aquino, 2011).
Now that the main negative outcomes of organisational 
change in relation to the underpinning themes of trust 
and CWB have been outlined, the next section considers 
the specific individual, social and organisational 
level triggers of CWB, both generally and, where the 
evidence exists, during change.
2.3 TRIGGERS OF CWB: 
INDIVIDUAL FACTORS
2.3.1 PROPENSITY - TRAITS
Longstanding study of CWB has focused on the 
functionalist, trait-based approach, which contends 
that such deviance is an atypical form of behaviour, 
perpetrated by rogue outliers (bad apples) (Kish-
Gephart et al., 2010). Supporting this perspective, 
personality has been confirmed in meta-analysis as an 
antecedent for CWB (Dalal, 2005). Three personality 
dimensions are specifically associated with CWB, 
and these are collectively known as the ‘dark triad’: 
Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy 
(O'Boyle et al., 2012). Machiavellianism concerns a 
manipulative personality, while narcissism includes 
facets such as grandiosity, entitlement, dominance 
and superiority; psychopathy involves high impulsivity 
and thrill-seeking along with low empathy and anxiety 
(O'Boyle et al., 2012). Individuals with these traits 
may carry out CWB as a means of feeling powerful 
or to abuse their already powerful position (Popovich 
and Warren, 2010; Searle et al., 2017a). Research 
shows that organisational interventions can help reduce 
negative outcomes such as CWB or abusive supervision 
associated with these personality traits (Spain et al., 
2014). However, more recently there have been concerns 
about the overuse of these diagnoses, thereby allowing 
organisations to be absolved of their role in creating 
work experiences that perpetuate these traits (Fritzon et 
al., 2018). Similarly, attention has focused on detecting 
and deterring entry into employment of those with 
intentional self-gain motivations or malicious motives. 
There has been comparatively little consideration of 
the impact of change on such individuals, who may 
escalate their CWB if they perceive that the turbulence 
wrought by change might reduce the detection of their 
behaviours.
Further, extant research indicates two of the ‘big-
5’ personality factors are associated with CWB - 
conscientiousness and agreeableness. Synthesis using 
meta-analysis found low conscientiousness as the best 
predictor of CWB such as theft, disciplinary problems, 
drug and substance abuse, damage to property, breach of 
organisational rules and other irresponsible behaviours 
(Salgado, 2002). Further work has dichotomised the 
relationship between personality and actions targeting 
either the individual (CWB-I) or the organisation 
(CWB-O). At an interpersonal level this study found 
direct inverse relations with agreeableness (e.g., 
good natured, cooperative, and trusting), while at the 
organisational level (CWB-O) there was a relationship 
with low conscientiousness (e.g.,, responsible, 
dependable, and achievement oriented) (Mount et 
al., 2006). It is noteworthy that a weak relationship 
was found between CWB and low emotional stability 
(e.g., those who are tense, nervous and highly strung), 
but that further investigation showed that emotional 
stability adds no further significance beyond that found 
for conscientiousness and agreeableness (Bowling and 
Eschleman, 2010). Other studies have revealed how an 
antecedent of CWB, namely managers’ disconfirming 
communication, has a particularly enduring negative 
impact on those with low emotional stability (Sniderman 
et al., 2016). This is an area for further research in 
the context of CWB. However, while personality 
dimensions are shown to be important in contributing 
to CWB and insider threat, other contextual factors 
including organisational culture significantly moderate 
their impact (O'Boyle et al., 2012).
2.3.2 MORAL IDENTITY AND 
DISENGAGEMENT
Aside from personality, a further individual-level 
factor is moral identity, which includes a disposition 
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to care deeply and be motivated to be moral and 
behave ethically (Aquino and Reed, 2002). Factors 
associated with moral identity include cognitive moral 
development, idealism, moral empathetic concern and 
guilt, as well as personality traits including honesty-
humility, conscientiousness and agreeableness (Detert 
et al., 2008; Egan et al., 2015; Johnson and Buckley, 
2015; Moore et al., 2012; Ogunfowora and Bourdage, 
2014). In contrast, the disposition to morally disengage 
has positive associations with Machiavellianism, 
external locus of control, trait cynicism, and moral 
relativism. Research indicates that this desire to 
ensure good behaviour (and also because dishonest 
behaviour motivates self-censure), people refrain 
from intentionally behaving in ways that violate their 
moral standards (Bandura, 1990; Bandura et al., 1996). 
However, there can be situations in which individuals 
deviate from their previously impeccable moral track 
records, becoming more susceptible to immoral actions 
(Merritt et al., 2010; Monin and Miller, 2001). In 
such circumstances, the usual self-sanctions become 
deactivated or weakened through cognitive processes 
(Bandura, 1991:71). To protect themselves, individuals 
try to minimise the gap by separating their moral 
standards from their real actions (Shu et al., 2011). The 
resolve to behave ethically can also be weakened by 
adverse emotional responses that arise from working in 
a high-stress context (Fida et al., 2015), which we will 
discuss further in a later section on self-regulation.
2.3.2.1 Mechanisms of moral 
disengagement
Three categories of moral disengagement mechanisms 
have been identified: i.) cognitive reconstruction 
of events; ii.) efforts to minimise the perpetrator’s 
agency; or iii.) focusing on changing the target 
(Bandura 1991; 1996; 1999; 2001). First, cognitive 
reconstruction of events includes moral justification, 
which comprises the reframing of immoral behaviours 
as defensible, through reducing obstacles of cognitive 
dissonance or anticipated guilt of unethical behaviour; 
euphemistic labelling, which includes obscuring 
reprehensible actions or re-labelling them to confer 
a more respectable status, for example civilians are 
not ‘killed’, rather bombs cause ‘collateral damage’ 
(Moore, 2015); and advantageous comparison, which 
builds on Festinger’s (1957) work to use a point of 
comparison which enables the perpetrator to appear 
less negative. The second category concerns efforts to 
minimise one’s role in harmful behaviour and includes 
displacing responsibility onto other parties; diffusing 
responsibility, such as through the use of bureaucracy, 
anonymity or devolving responsibility to a group as a 
means of minimizing moral agency of an individual; 
and distorting or disregarding the actual consequences 
of these unethical actions in order to weaken reactions 
that would deter an individual. The final set of 
mechanisms seeks to alleviate wrongdoing, either by 
dehumanising those targeted, for example implying they 
are a different and inferior category, or by attributing the 
blame of the unethical action on to the target. Through 
the use of such mechanisms situations are cognitively 
reconstituted to allow the perpetrator’s behaviour to 
no longer be subject to self-sanction. Studies show 
the clear relationship between moral disengagement 
and immoral behaviour: the more individuals morally 
disengage, the more likely they are to behave immorally 
(Aquino et al., 2007; Beu and Buckley, 2004; Detert, et 
al., 2008; Pelton, et al., 2004). The context of change, 
intertwined as it is with psychological contract breach, 
perceived injustice and revenge, presents a prime 
context for moral disengagement.
2.3.3 SELF-REGULATION AND EGO-
DEPLETION
An individual’s ability to actively inhibit negative 
behaviour draws on limited and exhaustible resources; 
the ability to manage behaviour and maintain good 
actions can become overwhelmed (Baumeister et al., 
1998). The ego-depletion perspective highlights how an 
environment can have an insidious accumulative impact 
to overwhelm and erode an individual’s good intentions. 
Extant research shows that a range of situations can 
cause dynamic degradation to self-regulation. This 
includes continuous efforts at self-control, such as in 
the vigilance required to control temptation (Muraven 
and Baumeister, 2000); responding to high levels of 
stress (Fida et al., 2015; Fox et al., 2001), with a study 
of CWB in health professionals showing how over time 
stressful work contexts can overwhelm supervisors 
to produce uncharacteristic theft behaviour (Searle 
et al., 2017a); efforts to regulate negative emotions 
(Kiefer and Barclay, 2012); or in response to poor sleep 
quality (Spector et al., 2006). The resultant emotional 
exhaustion leads to CWB through depersonalisation 
and dis-identification (Bolton et al., 2012), or from a 
process of moral disengagement (Fida, et al., 2015). 
Importantly these declines in self-regulation are found 
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to be far lower for individuals with high job satisfaction 
(Andreoli and Lefkowitz, 2009). Further, although this 
ego-depletion effect is not universal, it emerges as a 
byproduct of some individuals’ diminished ability to 
self-manage and inhabit negative responses, it is likely 
to have consequences for others in the workplace 
(Robinson et al., 2014) (see social processes section).
2.3.4 THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS
Until recently emotions had received relatively little 
attention in terms of their interplay with sensemaking, 
attitudes and behaviours, especially during threatening 
situations (see Maitlis and Christianson, 2014). 
Indeed, earlier scholars contend that emotions were 
an impediment to sensemaking (Weick, 1990; 1995), 
but more recent work has started to see them as 
important triggers to cognition (Maitlis et al., 2013). 
For example, emotions are a central component in 
directing current and future attention and can influence 
individuals’ subsequent attitudes and reactions 
(Fineman, 1993). They can affect whether individuals 
in the same context feel exhausted and overwhelmed, 
or have a sense of accomplishment (Zellars et al., 
2004). They can determine whether employees show 
cooperative behaviours, performing tasks to help 
others and the organisation, or instead withdraw or 
act counterproductively (Barclay and Kiefer, 2014). 
Therefore it is important to recognise that emotions 
do not just function as a communication device in 
social relationships, but also characterize and inform 
experiences of organisational processes, such as where 
they are considered just or unjust (Barclay et al., 
2005). Critically, emotional reactions can form a ‘hot’ 
antecedent that leads to impulsive forms of CWB (Fox 
et al., 2001; Spector and Fox, 2010).
Especially strong negative or positive emotions can 
be a catalyst behind employees’ struggles to find 
an explanation for their new situations. Generally, 
however, negative experiences have a greater and more 
enduring impact on individuals than positive ones 
(Baumeister et al., 2001; Fredrickson and Branigan, 
2005). Negative emotions are found to constrain 
and narrow thinking, causing individuals to focus 
on identifying and managing the perceived threat, 
thus making it more salient and easily recalled. By 
contrast, positive emotions appear more diffuse in 
function, enabling individuals to relax and have greater 
capacity for creativity in their problem-solving, coping, 
sensemaking and relating to others (Fredrickson, 2013). 
Negative emotions can be a significant precursor, both 
to alert an individual that sensemaking is now required, 
but also to provide the energy necessary to undertake 
the cognitive processes involved to lead to CWB (Fida 
et al., 2015). For example, Steigenberger contends that 
those experiencing both fear and anxiety are likely 
to show avoidance behaviour, while simultaneous 
feelings of hope and anger result in decisive actions. 
Emotions mark the end of a sensemaking episode, 
denoted by coherence between the felt emotions and 
the new plausible explanation of the situation (Maitlis 
et al., 2013). The process of sensemaking itself is also 
likely to involve powerful and often negative emotions 
(Maitlis and Christianson, 2014).
More attention needs to be paid towards understanding 
the differences in the types of emotions individuals 
generate to reveal why some employees experience 
organisational change as a source of new opportunities 
and challenges, and others regard the same experience 
as placing substantial threats or undue demands onto 
them (Cartwright and Holmes, 2006). For instance, 
studies show how personality traits such as anxiety, 
when combined with felt emotions (in this case 
anger), can be antecedents for CWB (Spielberger 
and Sydeman, 1994). Recent research looking at the 
impact of organisational change on employees has 
differentiated seven types with distinct emotions and 
cognitions (Searle et al., 2017b). Searle et al., (2017b) 
explain that one group in a cohesive team whose 
leaders sought to engage them in the process showed 
relatively little effect on trust, while two other groups 
were relatively limited in their attention, by either 
not being alert to what was happening to gather more 
information, or through being resigned and without the 
energy to engage. In a further group of three, however, 
concerns were salient but confined to a specific area 
of concern, such as trust in the leaders at the top, or 
regarding the shifts in identity required for some roles. 
In contrast, the last group had a distinct and completely 
negative tone, characterised by a pervasive distrust that 
adversely affected all their relations. These distrusters 
appeared to be exercised about how the change had 
affected their personal goals.
There are particular challenges to studying emotions 
which have caused more attention to be given to distinct 
and negative emotions rather than towards multiple 
and differently valenced emotions (Briner and Kiefer, 
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2005). This is especially true of single-toned negative 
emotions, such as anger, rather than positive or mixed 
emotions (e.g., Giner-Sorolla, 2013; Kiefer 2005). The 
most frequently examined emotions in the context of 
change have been discrete negative emotions, such as 
anger and frustration (e.g., Morrison and Robinson, 
1997; Zhao et al., 2007; Lindebaum and Gabriel, 
2016). Such work has been important, for example 
revealing anger to be an intense short-term emotion, 
and distinct from the withdrawal emotion of contempt. 
Anger has further been linked to active engagement 
connected with raised levels of concern (Folkman and 
Lazarus, 1985; Giner-Sorolla, 2013), and has also been 
linked to distrust (Jones and George, 1998). However, 
it has increasingly been recognised that emotions have 
a dynamic quality, making it therefore important to 
understand patterns in their progression from one 
type to another. For example, longstanding work 
has identified the evolution of frustration into anger 
(Dollard et al., 1939), and its subsequent development 
into contempt (Fischer and Roseman, 2007).
Furthermore, the role that a particular context might 
play in an individual’s emotional reactions is another 
relevant factor. Studies of CWB have found a significant 
relationship between stress and emotion. Critically, 
CWB is emerging as a behavioural response to strain, 
helping the individual manage a stressful situation and 
reducing their consequent negative emotions which 
threatens the organisation and its members’ well-
being while also reducing effectiveness (Spector and 
Fox, 2005). For example, further study of job stress 
shows how CWB arises in response to feelings of 
frustration at the organisation, which can build from 
disruption to the individual’s job activities, work goals 
and/or job performance (Fida et al., 2014). Similarly, 
experiences of anger are particularly important in the 
targeting of specific individuals within an organisation 
(Fox and Spector, 1999). Negative outward emotions 
are associated with hostility, which itself arises from 
exposure to experiences such as unfairness, and these 
emotions are thought to be distinct from behaviour 
associated with inward-focused emotions such as 
guilt or shame (Barclay et al., 2005). Provocative 
situations however, can vary in their impact, with those 
demonstrating high-trait anger more likely to respond 
with physical and verbal antagonism. Such individuals 
are also revealed to have lower constructive coping 
capacities (Deffenbacher, 1992). These variations in 
individual emotional response and coping capacity 
underlines the complexity behind employees’ responses 
to organisational change.
2.3.5 CHANGE APPRAISAL
Indeed, work focusing on the impact of change has 
shown that individuals’ appraisal of a stressful situation 
varies but can also change over time due to their 
perceived sense of control (Fox et al., 2001). Extant 
research shows that there is no single generic impact, 
only differences in individuals’ change trajectories 
(Solinger et al., 2013; Solinger, et al., 2015). These vary 
in part due to differences in change orientation (Fugate 
et al., 2008). For example, studies of the relationship 
between emotions and such appraisals reveal reciprocal 
relationships: those with a positive orientation towards 
change will have a positive appraisal and positive 
emotions, while the reverse assessment is associated 
with a negative appraisal and negative emotions 
(Fugate et al., 2011). Those with negative appraisals of 
change see themselves as less able to control events and 
therefore as having less of an ability to cope. Therefore, 
perceived control emerges as a significant antecedent of 
CWB, with those who feel they have lost control over 
their working lives acting in a more deleterious and 
damaging manner than others (Allen and Greenberger, 
1980). Further, individuals who do not feel in control 
are likely to fail to actively engage with change, instead 
resorting to an escape coping strategy by hoping the 
situation will simply pass and they can return to their 
previous state (Takeuchi et al., 2002). Thus their 
capacity to cope with change becomes undermined and 
a downward spiral is created; for example, those with 
negative appraisals also have negative emotions which 
have been found to predict both their level of sickness 
absence and their decision to exit (Fugate et al., 2012).
In contrast, a study on how to enhance the effectiveness 
of change has explored the use of organisational 
inducements and employee psychological resilience 
(Shin et al., 2012): both factors were found to be 
positively related to employees' commitment to change. 
Critically, those with a positive attitude towards change 
have a more positive set of associations towards change, 
which influences their subsequent appraisal of the 
changes they face. New models of individual responses 
towards change therefore differentiate between their 
primary appraisal processes, which focus on the 
congruence and resonance of goals, and a secondary 
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appraisal focused on their perceptions of their ability to 
cope (Oreg et al., 2018) (see Figure 2.3 above).
2.3.5.1 Resistance to change
Studies about change position those with negative 
responses to change as resistant to it (Bryant and 
Higgins, 2010). Resistance to change is defined as ‘A 
phenomenon that affects the change process, delaying 
or slowing down its beginning, obstructing or hindering 
its implementation’ (del Val and Fuentes, 2003: 148–
9). Resistance is therefore a means of maintaining the 
status quo and perceived as a form of organisational 
deviance. Such individuals alter their perceptions of 
important personal or organisational norms to allow 
themselves to maintain a consistent and more positive 
perspective of their own actions, thereby failing to 
regard themselves as being deviant. This positioning 
of such individuals as being deviant is particularly 
relevant when analysing a form of organisational 
change that ‘interrupts normal patterns of organisation 
and calls for participants to enact new patterns’ (Ford 
et al., 2008: 363). Situations of change, however, rarely 
include all the information, and therefore the resulting 
ambiguity or incomplete information can exacerbate 
stress, triggering further negative threat appraisals 
(Fugate et al., 2012).
Research into employee experiences of large scale 
change highlights the critical importance of how 
the organisation communicates and manages these 
transition processes. For example, a study showed that 
altering employees’ perceived control and autonomy 
during a cost-cutting change could ameliorate some 
of the negative consequences (Kiefer et al., 2015). 
Specifically, where change was introduced as being 
innovative, rather than merely cost cutting, its impact 
was not only less negative, but actually enhanced 
employees’ job satisfaction, well-being and work 
engagement over time. This study, among others (see 
Hope-Hailey et al., 2012), attests that even when the 
changes introduced have negative consequences, such 
as reducing costs and causing redundancy, if they 
are done in a way that involves employees, ensuring 
procedural and informational fairness, then they will 
be better received and have more positive outcomes.
2.3.6 INDIVIDUALS WITH AUTISTIC 
SPECTRUM DISORDER (ASD)
A critical difference that can affect an individual’s 
orientation towards and capacity to cope with change 
is Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD), also known as 
neurodiversity. Neurodiversity concerns a range of 
individual differences including autistic spectrum, 
dyslexia, dyspraxia and attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder. These conditions affect how people perceive 
and interact with the world around them. It is commonly 
accepted that those drawn to working in certain sectors, 
including maths, science and technology, have an 
aptitude for understanding and analysing predictable 
rule based systems (Ruzich et al., 2015). However, there 
Fig. 2.3 - Change Appraisal (Oreg et al., 2018)
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is a growing body of evidence that many of those with 
such aptitudes and preferences display characteristics 
associated with the autistic spectrum, especially 
Asperger’s Syndrome (AS) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; 
Billington, et al., 2007). These include individuals 
who can be crudely characterised as highly intelligent, 
socially awkward, having a narrow foci of interest 
which can be obsessive and those with communication 
problems stemming from an inability to relate to 
and empathise with others and to understand others’ 
intentions and feelings (National Autistic Society, 
2018). They can also have specific skills such as pattern 
recognition, memory and mathematics, but can find the 
stimuli of workplace noise and lighting overwhelming 
and are particularly intolerant of uncertainty (Austin 
and Pisano, 2017). Those with neurodiversity, and 
specifically Asperger’s Syndrome (AS), prefer routines 
and habitual activities that can make them resistant to 
and inflexible towards change (Fitzgerald and Corvin, 
2001).
Crucial to the successful employment and positive 
engagement of such workers is a focus on getting to 
know each individual well so that their particular 
vulnerabilities can be better managed (Austin and 
Pisano, 2017). For example, autistic people can be 
brutally honest about their own and others’ weaknesses. 
They can find it difficult to cope with unexpected and 
uncontrollable events which deviate from the goals 
they have, and to adhere to new processes when they 
simply do not understand why they have been changed.
Late adult diagnosis of AS has also been related to 
higher levels of mental health issues, specifically with 
depression and heightened suicidal tendencies (Cassidy 
et al., 2014). The stress associated with managing 
depression, and the secondary depression that arises 
from social isolation and feelings of exclusion and 
low self-esteem, appear to be contributing factors to 
such suicidal tendencies. Such findings suggest that 
greater attention should be devoted to diagnosis to help 
support such employees. In diverse workplaces, there 
could be considerable value in providing co-workers 
and managers with additional training, including using 
support circles and coaching that extends from work to 
include personal lives (Austin and Pisano, 2017).
In relation to insider threat activities, there is 
limited research into how ASD affects individuals’ 
behaviour. However, some studies of deviant behaviour 
demonstrate an important difference from that found 
in ‘neurotypical’ populations. For example, a study 
of computer science students showed that those on 
the autistic spectrum were more likely to steal others’ 
identities, to undertake cyberbullying, to write viruses 
and to be hackers (Seigfried-Spellar et al., 2015). 
It suggests that moral engagement may be different 
for such individuals; however, much more focused 
empirical research is required to investigate more 
precisely the role of neurodiversity in CWB and insider 
threat activities.
2.4 TRIGGERS OF CWB: 
SOCIAL FACTORS
The above section outlines the complex individual 
factors which can affect how an individual experiences 
and reacts to organisational change. In this next section 
we explore important social factors which should also 
be considered in any study of stable or change-related 
workplace behaviour.
2.4.1 WORKPLACE INTERACTIONS: 
SOCIAL LEARNING
Evidence suggests that individuals who demonstrate 
insider threat might not be identified as deviant or 
malicious people with little moral knowledge or self-
sanctioning capacity at recruitment stage. Instead, 
it is important to recognise how previously positive 
employees can become disillusioned and cynical 
through their increasingly negative perceptions and 
experiences of colleagues, managers or the organisation 
as a whole. Meta-analytic study of colleague 
relationships shows their importance in terms of work 
perceptions, attitudes, performance and withdrawal 
(Chiaburu and Harrison, 2008). Chiaburu and Harrison 
(2008) found that both supportive and antagonistic peer 
relationships have distinct impacts on an employee over 
and above that of leaders. These can vary as a result of 
the emotional, content and social intensity of the work 
context.
As social animals, it is through our group memberships 
that we connect with more abstract entities such as our 
employing organisation. Studies of social learning show 
how social norms become altered for the worse after 
witnessing others’ unethical behaviours particularly 
where an individual identifies with those in the 
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unethical group (Cialdini and Trost, 1998). This type of 
learning is shown to have two components: descriptive 
norms, which involves the identification of what most 
people do in particular situations, and injunctive norms, 
which indicate the specific behaviours that most people 
endorse or reject (ibid). For example, Wenzel’s (2004) 
work on tax compliance found lower deductions were 
made in tax returns only when there was identification 
with the particular social group that appeared in the 
information provided. Thus, professionals can become 
corrupted from their exposure to other professionals’ 
unethical behaviour (Welsh et al., 2015). There are 
three possible ways in which individuals can acquire 
such social learning: through direct exposure as a 
target of CWB; from vicariously observing others’ 
CWB actions; and ambiently, by virtue of working in 
organisations characterised by the collective deviance 
of colleagues (Robinson et al., 2014). The impact of 
such different forms of exposure has yet to be fully 
empirically tested.
2.4.1.1 Social networks and processes
Social networks are accordingly important influences 
on individuals for good and ill. First, they can alter the 
cognitive process of sensemaking, as the framing and 
reframing of meanings is influenced by interactions 
with others who share their interpretations and frames 
of reference (Thornton and Rupp, 2016). Through 
these shared social processes, a group consensus 
emerges which extends to include moral identities 
and perceptions of justice, both of which are known 
to be important for CWB (Thornton and Rupp, 2016). 
A second key impact of social processes is to alter 
individual behaviour by initiating individuals into 
wrongdoing (Palmer and Moore, 2016) by adversely 
influencing their ethical behaviour (Kaptein, 2011). 
Through processes of socialisation, individuals acquire 
shared norms, values and exemplars of behaviour 
(Schein, 2009). These shared backgrounds and 
experiences, produce shared perspectives (Thornton 
and Rupp, 2016). Groups provide examples of traits or 
characteristics to emulate (Knoll et al., 2017), which 
can alter norms changing individuals’ behaviours 
(Felps et al., 2006; Jurkiewicz and Giacalone, 2016). 
Further, the relative position and relational closeness 
to such exemplars impedes individuals’ willingness 
to report a significant other’s wrongdoing (Miller and 
Thomas, 2005). Where the decline in behaviour occurs 
over a long period, rather than through a single event, 
those around them may simply fail to detect it; in this 
way, progressive decline often goes unnoticed (Gino 
and Bazerman, 2009).
Such is the power of these social influences, even 
those without the aforementioned traits or intentions 
can start to behave unethically (Moore and Gino, 
2013). For example, a classic psychological study 
(Asch, 1951) shows how individuals conform to group 
pressures in order to fit in (normative influence) and 
can doubt their own individual judgment in favour of 
the collective judgment, even when they perceive this 
collective judgement to be wrong. As social animals 
the pressure to maintain membership of a significant 
group reduces cognitive efficiency, making the quality 
of group decision-making more lax (Janis, 1972). 
Mechanisms, including high social cohesion, can 
undermine ethical decisions and objective analysis. 
Thus, instead of individuals opposing and reporting 
wrongdoing, they stay silent or even undertake the 
same unethical actions themselves. This was evident in 
the case of the 2001 Enron scandal where a number 
of executives deliberately misled the board of directors 
and audit committee, but also pressured independent 
auditors not to report their CWB (Tourish and Vatcha, 
2005).
2.4.1.2 Whistleblowing
Thus, when employees recognise wrongdoing in an 
organisation, they are presented with three decisions: 
remain silent (or even engage in the behaviour 
themselves), voice discontent (i.e., blow the whistle) 
or exit the organisation (Mesmer-Magnus and 
Viswesvaran, 2005). Whistleblowing has been defined 
as the ‘disclosure by organisation members (former or 
current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices 
under the control of their employers, to persons or 
organisations that may be able to effect action’ (Near 
and Miceli, 1985:4). Factors influencing the decision 
to speak out include demographics (age, sex, level 
of education, higher-level or supervisory role, long 
tenure); personality variables (locus of control); high 
moral reasoning and morality (ethical judgements); and 
other characteristics (high organisational commitment, 
good job performance, and valuing whistleblowing 
above unethical behaviour) (Brabeck, 1984; Miceli 
and Near, 1984; Near and Miceli, 1996; Sims and 
Keenan, 1998). For example, those with long tenure 
may prefer to voice their discontent rather than exit 
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the organisation because they feel they have an ability 
to effect change and prevent further wrongdoing 
(French and Raven, 1959). Individuals exposing 
organisational wrongdoing risk retaliation not only by 
their organisation (through job loss, decreased quality 
of working conditions or demotion), but also from the 
public (character assassinations). Therefore it is not 
surprising that contextual variables can moderate these 
decisions, particularly peer support, organisational 
size and climate, and the threat of retaliation. At the 
core of this decision-making is the perception of top 
management support and the choice of reporting 
channel (internal vs external) (Miceli and Near, 1992; 
2002). In line with social exchange theory (Thibaut 
and Kelley, 1959), where there are higher levels of 
supervisory and co-worker support, internal reporting 
appears less threatening.
2.4.2 ROLE OF LEADERS
Leaders provide critical role models of how to behave, 
but their actions can also be triggers for CWB. Leaders’ 
behaviour is important in shaping the trust their staff 
have in them personally (Legood et al., 2016) and also 
influences the trust individuals have in their wider 
organisation (Windisch et al., 2017). Leaders can build 
trust with their followers by providing information, and 
thereby making themselves vulnerable to their staff and 
modelling trust by making the first move – this creates 
the basis for staff trust in them (Colquitt and Rodell, 
2012). As such, it can be through trusting followers that 
leaders build trust (Nerstad et al., 2017).
The actions of leaders can positively influence the 
actions of those who follow them, but they can also 
skew them towards nefarious activities (Knoll et al., 
2017). A classic psychological study (Milgram, 1965) 
shows how individuals undertake deviant behaviour 
to try to please and appease an authority figure. A 
further reason for this is that senior managers possess 
important means of directing and rewarding others’ 
actions; their organisational positions give them the 
power to reward and punish particular activities (French 
and Raven, 1959; Miller and Thomas, 2005). Powerful 
leaders can influence an individual’s decision to report 
a superior’s wrongdoing through either reducing 
or escalating fears for job security, which would 
be at stake for non-compliance (Modic, 1987). For 
example, attention has been devoted to what happens 
in toxic working environments when organisational 
leaders are unethical people who then corrupt and 
lead astray easily influenced followers (Padilla et al., 
2007; Fischbacher-Smith, 2015). The reporting of 
wrongdoing can itself create a conflict (Chonko and 
Burnett, 1983), with many employees choosing to be 
socially compliant and follow their local leader, rather 
than reporting an unethical act (Miller and Thomas, 
2005). The perceived organisational knowledge of a 
leader and the legitimacy of their position of authority 
also creates uncertainty as to whether the unethical act 
was actually acceptable behaviour (Greenberger et al., 
1987). Thus, corrupt leaders can cause real dilemmas 
for followers. Distrust in leaders can be a catalyst for 
organisational disengagement (Windisch et al., 2017), 
and conceptually argued to be an antecedent for insider 
threat (Fischbacher-Smith, 2015).
Leaders can however play a positive role in helping 
their followers make sense of and adjust to new 
experiences (Browning and McNamee, 2012). During 
times of change, senior management can positively 
influence employee commitment (Lok and Crawford, 
1999; Trevino et al., 2000), and help defuse employee 
cynicism about change (Johnson and O'Leary‐Kelly, 
2003). Other studies highlight the critical role of 
leaders in the successful implementation of change, 
with employees’ intentions to resist change positively 
related to leaders’ dispositional resistance to change, 
and negatively related to leaders’ openness to change 
and transformational style (Oreg and Berson, 2011). 
Leaders play a pivotal role in how employees view 
their experiences, by for example reframing the official 
company version of a lay-off more or less positively 
(Bean and Hamilton, 2006). One study used trust as a 
mediator to explore the antecedents and consequences 
of public sector employee trust in top management 
(Albrecht and Travaglione, 2003). Using data from two 
public sector organisations, the team again confirmed 
the importance of procedural fairness, but alongside 
organisational support, effective communication 
and job security in the retention of trust. Trust in top 
management was found to be a partial rather than a full, 
mediator. Other studies have found line managers to be 
particularly influential in all facets of an individual’s 
working experience (Nerstad et al., 2017).
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2.5 TRIGGERS OF CWB: 
ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS
While local groups and teams in organisations can 
influence the nature of individual and collective 
workplace attitudes and behaviour, wider organisational 
level factors are also influential and can act as triggers 
of CWB. Many of these factors arise during periods of 
organisational change and are closely related to issues 
of trust.
2.5.1 HR SYSTEMS
The most important systems which impact on 
employees at work are Human Resource Management 
(HRM) systems. HRM systems are one of the most 
influential areas of an organisation’s policy and practice 
for trust (Searle, 2018). HRM policy involves the 
operationalization of strategic interventions focused 
on human capital, designed to identify and develop 
resourceful employees. Organisational development is 
an important component of HRM.
Trust implicitly permeates HRM in three key ways. 
First, the strategic policy choices of an organisation 
offer clues and signals of its trustworthiness towards 
both employees and external stakeholders. These 
clues can be discerned from a plethora of decisions, 
including the type of work contracts selected (Reilly, 
1998) through to the approach taken in recognising 
and rewarding different groups and levels of employee. 
Such decisions are often made by senior managers, who 
have an important role in influencing both employee 
trust and organisational commitment (Farndale and 
Kelliher, 2013). Second, trust stems from how these 
policies are implemented, not only by HR professionals 
but increasingly by line managers to whom they 
have devolved responsibility for their day-to-day 
implementation (Searle, 2013). It is the fairness of such 
implementation that is critical (Searle et al., 2011).
One of the most regular HR processes that employees 
experience is performance management, which is 
underutilised in the management of successful change. 
As with other HR policies, trust here is related to the 
quality of the system itself and its execution. The 
perceived fairness and accuracy of the line managers’ 
assessment is critical (Fulk, et al., 1985). As performance 
management includes distinct components of goal 
setting, collecting and evaluating evidence about past 
performance, provision of feedback and the quality of 
the performance review (Bragger et al., 2014), it is an 
important means of reducing employee uncertainty (De 
Cremer et al., 2010). However, in a context of change, 
it can be a critical tool for discussing the new direction 
required and demonstrating direct and ongoing support 
for any required transformation. Third, trust can be 
undermined through inconsistencies that emerge from 
outsourced HR policies, such as payroll or recruitment 
(Cooke et al., 2005), but also increasingly through the 
use of change project managers who do not remain in 
the organisation and so cannot be held accountable for 
any promises made. Trust is breached as a consequence 
of intra-organisational variations (Gould-Williams and 
Davies, 2005).
HRM policy can be viewed in terms of an employment 
journey which influences the dynamics of trust in 
that employer (Searle and Skinner, 2011). Employee 
experiences of change are often defining experiences, 
and have the potential to carry over into subsequent 
employment relationships (Pugh et al., 2003). Early 
employment experiences appear to be particularly 
crucial in setting initial expectations (psychological 
contract) to form the basis of employees’ subsequent 
trust and affective, cognitive and behavioural responses 
to employers (Robinson, 1996). As noted earlier, the 
breach of these ‘mutual obligations’ (Robinson and 
Rousseau, 1994), is often a central trigger for how and 
why change can lead to CWB. There is considerable 
attention given to early employment experiences, 
but little focus on post-violation impact or recovery 
(Tomprou et al., 2015). This omission is important: 
we require a more nuanced understanding about 
whether there is a particular impact of organisational 
change on longstanding employees, who through 
pension considerations are often less flexible in their 
ability to exit their organisation. This group are often 
previously loyal and committed employees, but they 
may experience the consequences of change differently.
2.5.2 CULTURE AND ORGANISATIONAL 
CONTROLS
Different organisational groups may also be more 
or less affected by certain elements and changes to 
organisational culture and controls. Organisational 
culture refers to the practices (both formal and informal) 
which are both routine and meaningful to organisational 
members. It includes the norms and expected behaviours 
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of staff and the values an organisation advocates for 
or represents. All of these aspects help create shared 
experiences and beliefs among organisational members 
(McAleese, 2010; Mumby, 1988; Schein, 2004). 
Culture is usually created over a long period of time, 
meaning that changes to organisational culture may go 
unnoticed by many employees, or be most acutely felt 
by long-serving employees.
Messages regarding appropriate and inappropriate 
behaviour are communicated by the organisation’s 
ethical culture to employees via the interplay of formal 
and informal systems of behavioural control (Treviño 
et al., 1998). Formal systems (such as reward systems, 
company policies, codes of ethics and selection systems) 
tend to be under the direct control of organisational 
decision-makers, whereas informal systems describe 
the way things are in the organisation as transmitted 
through behavioural norms, rituals, stories, and 
language (Weibel, et al., 2016). When organisational 
members perceive that expectations are communicated 
effectively by formal and informal systems, the 
organisation’s ethical culture is considered strong and 
employees are likely to abide by the clear and consistent 
messages about behavioural expectations. When these 
messages are seen as conflicting, the ethical culture is 
deemed weaker (Trevino and Youngblood, 1990).
Structural assurance within an organisation helps to 
ensure that conditions are safe and fair (Shapiro 1987; 
Wilson et al., 2008). Such conditions include contracts, 
guarantees, regulations, standard processes and 
technological features (McKnight et al., 1998). They 
can also include four different types of internal controls 
(Weibel et al., 2016): input controls, which determine 
who enters the organisation; process controls, which 
determine how things are done; output controls, which 
involve the final goals; and the use of sanctions and 
punishments to punish wrong-doers and deter others. 
For example, in a resource-constrained organisation the 
use of input controls (in the form of screening and non-
selection of low conscientiousness and high emotional 
instability) would reduce the need for in-employment 
monitoring of this group, who are less effective in 
their handling of stress (Bowling and Eschleman, 
2010). Whilst structural assurances seek to handle 
problematic scenarios (Wilson et al., 2008), individual 
responses to change, unfair treatment or inequality are 
commonly accompanied by negative emotions, such as 
anger, outrage and resentment (Folger, 1994), which 
are shown to be a tipping point towards CWB (Fida 
et al., 2015; Fox et al., 2001) but cannot be managed 
through controls alone.
During periods of change, CWB can escalate for a variety 
of reasons connected to control. In order to evaluate 
whether new ways of doing things are being adhered to, 
there can be more emphasis on control and monitoring 
in some areas. This may be achieved, however, through 
diverting and refocusing some of the control processes 
in a new context, therefore leaving other areas more 
vulnerable. In addition, it is likely that following 
these changes there will be more aspects of work 
that need attention, and so organisations can become 
simply overwhelmed and less attentive to exploitation. 
Finally, unless such changes to control are clearly 
communicated, intra-organisational inconsistencies are 
likely, which in turn creates ambiguities for employees 
that can result in unintended CWB.
2.5.3 ORGANISATIONAL 
COMMUNICATION
Communication plays a critical role in organisational 
functioning during times of stability and change. 
Communication is more than just information exchange: 
it is inherently social and creates meaning between 
individuals (Hargie, 2006). As such, communication 
signals the priorities, ethos and values of an 
organisation and plays a central role in employee trust 
development and maintenance. Various studies have 
demonstrated that effective communication is linked to 
positive organisational outcomes, including employee 
satisfaction, performance and commitment (Kumar and 
Giri, 2009; Tourish and Hargie, 2009). Communication 
has been shown to facilitate the development of a 
sense of community within an organisation (White 
et al., 2010), and the central role that communication 
plays in developing and maintaining trust has been 
widely acknowledged (Rockmann and Northcraft, 
2008; Thomas et al., 2009). Conversely, employee 
dissatisfaction with organisational communication has 
been linked to reduced cooperation from employees, 
resentment and tension in the workplace (Wood, 1999), 
making it an important consideration in the mitigation 
or development of CWB.
Further, communication is recognised as playing 
a critical role in how people react to and manage 
organisational uncertainty (Brashers, 2007; Kramer, 
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2004). Both informative communication and 
communication which helps to create a sense of 
community within an organisation has been linked 
to employees’ readiness to change and to effective 
change in practice (Elving, 2005). The ability to 
communicate effectively about change has in turn 
been linked to employee trust in their organisation’s 
leaders (Saunders and Thornhill, 2003). Leaders who 
demonstrate openness and engage in dialogue with 
those they manage are able to effectively promote 
organisational goals (Bambacas and Patrickson, 
2008), whereas poor leader-follower relations reduce 
employee commitment, productivity and can lead to 
other kinds of CWB such as absenteeism (Hargie et al., 
1999). Indeed, much of the research in this area reveals 
that communication about organisational change is 
often ineffective. The dynamic and uncertain nature of 
organisational change often means that managers can’t 
share (or don’t always know) all relevant information 
with employees, and individuals’ search for clarity 
leads to rumours and the accessing of unofficial routes 
of information. This often leads to misinformation 
(Bordia et al., 2006) and increases individual feelings of 
uncertainty and vulnerability (Saunders and Thornhill, 
2003), conditions not conducive to trust or to positive 
working relationships. As outlined in various studies 
(for a review see Hargie and Tourish, 2009) effective 
organisational communication involves fulfilling several 
dimensions, such as providing an adequate amount of 
information (including avoiding overload), providing 
knowledgeable sources, timeliness, suitable channels, 
clarity, transparency, credibility and trustworthiness.
2.5.4 ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSES 
TO BREACHES OF TRUST
Relatedly, how an organisation responds to a violation 
of employee trust is crucial to subsequent employee 
behaviour. There are relatively few studies of trust 
repair, but there is an agreement that there needs to 
be a transition from a current negative position to a 
more positive one before trust can be re-established 
(Sitkin and Stickel, 1996). A review of the literature 
on employee trust in organisations identifies three key 
approaches to trust repair (Searle et al., 2011). First, 
at an interpersonal level, trust repair can derive from 
cognitive changes to attributions, related to three forms 
of breakdown: locus of causality (focus on who was 
responsible), controllability (identifying how deliberate 
their intent was) and stability (how likely this is to 
happen again in the future).
Kim et al.’s work (2004) identifies two distinct routes to 
repair – competence-based violation is better appeased 
by an apology and an admission of culpability, whereas 
for integrity breaches denial of responsibility is more 
effective. The second approach, social equilibrium, 
positions breaches as being a disequilibrium in both 
the relationship and the social context, (Bottom et 
al., 2002; Reb et al., 2006) produced by differences 
between expectation and reality (Ren and Gray, 2009). 
This form of trust focuses on restoring equilibrium 
through social rituals, such as penance and punishment. 
For example, studies of CWB have looked at this form 
of repair in relation to revenge, deviant outcomes (Bies 
and Tripp 1996; Tripp et al., 2007) and non-cooperative 
behaviour (Bottom et al., 2002). Such studies highlight 
how firms with high justice climates tend to have better 
procedures to formally deal with violations, thus making 
forgiveness and reconciliation more likely (Aquino et 
al., 2006; Tripp et al., 2007). In contrast, those without 
formal channels tend to experience greater retaliation 
following violations (Tripp et al., 2007). The third 
approach includes structural mechanisms: legal 
remedies, such as incentives, penalties or monitoring 
(Sitkin and Roth, 1993); and social mechanisms, 
creating obligations between the parties. Repair of this 
form makes future exchanges explicit to reduce the 
likelihood of further breaches (Gillespie and Dietz, 
2009; Nakayachi and Watabe, 2005; Sitkin and Roth, 
1993).
2.6 CONCLUSION
This study explores the role of trust and organisational 
change in CWB and insider threat activities. The review 
of the literature demonstrates the array of individual, 
social and organisational factors which can influence 
how employees perceive and react to organisational 
changes. These factors and associated experiences 
trigger the decline of trust and emergence of distrust. 
Throughout the remaining sections of the report, we 
examine empirical evidence gathered in a high-security 
organisation and consider the significance of these 
factors for CWB during organisational change.
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3. METHODOLOGY
Following our extensive literature review, primary data 
was collected from a case study organisation, Plan B, 
a security critical organisation who form part of the 
critical national infrastructure. To ensure a rigorous 
and robust methodology, a mixed-method approach 
was used involving the collection of both qualitative 
and quantitative data. We outline the approach below.
3.1 SEMI-STRUCTURED 
INTERVIEWS:
In total we carried out 17 interviews as follows:
Context interviews were held with middle and senior 
managers of the organisation to collect data on two 
aspects: 1) the nature and impact of recent local and group 
level organisational changes and; 2) their experiences 
of anonymous instances of counterproductive working 
behaviour and insider acts within this same time frame, 
both generally and regarding the three selected case 
studies. Five individuals were interviewed including 
representatives from HR, security, and communications 
and engagement.
Critical incidence stakeholder interviews were 
undertaken for three insider threat cases. These cases 
were identified following discussion with senior 
management. In each case, we interviewed a range of 
stakeholders, including: the perpetrator (where possible 
– one case only), co-workers, line managers, group 
leaders, and security staff directly involved or at least 
privy to each case. These individuals were identified 
by the team’s security contact following guidance from 
the research team.
These interviews focused on the events leading up to 
each case, what occurred during that incident, and what 
happened after. In line with our theoretical framework, 
our stakeholders were prompted around their perception 
of the individual, social and organisational factors 
involved in each case. Additionally, we gained their 
insight into their experiences of organisational changes. 
In total 12 interviews were undertaken at this stage.
All interviews were carried out at the organisation’s 
premises (except one which was conducted via 
telephone due to interviewee availability). Interviews 
lasted approximately 60 minutes. They were voice 
recorded and later transcribed in full. Any quotes 
reported in our findings are anonymised in line with 
our ethics and to preserve the confidentiality of our 
informants (see other ethics information below). They 
are reported by an identifier ranging from I4 through 
to I20.
3.1.1 INTERVIEW ANALYSIS
Interviews were coded using primarily a deductive 
approach via the software package ‘Nvivo’. Nvivo 
allows text from interview transcripts to be highlighted 
and grouped in terms of themes or topics of interests 
for a research project. Following our extensive literature 
review outlined above, and an initial scoping of the 
data, we developed an a priori codebook to capture 
relevant insights.
This included sections about: change; emotions; 
home life events; self- regulation; identity of the 
perpetrator; personality of the perpetrator; perpetrator 
work behaviour; perpetrator quality of relationships; 
team climate; incident type (intentional/unintentional, 
malicious/accidental) ;  moral  disengagement; 
organisational communication; organisational controls; 
organisational culture; security culture; power; 
trustworthiness. Where pertinent unforeseen matters 
emerged from the interviews the codebook was adapted 
and used to recode the relevant data.
To assign data extracts to our codebook categories, the 
coding of the interview data was conducted mainly at 
the explicit level (i.e., what was actually said rather 
than what could be inferred). The results were then 
organised thematically, with findings based on the 
recurrent themes and patterns which crossed individual 
codes (Deacon et al., 2007). Thus we moved from 
deductive and inductive ‘first-order codes’ to inductive 
‘second-order themes’ (Brown and Coupland, 2015).
Coding was carried out by a qualified research assistant 
with expertise in organisational change and qualitative 
data analysis, after training and guidance from the 
research leads on the codebook. Resultant coding was 
independently checked and verified or negotiated by 
the two lead researchers in terms of interpretation and 
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assignment to categories; this activity was undertaken 
on an ongoing basis after each interview transcript was 
coded, and then again collectively after all interviews 
were coded.
Further, we used the thematic analysis results (and the 
HR/security documentation outlined below) to help us 
construct timelines for each insider threat case, which 
we represent visually in our findings section.
3.2 ANALYSIS OF HR AND 
SECURITY DOCUMENTATION 
ON THE THREE INSIDER 
THREAT CASES
We reviewed the available security and HR 
documentation for each case. This included, 
disciplinary letters, scripts of interviews with 
perpetrators, investigation reports and organisational/
HR policy documents following the incidents. This 
information was used for context purposes and to assist 
with the development of the timelines we developed for 
each case.
3.3 ANONYMOUS SITE 
SURVEYS
Anonymous site surveys were used to assess the 
organisational climate as well as the current level of, 
and motivation for, CWB. We included validated scales 
for: personality (Donnellan et al., 2006); trust and 
distrust towards the organisation (Searle et al., 2011b) 
and towards line managers (Mayer et al., 1995); quality 
of change communication (Mohr and Sohi, 1995); type 
of social support (Wanberg and Kammeyer-Mueller, 
2000), emotional experience (Yik et al., 2011); change 
readiness and confidence (Fugate et al., 2008); identity 
(Ashforth and Mael, 1989); and counterproductive 
work behaviour (Spector et al., 2006). The survey was 
administered only in the two departments in which 
our case studies occurred. Following consultation 
with departmental management, we decided to use 
a paper format in response to staff concerns about 
the confidentiality and security of our usual online 
survey platform. The survey was distributed following 
departmental meetings with an accompanying addressed 
envelope to allow its return to the research team.
A total of 47 completed surveys were returned. This 
represented a response rate of 6 managers and 28 staff 
in Department 1 which was the location for insider 
threat Cases 1 and 3; and 2 managers and 5 staff in 
Department 2 in which Case 2 resided. This represents 
a response of 7% and 40% respectively. Although these 
numbers are relatively low, the surveys do nonetheless 
reveal some interesting findings (discussed in the next 
section). Further, due to the cross-sectional data it is 
not possible to identify causation, but we do show a 
number of statistically significant correlations between 
perceptions of relationships, trust and CWB. These are 
reported in the findings section.
3.4 ETHICS
This research was subject to rigorous ethical review 
by both Coventry University’s Ethics Team and our 
CREST’s ethical review (informed by ESRC standards). 
Required modifications were made following these 
reviews and all ethics documentation was approved 
before project commencement.
Prior to their interview, individuals received a participant 
information sheet and signed an informed consent 
form. The voice recordings of the interviews were 
subsequently erased in line our ethics and the transcripts 
anonymised and held securely on an encrypted data 
storage site. Similarly, those who responded to the 
surveys received a participant information sheet and 
signed an informed consent form and responses were 
anonymous. All of the data reported in our thematic 
findings section has been anonymised in line with our 
ethical procedures and to preserve the confidentiality 
of our informants.
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4. FINDINGS
Our findings are divided into two parts. In this section 
(Part 1) we focus on the results of our change context 
interviews and the survey results. In Section 5 (Part 2) 
we examine each of the three selected case studies of 
insider threat in detail.
Part 1 findings are split into four sections. First we 
focus on change, particularly the issue of continual and 
cultural change. We identify the critical types of change 
perceived by employees in our case study organisation 
and the impacts, most notably on job security and 
future personal goals.
In the second section we examine how and why 
uncertainty arises across the organisation following 
change instigation. We provide evidence of uncertainty 
development through ineffective organisational 
communication and perceived limited support. We 
explore trust in terms of the organisation and its key 
actors to show the significance of leadership changes 
and the importance of line manager trust.
The third section examines organisational systems and 
processes. We draw attention to the compliance culture 
and employees’ experiences of key systems. In the final 
section we look at the impact of change in terms of 
outcomes for the organisation. We identify the current 
emotional climate of the organisation and then look at 
insider threat risks and counterproductive work behaviour.
4.1 CHANGE
Both the survey and context interviews depict an 
organisation experiencing ongoing turbulence. There 
were two speeds of change evident. First, continual slow-
paced change was identified in relation to the changing 
culture of the organisation, as well as alterations to the 
physical environment in the form of new buildings and 
workspaces. Second, ongoing fast-paced change was a 
feature, associated with change to the organisation’s top 
management, specifically CEOs.
4.1.1 TYPES AND SPEED OF CHANGE
4.1.1.1 Continual change
There was a strong perception from those interviewed 
that change occurred regularly in the organisation but 
without a clearly defined long-term goal. For example, 
a shared sentiment was: “We are always changing 
but we never seem to get there…tends to go round in 
circles” (I7). Another interviewee similarly stated: 
It's going through such a period of transition 
and then one period of transition will fail 
so they will bring another in…and then 
try and put it in another direction and that 
will fail. I must have seen about 8 different 
transitions…the years I have been here, 
which is ridiculous (I15).
This ongoing exposure results in employees becoming 
cynical towards any new changes that are occurring in 
the organisation, a key characteristic of distrust (Cho, 
2006), as further illustrated below:
We always get promised this [and that]…but 
those of us who have been here for 30 years… 
we don't actually see very much change…
so there is a healthy level of cynicism about 
whether change will actually happen. [There 
is therefore] a degree of push back against 
change in the organisation (I1).
4.1.1.2 Cultural change
The cynicism around change initiatives and the 
aforementioned ‘push back’ appeared to be historically 
linked to the previous civil service culture of the 
organisation and the high proportion of longstanding 
employees with military backgrounds and habitual 
ways of working. One interviewee explained:
Most of them look at the problem in the same 
way. So when I come in and I challenge them 
it's a totally different angle, I'm a different 
age, I am a different gender, got a different 
background. I have got less experience so 
they just dismiss my view a lot of the time, 
which I can understand [as you have] 
consensus over here versus just this one 
voice, but it's ‘this is how we have always 
done it’ attitude, which is not good (I8).
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Others echoed this sentiment through referring to the 
bureaucratic nature of the organisation which restricted 
change initiatives: 
Change happens, but there is still a sense of 
the civil service about [Plan B] and there is 
a lot of bureaucracy and a lot of inertia. So 
I don't think anything happens particularly 
quickly here (I5).
Research shows that cynicism impacts on work 
performance, depressing voluntary behaviour 
(Chiaburu et al., 2013); it also undermines trust and 
organisational commitment. Cynicism is also more 
apparent in contexts with high role conflict, low 
autonomy and low levels of assertiveness (Naus et al., 
2007).
Long-established roles and ways of working are 
common to a large proportion of staff in Plan B, but this 
is at odds with the cultural change the organisation’s 
top management is seeking to deliver. For example, one 
individual explained:
We have come from a place of being 
a very parent-child, rule compliant 
organisation, with everything written down 
of expectations of staff, absolutely every 
written consequence, to moving to a place 
of more trust and peer-peer relationships, 
and maybe there is more flexibility in that…
From a security perspective there's some 
risk linked to that…but actually it's all about 
giving some parameters for people to work 
in but giving them more choices, and being 
responsible, and taking grown up decisions 
for themselves… And I think that's a massive 
change for lots of people who work here (I4).
The survey results show a shared view that there 
is frequent change, but that this is not necessarily 
transformational for those in Department 1, where 
staff from that department are also more uncertain 
about change (see Figure 4.1). Interestingly those 
in Department 2 have a more positive orientation 
to change, while staff in Department 1 are the most 
confident about change (Change Self-Efficacy), but 
the differences were not significant between the 
departments. There were higher levels of involvement 
in change by managers across both departments.
4.1.2 WHAT IS CHANGING
In addition to the general context of change outlined 
above, a number of discrete and critical changes were 
identified by respondents in both the survey and the 
interviews, namely changes to job security (due to 
redundancies and restructuring) and pension changes.
Fig. 4.1 - Perceptions and confidence regarding change
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The survey results from both departments show some 
variation in the perceived threat arising from change, 
with Department 1 managers indicating more areas as 
being under risk (see Figure 4.2). Specifically, they were 
aware of threats to job desirability, training investment, 
pride in the organisation and reduced ability to provide 
service to the country (these differences in perceived 
threat from change in Department 1 is something 
we will discuss in more detail in terms of CWB). 
Both staff and managers in Department 1 were more 
cognisant of a risk to their benefits and rewards, but all 
groups indicated benefits and rewards as an important 
matter for them. One clear group difference is that 
the importance of the changes was heightened for 
Department 2 managers (see Figure 4.3).
The interviews with members of the wider organisation 
(i.e., not just Department 2 and Department 1 but also 
HR, Communications and Security) revealed more 
insight into the types of change staff were aware of and 
their impacts.
4.1.2.1  Job Security: redundancies and 
restructuring
Job security in this organisation has changed 
fundamentally through the introduction and 
implementation of redundancies. It is a change with 
significant negative impacts, if not for each individual 
personally, then certainly for many of their colleagues. 
The impact is magnified as it has involved further shifts 
to policy, personnel and physical location. As a result, 
it was clearly regarded as a source of threat, as the next 
quote reveals:
It didn't directly affect our group…but it's 
certainly been visible across site. I speak 
to people in other teams, people are aware 
of it when they say, ‘Oh there might be 
redundancies’, everybody sort of wonders, 
will it be my group who is going to be affected 
next? (I4).
Redundancy is a novel event, which undermines the 
previous predictability of organisational life. As such 
Fig. 4.2 -  What is at risk from change?
Full list of scale comprised: Job security, Benefits & Rewards (pay, pension, holidays, etc.), Job desirability, Ability to perform to standards required, Investments 
made (e.g., training & qualifications that apply only to this organisation), Ability to provide meaningful service to country, Fulfilling community/country obligations, 
Welfare of others, Pride in the organisation, Work/life balance, Relationships in team, Pride in role, Relationship with line manager, Pride in profession.
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it triggers greater attention and sensemaking (Maitlis 
and Lawrence 2007; Stigliani and Ravasi, 2012). It 
demands information processing and decisions about 
not only current but also future behaviour, as the 
following quote further illustrates: “It does make me 
concerned…you think, well I could go elsewhere” (I4).
4.1.2.2  Procedural and distributive 
injustice
Mirroring past research (e.g., Gelfand et. al., 2007) an 
important reason for the largely negative perception 
surrounding this change was the sense of injustice in 
both how the redundancy process had been carried 
out and the actual outcome of the process. As one 
interviewee explained:
Lots of people have worked here their whole 
life and wanted to be made redundant to get 
a  big pay out [but] the company actually 
rejected a lot of people because it would cost 
too much to get rid of them. So if you think 
about that, they rejected people who wanted 
to go, and  ejected people who wanted to stay 
(I18).
More generally, there was evidence of the poor 
management and communication of redundancies with 
implications for relationships within the departments 
affected and in some cases the erosion of trust in the 
senior team as a whole, as the next quote illustrates:
It looks very personal…it made me think I 
really don't trust the boss AT ALL. It made 
me also  question the integrity of senior 
management across the whole department 
to be really honest because I thought, you 
are supporting that person to make those 
decisions and you are enabling them to 
happen, they should have been challenging… 
and then on top of that once the redundancy 
period finished there was no, at least 
legitimate, reason that was  communicated 
to the department… to actually explain why 
they amalgamated two jobs into one. So 
again it looked to be personal. So it’s not 
been a good place to work recently (I18).
 (C.4.iv will provide survey results pertaining to overall 
and distributive fairness in the organisation).
4.1.2.3  Pension change
A further change mentioned by interviewees was the 
reduced pension benefits, which not only made the 
organisation a less attractive employer, but also led to 
uncertainty in terms of individuals’ long term personal 
goals and security. Critically for insider threat, this 
change has meant previously engaged employees are 
re-considering the long-term viability of their current 
employment. Past research has demonstrated how 
the revisiting of commitment can be a precursor to 
organisational exit (Tzafrir and Enosh, 2011). The 
negative impact of this change has become amplified 
due to the perceived breach in psychological contract 
Fig. 4.3 - How important are these aspects to you?
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(Robinson and Morrison, 2000). There was a view 
that a key value of the organisation had been violated, 
reducing the organisation’s trustworthiness. Research 
shows such violations can be linked to CWB (Jensen et 
al., 2010). Significantly, the impact of this shift extended 
into the future, altering employees’ plans (Hoffman and 
Ocasio, 2001) and leading to a reduction in feelings of 
control about the future. There was a consequent feeling 
of disengagement among interviewees, for example one 
individual stated:
Since I joined back in the 90's it has been 
one of the strong points of the job here. 
Guys often refer to it as the handcuffs. 
People joined [the organisation], the 
pay wasn't brilliant but the pension was 
fantastic and people were reluctant to go 
to better paid jobs because of the pension. 
Now that's all changed. Because the 
pensions aren't affordable and everyone 
has to `accept the fact that it needs to be 
something different. So the job’s not as 
attractive as it used to be anymore. And 
I think across site people are a little bit 
disappointed by the fact it just seems like 
it's gone and there is nothing we can do 
about it (I5).
Another interviewee similarly stated:
It's one of the few times I probably feel, 
well, actually is it worth it? Don't get that 
benefit anymore… So yes it does change 
your philosophy. It's impacting people's 
belief because it was a strong foundation 
culturally of the organisation. The 
organisation’s culture was built on, people 
taking not a role, but an organisational 
employment for life…Where as now, 
without that foundation, I don't think the 
organisation has strong enough rewards to 
replace that (I7).
Like redundancies, these changes to pension 
arrangements caused a sense of injustice and unfairness, 
which for some individuals permeated into a general 
loss of trust towards the organisation as a whole:
I think more importantly at the moment is 
trust, or giving people confidence that they 
are paid fairly…I am being really general 
here, but money is not a driver of your 
average [names specific role]. However 
knowing that you are being treated fairly by 
your organisation, that you thought that you 
absolutely have a level of trust with and yet 
last year, psychologically we took that final 
salary pension away which as you know to 
some people… it's such an integral  part… 
we had that social contract of, ‘But you 
were looking after me, I knew what I was 
going  to get’, that's gone (I20).
Importantly the strength of feeling about pensions was 
moderated by the length of tenure in the organisation: 
Now is the time to make that bold decision. 
Close it and look at something else. So I may 
have looked at it differently if I'd had 28/30 
years of service with another 5 years to go…
the people who have been here longer are 
the ones that are more upset by it (I10).
The process of determining how much effort to expend 
on resolving the impact of change can in and of itself 
make further resourcing demands on individuals and 
teams (Morgeson and DeRue, 2006). As a result, new 
behaviour is likely to emerge which can create the need 
for further attention. The next quote highlights the 
responses of some to resolve their concerns: “There 
was a period of people writing to their politicians 
saying, what the heck, you know, can you not sort this 
out?” (I5). Further, there were constant reminders 
of this change through the visible actions of some 
employees, as noted in the following quotes: “There is 
an ongoing disagreement with the unions here striking 
every so often so we are very aware of it” (I4); “There is 
quite a lot of anger and resentment around the pension 
issue” (I20); “Industrial action is potentially impacting 
delivery, so it’s quite a significant talking point” (I7).
4.1.2.4  Powerlessness towards senior 
management
While cognisant that similar changes were occurring 
across other UK workplaces, in part due to changes 
in government policy, employees in this organisation 
ultimately held top managers responsible for pension 
changes. While injustice was a common theme, there 
was also a palpable sense of powerlessness for some: 
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The pension is a big disappointment. It's 
something that if I could be bothered I might 
have found out more about, and maybe been 
more animated about it. But I figure the 
management are going to do what they are 
going to do (I6).
Furthermore, while top managers were at pains at the 
start of communication about this change to explain that 
everyone would be impacted in the same way, the change 
by the CEO to become employed under a different part 
of the wider parent organisation and therefore escape 
detrimental pension changes, appeared to undermine 
the credibility of their claims and instigate distrust in 
the top team.
4.2 MANAGING UNCERTAINTY
The data collected from the survey and interviews 
demonstrates that change in this organisation creates a 
heightened level of uncertainty. Three aspects emerged 
as important in the management of this uncertainty. 
These include: the use of formal communication; types 
and level of support; and trust.
4.2.1 FORMAL COMMUNICATION
The survey indicated that the quality of formal 
communication about organisational change that 
employees received was relatively low: across all five 
areas, major shortfalls were perceived in the messaging. 
Across all departments and levels there was consensus 
that the information received had been incomplete, 
inadequate, and untimely (see graph 4). Further, there 
were some differences in its perceived credibility, with 
Department 1 not considering the information provided 
to be credible.
The interviews added further insight into organisational 
communication, with broad agreement that there was 
considerable room for improvement in terms of the 
changes within the organisation.
First, the reason for changes had not been given adequate 
attention, as the next quote illustrates: “People don't 
really like change when they don't see a need for it. 
Things like diversity haven't been communicated very 
well” (I14). Second, there were perceived differences 
due to bureaucratic and hierarchical levels within 
the organisation which were thought to disrupt clear 
communication:
Fig. 4.4 -  Perceived quality of organisational change communication
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I think sometimes communication is poor 
about changes. I think there is a lot of 
organisational change going on across the 
business that not everybody understands 
why…I still don't know how you get it from 
the top filtering all the way down, because it 
has to come down through several layers and 
it's a bit like Chinese whispers by the time it 
gets to one layer I sometimes think that it’s 
you know, it doesn't come through with the 
same message. So it's about consistency of 
messages as well (I17).
Another individual similarly commented: 
They just can't make their mind up which 
direction they are going to go. And again, 
my lowly level I probably don't have the 
understanding of an exec, but, I am sure 
there is a reason for it, but I can't make head 
nor tail of it (I15). 
Critically, communication was often considered 
to be used to pacify rather than involve or empower 
employees. For example one individual explained: 
They have got to the stage where they are 
communicating to the point which bores 
people. It always comes out in opinion 
surveys, we need better communication and 
that means that they flood more information 
towards you… But that's not leading better 
(I6).
There were clear perceived hierarchical differences 
between employees versus managers in terms of the 
amount of influence they could have in organisational 
decisions:
It does seem a little bit like, there is 
management and workers and the 
management are going to manage and 
they are still going to be very distinct 
from the workers no matter what you do. 
Workers are always going to want more 
control or more leverage…we need the 
leadership to lead better and they took that 
to mean communicate with us better. I think 
leadership is also to do with backing certain 
projects, or you know putting your money 
where your mouth is (I6).
There was acknowledgement of attempts being made to 
improve in this area:
I think it's improving. I think there is a lot 
of people engagement in teams and things 
like that… it’s whether or not we as an 
organisation can demonstrate the value of 
those things… [showing that] we can make 
it better for ourselves, we are empowered to 
Fig. 4.5 - Sources of support during change
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drive that change and to take responsibility 
for that change…But it's a matter of whether 
that becomes too forced. I think it's in 
between at the moment (I7).
These findings demonstrate the communication 
problems organisational change has been found to 
produce in many other contexts (Hargie and Tourish, 
2009) and the fine line between engaging individuals 
through communication about change and fuelling 
further cynicism (Johnson and O'Leary Kelly 2003; 
Naus et al., 2007). Importantly, research shows a 
relationship between cynicism and discretionary 
behaviours, of which CWB is one (Chiaburu et al., 
2013).
4.2.2 SOURCES OF SUPPORT
The second aspect of uncertainty management revealed 
in the survey was the various support resources 
perceived as important during change. Survey results 
revealed that in both Department 1 and Department 
2, the direct line manager was an important source 
of support. There were differences however between 
Department 2 managers and the other respondent 
Fig. 4.6 - Quality of relationship and focus of attention
Fig. 4.7 - Employee perceptions of organisational trustworthiness
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groups who identified the team and trade union as 
having a distinct role (see below graph 5). In contrast, 
staff in Department 2 were more likely to find support 
outside the organisation. In Department 1 there was 
little difference between the two levels, identifying 
their line manager, their team and external family and 
friends as their main sources of support.
Research shows that while social support, especially 
the quality of relations with line managers, plays an 
important role in dissipating the impact of stress, it is 
not effective in reducing CWB (Rupprecht et al., 2016; 
Viswesvaran et al., 1999).
As graph 6 shows, the quality of this support is impacted 
by the quality of the relationships, with the survey 
showing differences between the two departments 
and employee-management levels. In Department 1, 
managers perceive less strong relationships and report 
reduced capacity to cope with tensions and conflicts 
(termed Tensility (Carmeli and Gittell, 2009)), when 
compared with Department 2 managers. Managers in 
both departments report greater interest in others.
Accordingly, a critical element of managing uncertainty 
is trust (Weibel et al., 2016). Trust in the organisation 
and other actors refers to the extent to which an employee 
holds confident and positive expectations about their 
manager’s and employing organisation’s intentions 
and likely future efforts towards them. Trustworthiness 
has two distinct dimensions. Cognitive-based trust 
involves being seen as having the skills and abilities to 
operate effectively and efficiently (i.e., demonstrating 
competence), and in conducting this activity according 
to principles of fairness and honesty (i.e., showing 
integrity towards staff and other stakeholders). In 
contrast, affect based trust involves behaving in ways 
that signal care, concern and respect towards the 
interests of others (i.e., behaving with benevolence).
4.2.2.1  Organisational trust
The survey results show some areas of consensus and 
divergence that offer insight into the role of trust in the 
management of uncertainty. While we found agreement 
across all four groups regarding the integrity of this 
organisation, Department 1 managers do not share 
the other three groups’ view of this being a competent 
organisation (Ability) (see Figure 4.7). Affect-based 
trust was highest among staff rather than managers.
4.2.2.2 CEO Turnover
Trust in an organisation is strongly associated with the 
top leadership (Hope-Hailey et al., 2012). Therefore, the 
impact of ongoing changes to the CEO in Plan B is likely 
to have an impact on trust levels. Indeed, the interviews 
show the key role of the new CEO in instigating the 
current programme of change. For example one 
individual stated: “Obviously we are under a new chief 
executive now who is running things slightly differently, 
which always causes reorganisations and ripples” (I5). 
The change in staff at the top creates instability for 
employees making them cynical of the necessity and 
Fig. 4.8 - Perceptions of line managers’ trustworthiness and their levels of dependency
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value of change. It was viewed as a demonstration of 
power, rather than necessarily being in the best interest 
of the organisation, as the next quote illustrates:
People feel like the organisation is changing 
direction all the time as the CEO moves on… 
the CEO, the first thing they do, they come in 
they want to do something big that is going 
to put their stamp on the organisation, so 
they exercise control that way… and there is 
a new set of initiatives, that don't feel like the 
old initiatives even though actually under the 
hood they are very similar (I12).
The effect of successive new leaders has created a 
lack of consistent direction for the organisation, as 
the following quote outlines: “The CEO thing is really 
quite important for direction setting… for the time 
period we have been talking about, 13 to 17 different 
CEOs, different ideas, different promises, end games, 
different visions” (I16). Additionally, it was clear that 
there is a perception of mixed ability of various CEOs, 
as the next quote makes clear: “I think he appears to 
say the right [things]… he acts in a way you would 
expect a person who would get results to act. So he's a 
breath of fresh air really. I think he is good, credible. 
But he has followed some real dingbats. So he is going 
to look credible.” (I6)
4.2.2.3 Line manager trust
Another significant form of trust is trust in line 
managers. These individuals are responsible for 
shaping the local experience of the organisation 
(Nienaber et al., 2015). The survey shows little 
differences between the groups regarding the level of 
perceived trustworthiness of line managers (see Figure 
4.8). Nonetheless, while both groups of staff have 
similar levels of cognitive-based trust in their local 
leaders, Department 2 managers perceive their leaders 
(i.e., top level managers) to be more competent than 
any other group, and Department 1 managers regard 
their managers as having more integrity. The perceived 
level of affect-based trustworthiness (benevolence) is, 
however, lower for all groups, except for Department 
2 managers. 
Importantly, there was a higher level of distrust for 
non-managers in Department 2, who also felt more 
dependent on their managers; this group had the lowest 
levels of benevolence trustworthiness, a factor which 
is known to be central in positive social exchanges 
between leaders and followers (Colquitt et al., 2012). 
Further, past research shows that trust is strongest 
(and therefore feelings of vulnerability are low) when 
all elements of trustworthiness are fulfilled (Mayer et 
al., 1995). Thus it is not surprising that across all four 
employee groups there was consensus in a high level of 
alertness and vigilance.
The interviews offer further insights into trust issues, 
specifically the impact of organisational leadership on 
the working lives and experiences of employees, both 
generally and in relation to specific organisational 
changes.
4.2.2.4 Leadership Style
Top leaders provide role models of leadership and 
behaviour further down the organisation (Kalshoven 
and Den Hartog, 2009). Some of those at the top in 
this organisation had, according to interviewees, 
demonstrated positive examples of leadership, but there 
were other negative examples that were then emulated 
by long-standing senior staff, as the following quote 
demonstrates:
At the moment as far as I can see, he's [the 
CEO] demonstrating the right behaviour so 
that's good. If he could just get his tier 2's to 
do the same that would be great… we have 
got some of those across the company who 
have been here a while and don't necessarily 
show the right behaviour (I10).
4.2.2.5 Inconsistency
The net effect of this instability created from CEO 
turnover and various leadership styles was to create 
inconsistencies in behaviour across hierarchical levels 
of the organisation. The ethics of directors were called 
into question by some who saw different rules applying 
across the organisation and were consequently cynical 
towards leadership:
He's [the CEO] brought his own daughter in 
for work experience, which again, that's his 
right I suppose. He's brought his mates from 
other places…half of his board have got 
their sons or daughters working in roles…I 
actually raised [some of these issues] to 
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ethics…that smartly got dropped…didn't 
hear anything back (I15).
Furthermore, there were variations in how individuals 
did the same line management role. For example, the 
interviews highlighted how the quality of line managers 
varied considerably from person to person: “I think a 
lot depends in terms of who line managers are and on 
their personal qualities in all honesty. You know some 
are very good and some may not be so professional as 
they should be as a line manager” (I11). 
A further factor undermining the consistency of any 
clear message from leadership, particularly around 
change, was the impact of ongoing restructuring 
occurring in the organisation, with line management in 
flux: “The difficulty I think is just keeping that message 
alive cos obviously line managers are constantly 
changing with structures changing” (I19). 
Perceptions of managerial exploitation and injustice 
(Jensen et al., 2010; Jones, 2009;) as well as inconsistent 
leadership (Hershcovis et al., 2007; Skogstad et al., 
2007) have all been linked to CWB in past research. 
Studies show that the resultant negative emotions that 
arise from such experiences are the most critical trigger 
of CWB following organisational change (Sakurai and 
Jex, 2012).
4.3 ORGANISATIONAL 
SYSTEMS, CULTURE AND 
CLIMATE
The organisation we studied has specific systems and 
processes that are designed to recruit and manage 
suitable individuals and thereby ameliorate the risk 
of insider threat. Three types of controls categorised 
in recent work (Weibel et al., 2016) are evident: input 
(who does things – recruitment focused), process 
(how to do the job, formalised written HR procedures 
stipulating how employees should do their work and 
how procedural adherence should be monitored, as 
well as sanctioned or rewarded) and output (what 
employees produce, predefined targets and appraisal of 
results, use of goals). We explore these three control 
types in this next section, and then outline how their 
implementation and the wider organisational culture 
may actually undermine their effectiveness.
4.3.1 INPUT CONTROLS
4.3.1.1 Recruitment
This is a key policy determining who works in 
an organisation. The recruitment process in this 
particular organisation focuses on checking and 
verifying an individual’s past, especially their technical 
qualifications, and in detecting drug and alcohol use 
which might make individuals vulnerable to becoming 
an insider threat (Nurse et al., 2014). One interviewee 
stated: “We do pre-employment screening, checking 
peoples CVs and their academic qualifications to make 
sure they're verifiable and they are not lying about 
their backgrounds” (I20). In addition to technical 
skills, important characteristics are used to determine 
successful applicants including loyalty, as the next 
quote shows:
The recruitment team are looking out for 
qualities that the organisation want and 
we feed in some security requirements to 
that, which again are more about loyalty 
and trustworthiness…the values of the 
organisation are trust, pride, innovation and 
excellence… so they are looking for people 
who are going to be consistent with those 
values (I19).
However while loyalty is to some extent attitudinal, we 
know that an individual’s work experiences can either 
reinforce or damage its presence, particularly damaging 
are experiences of role conflict and low autonomy 
(Naus et al., 2007).
At the same time, surprisingly little attention is given to 
using predictive tools such as psychometric tests; these, 
due to financial considerations, are only used to recruit 
some graduate and executive roles. For example: 
I have talked about introducing enhanced 
DV with psychometric testing… [things like] 
suggestibility and conformity because in 
this environment that to me seems such an 
obvious thing to include…because you want 
to look at how likely is this person to be led 
astray (I18).
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4.3.1.2  Vetting
A critical component of the recruitment process for this 
organisation is formal vetting. Vetting is undertaken 
prior to clearance for employment by a third party and 
involves a background check and an in-depth personal 
interview. At an organisational level this process 
“provides another level of assurance about people” 
(I18). The impact of this process as one interviewee 
explained is that:
Our recruitment, it's quite narrow because 
of what we do already. So obviously you 
have got vetted roles. So everyone working 
here has [security clearance]. So they have 
already gone through a degree of scrutiny 
prior to employment (I20).
While an important process for this security critical 
organisation, it can risk a lack of attention being paid 
to employee behaviour once they become part of the 
organisation, as the following quote illustrates: 
So traditionally we would have had a defined 
default setting which was you know, everyone 
here has a DV and once you have got vetting 
you are in you are trusted and we won't 
worry about you for another 7 years until 
your vetting comes up for renewal. And we 
have decided that's not good enough (I20).
Further, an unintended consequence of the vetting 
process itself is to heighten a sense of anxiety for staff 
over subsequent disclosures, for example in relation to 
mental health concerns, as one individual explained: 
We are given these leaflets which tell you 
ways of seeking counselling if you like... but 
there is always the concern that what you say 
will come back on you…. It's the whole thing 
of the [security] clearance (I4). 
Potentially more concerning is that the vetting 
process can fail to capture and disseminate important 
information. This may arise due to the deliberate 
hiding of personally embarrassing information, or more 
indirectly due for example, to anxiety reducing recall. 
However, it may also be produced through the failure 
of an external organisation to effectively communicate 
concerns to the organisation, as the next quote indicates:
When somebody starts…UKSV don't always 
communicate all of the flags to us. I mean 
from a DPA [Data Protection Act] point of 
view, I get why that might be. To some extent 
because it's vetting in confidence, the vetting 
has been done by them with the individual so 
they hold  that information. But as the sort 
of custodian of that employment you would 
think that they would share that information 
(I18).
Such an issue reveals that ‘blind trust’ in an external 
vetting agency can have unintended negative 
consequences in terms of reducing individual vigilance 
towards inappropriate behaviour, as found in our recent 
study of the health and social care context (Searle et al., 
2017a). Ongoing personnel security management in the 
organisation therefore relies heavily on line managers:
So the member of staff should be telling their 
line manager anyway what the problem is. 
Purely from a point of helping them to do their 
job…but I think a lot of staff don't do that. So 
some staff report to us, and haven't told their 
line manager and then we [security] don't 
tell  their line manager because it's down to 
the individual (I18).
The emphasis on security as an external process 
imposed on individual employees and upheld by those 
with line management authority therefore potentially 
creates a false sense of security for employees of 
this organisation, through triggering two important 
mechanisms of moral disengagement: the diffusion of 
responsibility for security as a matter for others with 
authority, and the displacement of responsibility onto 
an external organisation (Bandura, 2002). 
Further, vetting gives employees a particular status that 
distinguishes them. As the organisation is undertaking 
significant change to reduce the numbers of sensitive 
post holders, such change could be a source of discontent 
and identity shift for some members of staff. It may 
create distinct in- and out-groups and could result in the 
perceived erosion of status for some employees, whose 
identity is intertwined with their elevated clearance 
(Searle et al., in press). 
Such changes need to be sensitively communicated to 
avoid a perceived breach of psychological contract. The 
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perceived downgrading of such employees’ importance 
may reduce their identification with, and commitment 
to, the organisation.
4.3.1.3 Autistic spectrum staff
As a science and technology-focused organisation, 
Plan B attracts and recruits increased numbers of 
employees on the autistic spectrum (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001; Ruzich et al., 2015). While these individuals 
have clear and important skills and talents to offer 
the organisation, their ability to manage change and 
uncertainty makes them a source of potential increased 
risk to the organisation. Further, research shows that 
those who have had a late diagnosis of this condition 
are more likely to be vulnerable to mental health 
issues, specifically depression and suicide that could 
significantly impede their capacity to self-regulate 
their behaviour (Cassidy et al., 2014). The interviews 
revealed wide variations in the levels of awareness and 
support within this organisation for those on the autistic 
spectrum. The organisation evidently needs to become 
better in its recruitment process in terms of identifying 
and offering bespoke support to such employees. 
Critically, our interviews revealed that: “None of us 
are trained in diagnosing or even referring people for 
autism” (I8). 
This issue is particularly relevant for line managers, in 
enabling them to more effectively support employees 
(Hagner and Cooney, 2005; Lorenz et al., 2016; Parr 
et al., 2013). For example, while cognisant of the 
challenges these employees might have in working 
in open plan offices, there seems little awareness 
of their potential vulnerability to manipulation by 
others (Faccini and Allely, 2017) (see case study 
3), or their capacity to engage in particular forms of 
counterproductive work behaviour such as hoarding 
(Seigfried-Spellar et al., 2015).
4.3.1.4  Daily security reminders
A final important daily input control that is designed 
to reduce security risk is the daily IT Login. This 
system allows employees access to their workstation 
and comprises a daily reminder about security and the 
organisation’s right to access their files and monitor 
their activity. While it must be accepted in order for 
the system to open, it is routine and thus a habit which 
is likely to fail to make the issue of risk salient. The 
passive nature of the response required from employees 
renders it a de facto assurance tool for the organisation, 
rather than a means of altering malevolent intention or 
behaviour, as the following quote demonstrates:
It has an ok box you have to click and accept 
that you understand that there is no right to 
privacy, and that everything can be monitored 
on a company system… I think to be honest 
with you our attitude to that would be that 
that's good enough, because we just need to 
prove that  you clicked it… when you look at 
the bigger picture it's probably not that great 
because maybe it should change and then 
people are making a more informed decision 
every day. The hope is that they have read it 
once (I18).
4.3.2 PROCESS CONTROLS
An important process control we identified in our case 
study organisation is straightforward compliance with 
procedures and instructions (Weibel et al., 2016). The 
following quote demonstrates the issue of complying 
with safety on a day to day level: 
We are process driven a lot of the time in 
certain jobs. So for example a front line 
worker literally follows a script. So like turn 
a nut 3 times to the right, you know literally 
to that point (I18).
4.3.2.1  Employee Assurance
A more sophisticated process-focused approach to 
security was used by the organisation for employee 
risk assessment. Their technology-based method 
allows them to combine security, HR and team 
level information on individuals to better categorise 
individuals’ behaviour according to a risk matrix 
that considers change of work and personal habits, 
personality and other factors. 
This technique is important as it captures any changes 
to certain personal and work-related behaviour and 
allows better detection and targeting of resources into 
those who are identified as having a heightened level 
of risk.
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4.3.2.2 On-going personal welfare 
monitoring
In addition, efforts are made on an ongoing basis to 
encourage staff to observe and report their concerns. 
The following quote highlights how such control can be 
used to emphasise the well-being of others as opposed 
to perceived surveillance:
an individual who was just not themselves 
over a period of a week…the individual 
hadn't even noticed it in themselves… it 
was the team that first spotted  the change 
in behaviour that led to the medical 
intervention. And we have used that as a 
bit of a security example to say, actually 
that might be early indicators of a potential 
security risk that someone is changed in 
their behaviour and they are being slightly 
different. Actually, for you to intervene and 
seek some help and talk to the individual… 
We have always said we don't really care 
where you raise the concern to. So actually 
it could be to security, it could be to HR, it 
could be to our ethics team, just raise it and 
then we will work behind the scenes to join 
up the dots (I19).
However, there are various barriers to this approach 
which we discuss in the organisational culture section.
4.3.3 OUTPUT CONTROLS
4.3.3.1  Role-related boundaries
A control that has been to some extent overlooked in 
this organisation is the effective communication about 
changes to role-related boundaries. Evidence from 
our interviews suggests that for new hires, work tasks 
may vary in the clarity with which they are explained, 
creating very different views of their role, what is 
expected from them and important boundaries. This 
was most pronounced with regard to access matters 
(see also 4.3.4.1 ‘need to know’ basis). Staff appeared 
anxious about policing their own behaviour due to 
for example, receiving either increased or reduced 
access as part of organisational restructuring, and so 
the resultant uncertainty could undermine their ease in 
detecting and challenging other’s information access as 
well (e.g., Case 3). The failure to clearly and explicitly 
communicate role boundaries and expectations creates 
ambiguity. Further, those on the autistic spectrum 
require explicit information; once given, they are likely 
to adhere strictly to operating within given boundaries. 
It is therefore important that any changes to security 
and access are clearly and consistently communicated 
to avoid uncertainty.
4.3.3.2 Progression and Promotion
Our case studies reveal that an important control 
system, progression and promotion, has changed in the 
organisation and has unintentionally provoked insider 
threat behaviour (e.g., see case study 3). In the past 
the transparent process allowed employees to easily 
understand how to progress to the next grade, however 
it is currently in flux and there is a resultant information 
vacuum about what is now required. This transition has 
been accompanied by a clear negative emotional tone 
among some staff: 
It's been unclear about a way to progress, 
promotions, that has become unclear. The 
old ways worked and you know changes to 
performance review, new software is coming 
in, it's all left people a bit frustrated (I14).
4.3.3.3 Reward and recognition
Similarly, the new reward and recognition system 
introduced to the organisation represents a transition 
away from the previous focus on solely technical skills 
towards a potentially more ambiguous set of behaviours. 
While recognised as part of a CEO-led change to 
develop more effective line managers and leaders, it has 
again not been communicated as effectively as it could, 
according to interviewees: 
He's [the CEO] putting a big thing on 
leadership… it doesn't matter how good you 
are technically, if you don't display the right 
behaviour and leadership, then that would 
bring you down (I17).
4.3.4 CULTURE
The interviews and survey reveal this organisation, like 
any other, to have a specific type of culture and climate 
which sets the parameters for how systems, processes 
and controls operate on an everyday basis. Culture has 
an ongoing role in creating and sustaining trust and 
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in setting the attention given to controls and security 
(Weibel et al., 2016).
4.3.4.1 Need to know basis
An important element of the work undertaken in 
this organisation is that it is security-sensitive. As 
explained, this is conveyed through the requirement of 
staff to have a specific level of security clearance, but 
also through the values embedded in the organisational 
culture of ‘need to know’. This means that staff 
should not discuss aspects of the organisation’s work 
that they are not involved in, nor access areas of the 
organisation’s network that do not relate directly to 
their own work. While there is a clear rationale in 
this approach to safeguard organisational capital, an 
unintended consequence is the reluctance of staff to 
challenge colleagues’ behaviour that they intuitively 
consider alarming, for fear of neglecting this ‘need 
to know’ boundary. The aforementioned concern 
following vetting makes them particularly sensitive 
to creating unnecessary security concern for others. 
While we found examples in our interviews of leaders 
noting and sharing staff concerns with each other, non-
management actions were often different; employees 
were often aware of instances of process deviance, such 
as writing down codes (see Case 1) or the collection and 
sharing of information without an author’s permission 
(see Case 3), but were reluctant and/or often failed to 
report these matters formally. These findings highlight 
the ambiguity that can surround informal organisational 
norms and the strong role of social influence in reducing 
individual whistleblowing (Moore and Gino, 2013).
Individuals further commented on the perverse effect 
of the ‘need to know’ principle being used as a status 
symbol, thereby restricting open communication 
between individuals. One individual reflected that:
[we’re] not always that effective at 
communicating. And I think sometimes this 
need to know culture where you blinker 
things off, gets to an extreme where people 
don't say anything. And then some people if 
you are not careful use it as sort of a one-up-
manship, rather than, we can't share for true 
assurance reasons. So, they kind of do it on 
the reverse, ‘I’m special, and you don't need 
to know’. That's a bad cultural thing if that 
happens. So those sorts of triggers, managers 
need to identify and work with those people 
and their behaviour and their leadership 
skills to demonstrate the right approach (I7).
4.3.4.2 Fear and Distrust of HR and 
Security
A contributing factor undermining the likelihood of 
employees speaking out was the perceived negative or 
heavy-handed security and HR response, as the next 
quote highlights:
The other thing is the fear of getting people 
into trouble, which is definitely there. The 
fear of mentioning something and then it's 
an overreaction…. you know you are going 
to get somebody in an awful lot of trouble 
for doing something that might just be one 
document in one folder that they might have 
happened to have clicked on (I14).
Another interviewee elaborated on this point but made 
a distinction between employee perceptions of security 
versus HR: 
It's interesting, when we have gone to talk to 
people… they distrust HR. I think because 
it sets off disciplinaries and grievances too 
regularly, or their perception is you are into 
some formal process very quickly. So when 
we have run things like the [new security 
procedures] past the union representatives 
to say this is what we are intending to roll 
out, they were saying for goodness sake sell 
it as a security tool, not an HR tool” (I19).
Prior research has also identified how HR’s handling 
of sensitive policies can undermine staff confidence 
and their trust in reporting concerns about others 
(Harrington, 2012).
4.3.4.3 Accountability
A further and related factor affecting organisational 
culture was accountability. The organisation has a 
strong sense of hierarchy, yet the accountability lines do 
not always appear clear to employees. Inconsistencies 
in the application of processes leave employees unclear 
as one interviewee noted:
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It really depends on who you get on the end 
of the phone [with HR]. Sometimes I have 
been  told, it is entirely up to you. Sometimes 
I've been told NO… we cannot allow this, 
it must be  done to the blueprint and you 
know, that's unnecessarily harsh, and then 
the person’s a bit  disgruntled. It's very 
uncertain. You never really know what you 
are accountable for  (I14).
Importantly this lack of accountability was attributed 
in part to the ongoing changes and restructuring within 
the organisation: “In terms of accountabilities and 
responsibilities it's unclear. Everybody is just muddling 
through at the moment because of transformation. So 
you know things are not joined up, you just muddle 
through” (I14).
4.3.4.4 Approach to security vs 
approach to performance
Additionally, there was a perceived disconnect, 
according to several interviewees, between the way 
security related matters versus performance related 
issues are dealt with in the organisation, illustrated by 
the following quote:
We have a disciplinary process fairly 
similar to any other organisation, with a 
fairly heavily unionised environment, in my 
experience fairly employee sensitive, if that 
makes sense… I don't get the sense that we 
manage performance [well], certainly not in 
a behavioural context… certainly anything 
to do with security and safety, there's a 
really hard line and I think the contract here, 
as in the informal contract, is so clear, that 
you know you potentially impinge on anyone 
else’s safety, or certainly with regards to 
security, then you know there is a very swift 
[move] to the door. But I think we are really 
reluctant to be bold in decisions in other 
areas where we have people who choose to 
be non-compliant, in a destructive way (I20).
The uncertainty around accountability coupled with 
the perceived security/performance incongruence 
facilitates two different kinds of behaviour. First, 
employees seek to protect themselves against potential 
transgression, but in so doing they actually behave in 
counterproductive ways, as the following example 
reveals:
In some people this is, this is going to 
sound a bit incongruent but the compliance 
with the  rules. I see a mentality of kind of, 
I will almost follow that rule to spite the 
organisation or to  spite myself but it's the 
rule and actually I am safe if I follow that… 
Fig. 4.9 - Employee perceptions of fairness and type of climate 
48
FindingS
Assessing and mitigating the impact of organisational change on counterproductive work behaviour
I do what it says on the tin…  I think there is 
a bit of survivor syndrome (I20).
On the other hand, there was evidence that rules were 
not always followed as individuals sought to work 
autonomously without obstruction: “There are a lot of 
people that bypass the rules because it's not conducive 
to the way they want to [work]” (I15). The failure 
to consistently detect and sanction those who do not 
adhere to the rules is a form of passive insider threat 
and symptomatic of disengagement and withdrawal 
behaviour (see section 4.4.3.2).
4.3.4.5 Justice and fairness
One of the underlying and consistent themes for this 
organisation concerns fairness. This was mentioned 
earlier regarding change, specifically, the sense of 
injustice in the implementation of the redundancy 
process (4.1.2.2.) and decision making for the pension 
changes (4.1.2.3.). This was identified as having long-
term consequences for some teams. The survey results 
echoed that the organisation was perceived by some 
to be an unfair workplace (see Figure 4.9). Unusually 
(e.g., see Rupp, 2014; Searle, 2011) we found managers 
perceived the fairness of the organisation as lower than 
their staff. However managers in both departments, 
but especially Department 2, regarded the fairness of 
decisions as more fair than employees, indicating that 
they may be more privy to the machinations underlying 
organisational decisions. These results, however, 
are encouragingly not indicative of a low fairness 
organisation overall.
4.3.4.6 Work Climate
Similarly, work climate arises from the social processing 
of information, sensemaking and the collaborative 
decisions made by members of a work unit as they 
share stories and experiences. This study examined the 
motivational climate which is deemed important in the 
sharing of knowledge in organisations. Perceptions of 
motivational climates influence how employees relate 
to their work tasks as well as to each other, which goals 
they accomplish, and how willing they are to develop 
and learn. Line managers have a critical role in how 
motivational climates form, specifically in the level 
of autonomy and trust they show to subordinates. We 
assessed performance and mastery climates, as detailed 
below.
Performance climate relates to work situations 
which foster intra-team competition (Černe, 2014). 
They promote social comparison between employees 
regardless of whether there is any prior interest in 
such comparative information. They involve public 
recognition being given to those employees who 
demonstrate their ability and restrict rewards to only 
the best or top performers. As a result, in such contexts 
employees are more likely to perceive coworkers 
as competitors and rivals, reducing their sharing of 
knowledge to maintain their personal advantage. While 
Fig. 4.10 -  Core emotions of staff over the previous month
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these climates may foster individual competition and 
deliver results, they can actively obstruct knowledge 
sharing and the acquisition of knowledge and learning 
in the organization more widely.
Mastery climate, on the other hand, creates a context 
in which employees’ effort, cooperation, learning 
and development of skills are valued, supported, and 
rewarded (Černe et al., 2014). Here employees are 
encouraged to try their best, providing opportunities for 
improvement. Employees feel encouraged to evaluate 
or monitor their own progress toward their goals. The 
goals employees achieve in such climates typically 
exceed previous performance, motivating them to share 
information and actively support each other, thereby 
facilitating the development of norms that encourage 
effort. Through these means social responsibility 
emerges, with individuals sharing insight for the wider 
benefit of others’ learning and growth. They tend to 
be more cooperative contexts, promoting collective 
effort. Importantly, research shows it is employees 
feeling trusted by their line managers than is critical in 
mastery climates creating further information sharing, 
through such leaders’ modelling behavioural norms 
(Nerstad at al., 2017). Similarly, in this organisation a 
significant correlation was found between perceptions 
of a mastery climate and cognitive-based trust in both 
the organisation and the line manager (r= 0.36 and 0.51 
respectively).
Overall, in this organisation there was endorsement of a 
learning and mastery climate in both departments, with 
managers in Department 2 more attentive to sharing 
their information and learning with their colleagues 
(see previous graph). By contrast, in Department 1 
managers endorsed a competitive performance-focused 
climate.
4.4 OUTCOMES
Our study identified a number of outcomes that 
arose from a turbulent context of change. The survey 
examined both positive and negative emotions, attitudes 
and behaviour.
4.4.1 EMOTIONS
We measured Department 1 and Department 2 
employees’ reported core emotions for one preceding 
month (October 2017). Emotions have been identified as 
important to other processes, including complex thought 
processes, recall and well-being (Yik et al., 2011). The 
results from Plan B showed differences between our 
four groups surveyed (see Figure 4.10). Specifically, 
we found managers in Department 2 strongly endorsed 
the positive emotions over the negative ones. These 
included deactivated pleasure, e.g., feeling secure 
(mean = 4.5), but also a high activation of pleasure 
(e.g., satisfied: mean = 4). Their staff were less strong 
in their activation of these emotions (mean = 2.8). 
Fig. 4.11 -  Employee outcomes
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Department 2 staff also registered some unpleasant 
activation (mean = 2.2). 
Staff and managers in Department 1 also registered 
their highest activation for pleasure (mean = 3.15 and 
3.0 respectively). However, both Department 1 groups 
indicated some unpleasant deactivation (e.g., bored) 
(mean =2.61 managers, 2.2 staff), which research 
shows is a factor in CWB (Bruursema et al., 2011), for 
example, CWB has been found to be used by employees 
as means of coping with boredom (Spector et al., 
2006). By contrast, staff in Department 2 and managers 
in Department 1 indicated unpleasant activation (e.g., 
anxious) (mean 2.2 and 2.5 respectively). Department 
2 staff displeasure was also activated (e.g., dissatisfied) 
for some (1.93). Negative emotions particularly are 
known to be a trigger for CWB (Sakurai and Jex, 2012)
4.4.2 JOB SATISFACTION AND 
INTENTION TO QUIT
We assessed job satisfaction and intention to leave 
the organisation, as well as citizenship behaviour 
which includes voluntary actions that are not typically 
recognised or rewarded but nevertheless improve 
the functioning of the workplace or benefit others 
(see Figure 4.11). Job satisfaction is shown to play 
an important role in curtailing CWB (Andreoli and 
Lefkowitz, 2009). We found job satisfaction levels were 
higher among Department 2 managers (mean = 4) and 
Department 1 employees (mean = 3.61) than the other 
two groups, but surprisingly also intention to quit was 
also higher in these two groups (mean = 4.00 and 3.91 
respectively). Research identifies high role conflict, 
low autonomy and low assertiveness as predictors of 
organisational exit (Naus et al., 2007), and that negative 
emotions can induce avoidance tendencies that are 
critical to an intention to quit (Spector and Fox, 2002). 
Both departments’ managers indicated greater levels of 
group and organisational focused citizenship behaviour 
than their staff (means = 4.5 and 4.03, 4.25 and 3.9). 
There were no significant differences between the other 
groups.
4.4.3 COUNTERPRODUCTIVE WORK 
BEHAVIOUR
A range of counterproductive work behaviour was 
also measured in the surveys completed by the two 
departments; this assessed actions which impede or 
harm other employees or the organisation itself.
4.4.3.1  Knowledge hiding
The survey measures included knowledge hiding 
activities (Connelly et al., 2012), which provides an 
important demonstration of CWB withdrawal. There 
are three different strategies that can be used in hiding 
knowledge from others at work. 
First, Rationalized hiding, where the hider provides an 
explanation (i.e.,, a rationale) as to why the requested 
information is not forthcoming. For example, hiders 
Fig. 4.12 - Employee knowledge hiding behaviour
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may explain that they are not authorized to provide 
information to people who are not on a particular 
project, or they may explain that their boss has asked 
that they not release that information. This strategy is 
the most effective in retaining trust. 
Second, Evasive hiding, in which hiders engage in 
behaviour designed to stall or delay the release of 
information or provide only part of what was requested. 
For example, hiders may provide an overly simplistic 
explanation of how something should be done, or they 
may say that they will provide information at a later date 
without the intention of ever following through. This 
strategy can undermine trustworthiness, especially if 
individuals have a reputation for being evasive. 
Finally, Playing dumb where hiders feign ignorance 
and pretend that they do not possess the requested 
information. For example, they may deny any knowledge 
of that domain or they may minimize their competence 
in that area. This approach is the most detrimental to 
trust, with low trust and potentially distrust emerging 
as the truth emerges.
Knowledge hiding levels appear relatively low in this 
organisation. However, they are more pronounced for 
staff in Department 2, especially concerning rationalised 
hiding (mean 2.5). This type of behaviour may reflect 
the specific roles they are doing, but it is interesting to 
note a comparable level is not found among managers. 
Similar levels of evasive hiding were self-reported by 
those in the two staff groups, who reveal that they use 
this tactic more often than their own managers. They 
also were more likely to use ‘playing dumb’ tactics. 
Interestingly, in the context of CWB, significant 
Fig. 4.13 - Employees’ counterproductive work behaviour
Fig. 4.14 - Percentage  of at least occasional CWB by department and level
CWB Category/ Perpetrator type Sabotage Withdrawal Prod Deviance Theft Abuse
Department 2 Managers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Department 2  Non-Managers 0.00 20.00 0.00 20.00 20.00
Department 1 Managers 16.67 50.00 0.00 16.67 100.00
Department 1  Non-Mangagers 3.57 42.86 10.71 14.29 46.43
% of overall sample 4.26 34.04 6.38 12.77 42.55
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correlations were found between rational hiding (r = 
0.45) and playing dumb (r=0.37) with line manager 
distrust. Thus, the sharing of information was curtailed 
where there was concern about the intentions of the line 
manager. This corresponds to prior research showing 
how the mechanism of reciprocated distrust inhibits 
knowledge sharing (Černe at al., 2014).
4.4.3.2 Types of Counterproductive 
Work Behaviour (CWB)
We measured types of counterproductive work 
behaviour (CWB) using a checklist that respondents 
completed about their own activities. The list 
differentiated five different types of activity (Spector 
et al., 2006). It included deliberate acts of sabotage 
against the organisation; stealing and theft; deviation 
from stated policy and procured (production deviance); 
withdrawal activities, which comprise actions that 
reduce time at work such as unnecessary sick leave, 
extending breaks or leaving work early; and actions of 
interpersonal abuse which included rude and uncivil 
behaviour against others, making jokes at others’ 
expense, through to physical threats and abuse. While 
a relatively small sample, the results do show that 
anonymous self-report is a useful means of detecting 
CWB. They show that self-declared transgressive 
activities are confined to a relatively small number of 
perpetrators.
Surprisingly, the highest average level of self-
reported CWB activity was found among managers 
in Department 1. They also indicated greater levels of 
passive withdrawal behaviour (mean 1.25) and active 
interpersonal abuse (mean 1.17). Similar levels were 
self-reported for their subordinates (1.24 and 1.12) (see 
Figure 4.13).
4.4.3.3 Types of Counterproductive 
Work Behaviour (CWB)
We measured types of counterproductive work 
behaviour (CWB) using a checklist that respondents 
completed about their own activities. The list 
differentiated five different types of activity (Spector 
et al., 2006). It included deliberate acts of sabotage 
against the organisation; stealing and theft; deviation 
from stated policy and procured (production deviance); 
withdrawal activities, which comprise actions that 
reduce time at work such as unnecessary sick leave, 
extending breaks or leaving work early; and actions of 
interpersonal abuse which included rude and uncivil 
behaviour against others, making jokes at others’ 
expense, through to physical threats and abuse. While 
a relatively small sample, the results do show that 
anonymous self-report is a useful means of detecting 
CWB. They show that self-declared transgressive 
activities are confined to a relatively small number of 
perpetrators.
Surprisingly, the highest average level of self-
reported CWB activity was found among managers 
in Department 1. They also indicated greater levels of 
passive withdrawal behaviour (mean 1.25) and active 
interpersonal abuse (mean 1.17). Similar levels were 
self-reported for their subordinates (1.24 and 1.12) (see 
Figure 4.13).
Fig. 4.15 - Categories of perpetrator by department (%)
% of total survey 
sample
Nothing 
reported Slipper
1 type beh 
occasionally 
1 type done more 
frequently
Multiple CWB 
occasionally 
Serial transgressor 
- frequent
Department 2 
Managers 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Department 2 Non-
Managers  60 20.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 0.00
Department 1 
Managers 0 50.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00
Department 1 Non-
Managers  39.29 14.29 3.57 14.29 10.71 17.86
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Although the average response on the checklist of 
CWB showed relatively low average levels, closer 
scrutiny of the results revealed patterns to this type of 
action. Important differences were evident between the 
two departments and between managers and their staff. 
Specifically, we found pockets of transgression evident 
in the results collected: we found six different groups 
– non-transgressors who reported never undertaking 
any CWB activity; ‘slippers’ who reported an action 
that occurred occasionally within one of the five CWB 
categories; repeat single type transgressors endorsing 
occasional activities within only one category; curtailed 
multiple occasional transgressors who undertook 
occasional transgression in more than two CWB 
categories; broad multiple occasional transgressors 
who undertook occasional transgression in more than 
two CWB categories; and frequent multiple offenders 
who undertook more frequent transgression across a 
number of CWB categories (see Figure 4.14).
Within Department 2, managers did not self-report any 
CWB, and only two forms of CWB were reported from 
staff members: one, a slipper, identified occasional acts 
of withdrawal in taking extending breaks, and the other 
was a multiple occasional transgressor with occasional 
employer-focused theft and occasional interpersonal 
abuse and incivility (see Figure 4.13).
Importantly, the CWB pattern was very different 
in Department 1; here respondents indicated they 
undertook all five forms of CWB (see Figure 4.13). In 
this department we found 50% of managers and 46% 
of staff were serial offenders. Most common across this 
department as a whole was the self-report of occasional 
acts of incivility and interpersonal abuse directed 
towards others often in the form of insulting or making 
fun of someone (56%), followed by withdrawal of 
labour (44%) through taking excessive breaks and not 
completing a full day’s work. We also found that 14% 
reported that they had undertaken theft in the form 
of removing organisational resources without proper 
authorisation and 6% indicated sabotage behaviour 
in the form of deliberately wasting resources,. The 
prevalence of these activities, however, differed by 
level (see Figure 4.14). Thus while only 3 managers 
reported withdrawal behaviour, this constituted half of 
the managers in this department.
Thus CWB was much more apparent in Department 
1. For example, amongst the managers in Department 
1, all reported that they had undertaken some form 
of CWB; two identified themselves as slippers, one 
identifying occasional theft activity and the other 
occasional actions of interpersonal incivility; another 
was a repeat occasional interpersonal abuser; two were 
found to be curtailed multiple occasional transgressors, 
Fig. 4.16 - Associations between Emotions and Counterproductive Work Behaviour
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undertaking withdrawal and interpersonal abuse 
actions, and the last reported broad multiple occasional 
transgressions, including sabotage, alongside the more 
common withdrawal and interpersonal abuse found in 
this department. The common form of transgression in 
Department 1 was interpersonal abuse (100%), followed 
by withdrawal (50%) and then theft and sabotage (17%). 
In terms of staff numbers, 39% reported undertaking no 
CWB. However, it was apparent that for those who did 
report CWB, its nature was distinct in three important 
ways: first they self-reported behaviour covering all five 
types of CWB; second, the number of behaviours within 
each CWB category was greater, thus while managers 
might indicate either a single action in a category or 
confined to one category (18% in the single slippers 
or repeat single type transgressors categories), more of 
their staff showed activity within and between CWB 
categories; and finally, the frequency of their actions 
was more pronounced than that indicated by their 
management, thus 6 managers reported interpersonal 
aggression then this was increased to 13 staff, showing 
a proliferation of CWB activities (14% self-identifying 
more frequent actions within one type of CWB, and 
29% with behaviour that crossed more than two forms). 
This result shows a clear escalation in the frequency 
and range of CWB that occurs within Department 1.
The interviews confirmed interpersonal abuse was 
a present form of CWB, with some leaders using 
confrontational communication styles, as the following 
quote shows:
It was just really the way he was, ‘it's my way 
or the highway’, that sort of stuff. ‘I am not 
listening to you, just get on and do as you are 
told’, ‘I don't care. Get on with it’. Shouting 
at people in front of others, demeaning 
people in front of others that sort of thing, 
not good (I10).
Importantly, this type of leadership behaviour was 
not confined to just Department 1. In our interviews, 
an individual reflected that despite results from the 
organisation’s own survey indicating the presence of 
bullying and harassment, managers appeared reluctant 
to acknowledge and tackle this behaviour:
When our engagement results came in for 
last year [they] weren't very good. And they 
took us for an away day, to talk about what 
was wrong. And one of the things that had 
scored poorly is intimidation and bullying 
in the department and (my senior manager), 
I can remember him saying, ‘I mean, 
intimidation and bullying doesn't happen 
in our department’. And I said to him, ‘yes 
it does because it's happened to me’... and 
then he was like, ‘oh right ok’. And then later 
on we were having a big group discussion 
and again he said bullying and intimidation 
doesn't happen in this department. And I 
thought, you didn't listen to me (I18).
4.4.3.4 Associations with CWB
We further analysed which activities had significant 
associations with CWB for the two departments 
surveyed. Specifically, we found those who sabotage 
were also likely to be abusive to others (r=0.5), 
while those who withdraw also undertake production 
deviances (r=0.3). Those who undertake production 
deviance regarding the rules and norms of how their 
job should be performed were also likely to sabotage 
(r=0.3), and to be interpersonally aggressive (r=0.45). 
A second scale, Interpersonal Conflict at Work Scale 
(ICAWS) (Spector and Jex, 1998), was also included in 
the survey to confirm the prevalence of interpersonal 
incivility and aggression. Analysis confirmed those 
indicating high levels of interpersonal aggression on 
the checklist also reported interpersonal conflict on the 
ICAWS (r=0.5). In line with other studies we found theft 
to be a distinct transgression which did not correlate 
with other forms of CWB (Spector et al., 2006).
Exploring associations of those who undertake CWB 
with aspects of change also revealed some significant 
associations. Specifically, we found that those 
who perceived pride in their role and thought their 
profession was being threatened by the changes were 
positively associated with four types of transgression: 
sabotage, withdrawal, production deviance and 
incivility (r=0.45). In contrast those who perceived 
that their organisational pride and the desirability of 
the job were being threatened by the changes were 
more likely to indicate they had undertaken sabotage 
and interpersonal abuse (r=0.35). Those who felt their 
relationship with their line manager was threatened by 
the change also had high associations with production 
deviance (r=0.45), while those who felt that the welfare 
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of others was being threatened were linked to self-
report sabotage (r=0.4).
Further those who identified change as personally 
difficult were more likely to report that they undertook 
CWB. Specifically, those low in change self-efficacy 
were also associated with undertaking production 
deviance (r= -0.3), and such CWB activity was also 
associated with a less positive overall attitude toward 
change (r=0.5). Research shows that during a period 
of stress high self-efficacy can play a critical role in 
ameliorating CWB (Fida et al., 2015). This result 
suggests production deviance is a form of CWB that 
is more common for those who have low endorsement 
and acceptance of change. This group were also found 
to be low in both forms of identity (career and work), 
which suggests that they may not regard their employer 
or career as central to their personhood however they 
indicated that their role and the pride derived from 
undertaking this role are significantly threatened. Prior 
research shows that threats to identity can be a trigger 
for CWB (Aquino and Douglas, 2003).
In contrast, those with high CWB withdrawal reported 
higher levels of job satisfaction (r=0.4). This suggests 
they may feel some pleasure in their CWB activities. 
Those high in CWB interpersonal abuse paradoxically 
also reported that they had higher relationship quality 
in their team (r=0.3) and also perceive higher levels of 
affect-based trust (benevolence) in their line manager 
(r=0.35). This suggests that those who undertake 
interpersonal incivility may not be aware that such 
actions might undermine relationships, but perhaps 
also that they feel passively supported rather than 
sanctioned by their line manager.
Core emotion is a further area significantly associated 
with CWB. Specifically, we found in line with prior 
research (Fox et al., 2001; Spector and Fox, 2002; 2005; 
2010; Sakurai and Jex, 2012) an association between 
negative emotions and CWB, indeed specific emotions 
accompanied each form of CWB (see Figure 8). For 
example, saboteurs were found to be significantly 
associated with the negative emotions related to active 
displeasure and displeasure (r>0.4), while production 
deviators were more associated with other negative 
emotion areas (displeasure and deactivated displeasure) 
(r=0.33 & 0.4 respectively). In contrast, withdrawers 
were associated with slightly different negative 
emotions (deactivated displeasure and unpleasant 
deactivation) (0.35 & 0.4 respectively). Finally, those 
who indicated that they undertook interpersonal abuse 
had significant associations with all five of the negative 
emotions (r=0.4). Critically, prior research argues that 
such negative emotions are important triggers of CWB, 
particularly in reducing self-regulation (Spector and 
Fox, 2002; 2005; Samnani et al., 2013).
4.5 CONCLUSION
The results from the interviews and survey show 
how the various ongoing and new changes permeate 
all areas and levels of the organisation. It highlights 
differences in threat perceptions between different 
parts of the hierarchy as well as between departments 
which can provoke different kinds of CWB throughout 
the organisation. The analysis reveals that a variety 
of positive and negative attitudes and behaviours are 
evident, which illustrate local team contexts and 
the overall organisational climate. There is clear 
discontent among employees regarding the process 
of, and communication of, some key organisational 
changes which leads to perceptions of powerlessness, 
dissatisfaction and injustice among some individuals. 
Inconsistent leadership appears to be a particular 
problem in propagating the uncertainty which 
organisational changes produce. Moreover, the strongly 
hierarchical nature of the organisation appears to make 
the role of managers critically important in setting 
the tone for acceptable and unacceptable behaviours. 
The findings show that informal norms and individual 
perceptions can significantly challenge the formal 
controls the organisation has in place.
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5. FINDINGS 
– CASE 
STUDIES
As part of our study we examined three separate 
case studies of insider threat, occurring within the 
organisation in the past six years. These are outlined 
below to show how these events unfolded and to 
identify any important triggers of CWB.
5.1 CASE STUDY 1
5.1.1 OVERVIEW
Case Study 1 involved an incident where an employee 
who had worked at the organisation for several years 
took a confidential and highly sensitive document off-
site and then lost it. The information was eventually 
found shortly afterwards and returned to the organisation 
by a contractor; nonetheless this represented a serious 
security and reputation breach of the organisation. 
While there was a variance of opinion about whether 
the perpetrator intended to breach security, the fact that 
they had failed to report the security breach and the 
loss of the document, and then recreated the document, 
was viewed by many as an attempt to cover up their 
wrongdoing. A further dimension to this case was the 
lack of appreciation the individual appeared to have for 
the severity of the situation. This incident can therefore 
be classified as a combination of both accidental (in 
the initial loss of the document) and intentional (in that 
the activity was not transparently reported and action 
was taken to avoid accountability). There does seem 
to be agreement among interviewees however, that the 
intention appears not to have been malicious at any 
point, but instead self-protective. The final outcome 
was the termination of the individual’s employment.
We interviewed four individuals associated with this 
case: two co-workers, the line manager of the individual 
involved and a security representative. We also consulted 
HR and security documents and the supporting 
paperwork for the incident. The disciplinary script 
outlined the process of an independent investigation 
and an indication of the timelines. It included mention 
of the individual’s ongoing suspension from work 
directly following the suspension interview, with 
regular (weekly) phone contact to follow. While details 
are provided of the named HR link for the individual, 
it was not clear from the script whether the person 
undertaking the suspension would be making this 
weekly contact nor what the provision for face to face 
meetings was. Checks were required to ensure that 
the perpetrator was aware of the confidentiality of the 
incident and the named individuals with whom they 
could talk to about it. Further welfare support was 
offered through an employee assistance programme 
but it was not made explicit whether they could talk 
about the incident as part of the counselling support 
being offered. The disciplinary letter outlined the gross 
misconduct and that it was considered a ‘senior breach’.
The investigation report further outlined the lack 
of malicious intent, concluding that there had been 
a disruption to the usual routine of this person. The 
report indicated that this individual had previously 
demonstrated personal goal setting and planning and 
organisation behaviours, but ineffective communication 
with others. There were attributes of personal laziness 
identified with the perpetrator. The case reported a 
perceived lack of acknowledgment from the individual 
about the severity of the incident, but not how this 
view was arrived at. It identified a number of attempts 
to cover-up the error. The events were positioned 
as a breach of trust between the individual and the 
organisation. The report also outlined the lack of 
remorse over the incident and events that followed, 
but with no clear insight into how this conclusion was 
derived.The thematic analysis of the interview data 
from this case study is presented below.
5.1.2 PERPETRATOR 
CHARACTERISTICS
In terms of the perpetrator’s personal characteristics, 
there were a number of themes which occurred strongly 
across the interviews.
5.1.2.1 Different to Other Team 
Members
All interviewees commented that this individual was 
‘different’ to other team members. This was in terms 
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of their demographic and junior position in the team 
and their introverted demeanour. For example, one 
interviewee commented: “We are a bunch of nerdy 
types, we are not, you know, royal marines and stuff 
but he was, even nerdy beyond the pale, compared to 
us” (I6). Another commented that being the youngest 
member of the team: “He didn't really bond with 
anybody else in particular” (I5). This impacted both 
on the individual’s proactive input at work and in their 
socialising with colleagues:
He tended to be quiet. So in a meeting you 
wouldn't hear a lot from him. And I put that 
down  to perhaps some insecurity about his 
technical knowledge. The rest of the team is 
quite  experienced and quite knowledgeable. 
He was pretty much the junior member. He 
was also in  his personality quite introverted 
(I5).
5.1.2.2 Team Relationships
While there was palpable tolerance for this difference 
within the team, it was clear that the individual did 
present some relational difficulties within the team. For 
example, one colleague commented:
He could be quite rude and yet I was only 
trying to make conversation with him and be 
nice  to him… at times he could say things 
that would offend me. And I would just think, 
how can  you? I would say other people 
noticed he was problematic (I4).
Accordingly, there was consistent speculation among 
interviewees that the perpetrator in this case may have 
been on the autistic spectrum. While we have no official 
confirmation of this (the individual was not tested 
while working in the organisation), research shows 
that those on the autistic spectrum can have lower 
levels of co-operation than those who are neurotypical 
and demonstrate unusual social communication 
(Soderstrom et al., 2002).
5.1.2.3 Self Interest
These interpersonal problems appear related to the 
perception that the individual was self-focused. For 
example, one interviewee commented that: “I found if 
I gave him something he enjoyed doing he would work 
at it solidly” (I5), but that issues arose in his motivation 
when it was a less desired task that was presented. 
Importantly the individual appeared to lack citizenship 
behaviour towards others, for example, in relation to 
sharing the burden of driving to social outings. One 
interviewee commented:
After 3 or 4 times you think, well maybe it's 
your turn to offer a lift you know. But he  
would never offer a lift because he would 
always want to have a drink when we got 
there…  so he stopped going… Nobody else 
is driving, so I would have to drive, so I won't 
go tonight…  he didn't try to get anybody 
back…I would then point out that sometimes 
it's nice to be  sociable… He was just not on 
the same piece of paper. It was not an option. 
(I6)
This lack of social reciprocation and individual focus 
exemplifies characteristics of those on the autistic 
spectrum (Soderstrom et al., 2002; Baron-Cohen et al., 
2004), but again this individual had not been formally 
diagnosed. Further, there is evidence of low levels 
of reciprocated empathy between the team and this 
individual which is common in cases of CWB (Moore 
et al., 2012).
5.1.2.4  Immaturity
A related issue was the individual’s perceived 
immaturity. This caused some issues with other team 
members, for example one interviewee commented:
after he had been here a few years everybody 
else was highlighting things he'd say as  
abnormal, weird and I would kind of defend 
him a bit. Figuring that basically he wasn't 
nasty,  he was just a bit wet behind the ears 
sort of thing…he would get under people's 
skin in the  same way as you know as a 10 
year old boy would, you know has his own 
interests at heart  and doesn't think of the 
bigger picture (I6).
Immaturity has been linked to cognitive diversity in 
previous research (Soderstrom et al., 2002) but also 
found to be a personality trait in other studies of insider 
threat (CPNI, 2013).
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5.1.2.5 Identity Conflict
A further and perhaps underlying dimension to this 
individual’s perceived ‘difference’, was the multiple 
identity conflicts they encountered, occurring at 
personal, professional, and organisational levels. 
On a personal level, the individual experienced an 
identity conflict which appeared to affect them quite 
profoundly. For confidentiality reasons we cannot 
divulge the detail of this personal issue, however one co-
worker explained: “I found him to be quite a troubled 
person… he always felt persecuted… he always felt 
like society was judging him” (I4). On a professional 
level, it was widely recognised by colleagues that 
“he wasn't particularly interested” (I4) in his work 
role. Unlike his other colleagues, the individual did 
not show a strong desire to work in the organisation 
or his particular role, nor were they motivated by the 
same kind of professional identification that other team 
members experienced: “On occasion he would talk to 
me about leaving here…I don't think he was satisfied 
here… it was local to him… that's more of how he 
ended up here… So people were aware that he wanted 
to do other things” (I4). Another stated: “At least we 
are a little bit more engaged with what we do, and more 
positive in what we do… we are working at a one-off 
place and there is an element of, it's a privilege to have 
a specialised job, I don't think he got that” (I6). This 
was made more apparent by the fact that the individual 
was considered highly competent: “He was clever. He 
was intelligent. He was good at doing what he did…he 
usually added value when he did things” (I6).
5.1.2.6 Emotional Instability
This matter led to the individual suffering from mental 
health issues which were recognised at work leading to 
medical and managerial support. Research shows that 
CWB can rise during a period of personal stress (Fox 
et al., 2001; Fida et al., 2015). While one interviewee 
commented that the individual’s mental health issue: 
“didn't often manifest at work” (I5), a triangulation 
of the findings across participants portrays a different 
picture. For example, another interviewee commented 
that the individual had voluntarily moved to a less 
sought-after position in the organisation, which may 
suggest an inability to cope or an act of self-sabotage: 
“It did surprise me yes, because where he was was 
certainly better… It was a better job where he worked… 
I think he was just unhappy. I think he could have moved 
anywhere to be honest” (I4). Another interviewee 
commented that in terms of the resultant breach that 
they had questioned how the individual’s mental health 
condition and medical treatment may impact on their 
decision making:
Because of vetting in confidence I couldn't 
tell people there were [specific] issues 
maybe sort  of burdening their mind so that 
so they are not as security conscious as they 
should be,  because… we can't even give 
100% of our attention span but it’s even less 
for somebody who  is carrying an emotional 
weight, and also on top of that they were 
receiving medication for  depression… I 
felt like, look, if this had been me, I would 
have wanted somebody to fight my  corner 
and I would have wanted people to ask 
these questions… Nobody was interested…  
because a breach is a breach (I8).
Further, this individual was also undergoing quite a 
significant life-change concurrent to the incident, by 
moving house to live alone for the first time. While this 
is a significant life event for anyone, for this individual, 
if indeed on the autistic spectrum, its impact was likely 
to have been further amplified through: i.) disruption 
to normal routines, ii.) having to undertake for the first 
time home-related responsibilities, and iii.) reduced 
levels of social and practical parental support. There 
was therefore likely to have been a considerable spill-
over from these additional home responsibilities 
into work and in making greater demands on the 
individual’s cognitive resources, exacerbating further 
his forgetfulness and distractibility (discussed below). 
A colleague commented that: “I think, because of 
his problems or circumstances he likes the privacy 
of being away from his parents. But I think perhaps 
organisationally, if that's a word, I'm not sure he is best 
able to cope with it” (I4). While research shows that 
those who have a later diagnosis of autism are more 
likely to suffer from depression and suicidal tendencies 
(Cassidy et al., 2014; Lai and Baron-Cohen, 2015), this 
individual had not been diagnosed and thus the root of 
their emotional stability is unclear.
5.1.2.7 Limited Conscientiousness: 
previous breaches
A significant dimension to this case was the finding 
that the perpetrator had limited conscientiousness and 
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had breached organisational and security policy on a 
number of prior occasions.
5.1.2.8  Lack of awareness or disregard 
of rules
The individual frequently demonstrated a general lax 
approach to rule following and adherence to the norms of 
the workplace. His actions reveal moral disengagement 
in the form of distortion of consequences, and failing 
to see the need to comply with rules. For example one 
interviewee explained:
I don't think he ever intentionally caused 
problems for anybody else. You have 
reminded me that, for a while he cycled to 
work and because of the nature of the work 
on site we have strict health and safety on 
site… on at least two occasions he got into 
trouble for forgetting his cycle helmet or not 
having cycle lights on in the dark. It was 
just another example, now I think about it, 
of him not taking something seriously that 
everybody else takes seriously (I5).
In relation to the specific case study incident, this same 
individual commented:
I don't think he deliberately did anything 
other than failed to tell someone that he 
had lost  the document and create a copy… 
from my knowledge I can see that he may 
have thought he  was doing the right thing 
there. But he probably was not aware of the 
number of rules he was  breaking (I5).
5.1.2.9 Forgetfulness and distractibility
A well-noted theme across interviewees in this 
case was that the individual displayed persistent 
forgetfulness (I4). The individual actually admitted in 
the investigation that they had become distracted. One 
interviewee explained that they believed this to be a key 
trigger of the incident in this case:
he was a particularly forgetful individual, not 
strong organisational skills. Quite diligent 
and  hard working in many ways but he had 
a reputation for forgetting things and having 
to be  reminded to do things. And I can't 
help feeling that that was at the core of his 
problem, you  know, he put this thing down 
and got distracted by something else. It was 
just a fundamental  part of his character that 
he had problems remembering important 
things (I5).
This forgetfulness was a further element which 
distinguished the individual from the team and was 
evident to, and problematic for, others:
I found he had to write down a lot more than 
I expected… I had given him the password 
for a  machine and then like 3 days later he 
had asked if I could give him the password. 
And I said I  gave it to you 3 days ago. And he 
said, oh, I can't find that anywhere. And he 
said can you  just write it down again. And 
I said well no, because if you have lost the 
password for it, now  you have got to spend 
time now looking for the password. That is 
more important than  anything else that you 
should be doing because that is a problem 
for us if you have lost the  password (I6).
Another commented: “The fact that he was quite 
forgetful and we would have to explain certain things, 
technical aspects of the job, we would have to go over 
things over and over again. Some of the team found that 
frustrating” (I5).
There was a recurrent theme among the team that the 
individual appeared absent-minded and “disconnected” 
(I6):
It was quite strange…we would have group 
meetings where we would talk about what we 
had done in the past week…He wouldn't write 
down what he had done, but then he often 
wouldn't remember either… I would come 
out of the training course and I would say 
to him ‘what do you think about that?’ and 
he would pretty much have no recollection of 
the entire meeting, even though we had just 
walked out of it (I4).
Thus the lack of appreciation for security breaches, 
coupled with his known forgetfulness caused the 
individual’s colleagues some concern, however, 
such prior experiences were not shared or flagged to 
60
FindingS – caSE StudiES
Assessing and mitigating the impact of organisational change on counterproductive work behaviour
management or to the security team. One individual 
noted: “I know other people noticed it, but I don't know 
to what extent it caused problems for him” (I4). Rather 
than this issue being dealt with directly, the situation 
became a topic of casual team humour:
It was a standing joke…quite often other 
people would go, oh and you went to that 
meeting,  and you did this thing and he was, 
'did I?' So he didn't seem very switched on to 
the  moment…and almost like you had to talk 
loudly, and at him to get him to even notice 
that he  was part of the conversation (I6).
5.1.3 5.1.4 TEAM CLIMATE
5.1.3.1 Passive Insider Threat
Accordingly, the widely shared team knowledge about 
this perpetrator’s potential risk was made explicit by 
one interviewee: “if it was going to happen to anybody, 
it would have been him” (I5). Yet, it is quite striking 
that colleagues did not raise their concerns. This points 
to significant moral disengagement by other staff 
members through mechanisms including the diffusion 
of responsibility, demonstrated in the following quote:
He worked in our team for a number of years, 
and we had mentioned that he shouldn't write  
things down all the time, and that if he loses 
a password that's a drop everything and fix it  
thing. It's not a thing where you can just you 
know, tut and walk on and do other things…
[but]  I don't think we probably impressed 
upon him more how serious they were (I6).
We consider passive insider threat to include the 
unintentional behaviour of those around an insider 
that facilitates or tacitly condones the insider’s 
threat behaviour and consequently threatens or harms 
an organisation and/or its members. Indeed, further 
insight into his own moral disengagement was apparent 
in his reaction to the sanction he received following 
the incident becoming public; it revealed how far the 
consequences of his actions had become distorted and 
how he failed to see the fundamental breach in trust 
that had been created:
He was a little bit surprised. He almost 
couldn't appreciate it was a problem… and 
that perhaps he would just end up with maybe 
an improvement notice. I don't think he ever 
fully appreciated how much trouble it had 
caused… I think given the fact that he was 
unable to appreciate precisely where he had 
gone wrong and the lead investigator made 
a comment to me that at no point did he try 
to apologise for it either, she used the words, 
‘it's as if he doesn't know what he has done’. 
I felt that he probably wouldn't be able to 
continue with us. Because how long before 
the next episode happens (I5).
Clearly this suggests a problem with the individual’s 
personal accountability. However, interviewees did 
acknowledge that: “If it was going to happen to anybody, 
it would have been him” (I5). Other evidence indicates 
a ‘bystander effect’ and a diffusion of responsibility 
among the team where such concerns were cognitively 
restructured as solely a management preserve, as the 
next example reflects:
Fig. 5.1 - Case 1 Timeline
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I, as not [being] the line manager, had the 
option of sort of just, not wasting an hour of 
my life, sort of taking him under my wing… 
because I wasn't his line manager I then 
didn't take it that I needed to further impress 
on him or start nagging him. I said what I 
thought should happen and if he chose not 
to do it, then, it wasn't my problem. And he 
didn't, I suppose (I6).
This division of security tasks as being the role of 
the line manager exemplifies the importance placed 
on the formal hierarchy within this organisation, with 
accountability afforded only to management roles, as 
highlighted in Part 1. This creates an abdication of 
responsibility among staff for speaking up and sharing 
their concerns about a colleague who is evidently 
struggling to fit into this organisation and meet the 
demands of their role. Further, there was little evidence 
of HR playing an active role in supporting this staff 
member, despite undertaking a surprising lateral and 
potentially downward job change in the organisation.
5.1.3.2 Organisational culture
In reflecting on the culture of the organisation, 
interviewees considered that a shift in the organisation’s 
security and overall culture may have contributed to the 
individual’s behaviour and to the behaviour of some of 
those around them:
I suppose I have been institutionalised 
because I have been here so long but when I 
started,  combinations, keys and passwords 
were kind of a serious big issue you know, 
the sort of thing  that should make you have a 
cold sweat if you do it wrong. Maybe because 
when I started  here people were a lot more, I 
don't know, a bit strict. It was maybe a little 
bit less liberal of a  place to work. You know 
you knew you could lose your job over things 
like that. Maybe he  didn't have that feeling 
about the place. Maybe because you know, 
we are quite a friendly,  it's a nice relaxed 
place but maybe we didn't impress upon him 
enough how big a deal that is  (I6).
5.1.3.3 Empathy blocks reporting
In addition to reporting being considered a line manager 
responsibility and a more lenient organisational culture, 
there was a feeling of empathy towards the individual, 
which left colleagues reluctant to speak out about their 
prior breaches and unsafe behaviour. One interviewee 
explained:
It felt a little bit like if you said something 
unkind that you were kind of kicking a 
puppy sort  of thing…I like to think that I 
don't deliberately go out of my way to draw 
people’s attention  to negative behaviour 
because it seems unkind. But… there was a 
bit in most team meetings  where everybody 
kind of looked at each other, including 
management, and sort of grinned as  if to 
say, ah he's gonna miss the point here… 
everybody kind of knew but nobody had a 
clever  way to bring it up I suppose, without 
it being hurtful, is how I perceived it. (I6).
Critically, as discussed in Part 1, such empathy 
was underpinned by a concern about the effect of 
registering such concerns for security clearance: “It's 
the whole thing of, you get the DV clearance, and that's 
quite probing and I think you are always concerned 
you know that, if you said something it would come 
back on you on your clearance” (I4). Past research 
reveals that empathy, care and concern for others 
can actually facilitate reporting on others’ behaviour 
through a desire to show sympathy or in response to 
other’s distress (Eisenberg et al.,1998), however for 
continued information sharing this must be matched 
by an empathetic and respectful approach from the 
authorities who receive such reports (Thomas et al., 
2017).
5.1.3.4  Team response/learning post 
incident
Following the incident, there were some reflections on 
how the team had reacted and the learning that had been 
derived from it. The incident was not openly discussed 
within the team, instead management reminded staff 
of the procedures around security ‘anonymously’ 
and ‘conversationally’ (I6). In fact, the individual’s 
departure was learned via rumour and assumption a 
few weeks after the event. While this might respect the 
anonymity of the individual involved, it reduces the 
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in-depth explicit learning that could have been gained 
from openly discussing the incident, and inadvertently 
may increase a climate of closed communication, which 
appears to be at the root of many security issues as well 
as low organisational trust.
5.1.4 CASE STUDY 1: CONCLUSION
In conclusion, to illustrate our overall findings we have 
derived a timeline of the triggers which led to the insider 
threat activity in Case 1. First, we propose that poor 
input controls around the time of recruitment may be 
responsible for why the individual, who appears to have 
had poor role and organisational ‘fit’, was accepted into 
the organisation. Thus it is important to acknowledge 
issues of not only an individual’s job engagement 
(Moore et al., 2016) but also their suitability to their 
role and organisation. Other clear triggers of this 
incident involve the individual’s low conscientiousness 
(found in other studies, e.g., CPNI, 2013), and high 
levels of distractibility and forgetfulness. When 
coupled with immaturity and emotional instability, 
along with poorly developed coping mechanisms, this 
led to repeated counterproductive work behaviour and 
security breaches.
Critically, such behaviour was abetted by the moral 
disengagement of the individual’s colleagues, 
culminating in a passive insider threat as concerns were 
not flagged to management or security. In part this 
arose due to empathy with the individual’s personal 
circumstances on the one hand, and the individual’s 
low agreeableness on the other. Concurrently there 
was anxiety from colleagues that raising such concerns 
would produce an over-reaction from HR and security; 
this reduced the willingness of colleagues to speak out. 
Through these competing forces, the group remained 
focused on protecting themselves at the expense of their 
employing organisation or the individual perpetrator.
While the individual did receive some emotional 
support from the organisation (both formally and 
through their line manager and some individuals in the 
team), it does not appear to have been tailored strongly 
enough to their individual needs. During this time 
period, the magnitude of the change to the individual’s 
routine, and turbulence in his psychological, home, and 
working lives coupled with limited or depleted coping 
and social skills (linked to possible undiagnosed ASD) 
created a crucible for CWB. In hindsight it appears that 
much of this incident deals with routine and predictable 
behaviour of this individual, which suggests the event 
was preventable. While many of the individual’s 
actions were not considered official ‘security’ warning 
signs (e.g., such as excessive copying or staying after 
hours), they were certainly flags of unsafe behaviour 
whose frequency did seem to be increasing; this should 
have made it a particular concern for the organisation.
5.2 CASE STUDY 2
5.2.1 OVERVIEW
Case Study 2 involved an incident where a Removable 
Hard Drive containing sensitive information went 
missing from an office. After a period of extensive 
searching by the organisation’s security teams lasting 
around two weeks, the item was found unconcealed 
in the manager’s drawer (which had already been 
searched, where it had not been there earlier). The 
general consensus was therefore that someone (an 
unknown perpetrator) had ‘planted’ the missing drive 
in the drawer as an act of sabotage, or at least put it there 
to avoid accountability. The incident could therefore be 
classified as intentional and malicious or accidental 
and non-malicious. Given the ambiguity around the 
events and as no individual was found responsible 
(the manager in whose drawer the disk was considered 
innocent given previous searches), the analysis of this 
case in terms of perpetrator characteristics is limited. 
There was speculation from interviewees as to who 
the perpetrator may have been; there were various 
team problems which raised suspicion towards certain 
individuals. However, all members of the team received 
a written warning and new procedures (i.e., the ‘two 
person rule’, meaning individuals must be accompanied 
by at least one other person in secure locations) were 
implemented for a period of time after the incident. 
The following analysis takes account of discussion 
around possible perpetrators but largely focuses on the 
local climate, which appears significant in triggering 
this case.
We interviewed five individuals associated with this 
case, including the team manager, one team employee 
and three security representatives. We also consulted 
the limited HR and security documents relating to the 
incident comprising two process files and an email. 
These documents all outline the changes to access 
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policy and keyholders that required individuals to have 
two staff members when accessing external storage, 
and to the clear desk policy that was in operation. 
There was little further specific information due to the 
fact no one individual was formally identified as the 
perpetrator.
The thematic analysis of this case study is presented 
below.
5.2.2 TEAM CLIMATE
A strong theme across the interviews for this case 
study was the negative team climate within which this 
incident occurred.
5.2.2.1 Leadership
A number of interviewees commented that the 
leadership of this team was an underlying issue within 
the team. There was a perception that the manager’s 
entry to the team comprised an ulterior motive to 
instigate change within the team. For example, as one 
individual stated:
There is a lot of umbrage, if you get the 
impression that someone comes in and they 
either  want to bring in their own people, 
or they want to get rid of, don't respect the 
people that are  there, or their experience. 
Or, you know they seem to have a hidden 
agenda to reduce numbers  or get rid of a 
function (I7).
Accordingly, in the wake of the incident, there was a 
perception that some individuals within the team may 
have wanted to deliberately sabotage the manager. 
While prior to the incident, some suggested that 
“relationships between the team members were 
affable” (I11), other suggested that there was a uniting 
factor: “the team gelled quite well, because they have 
had one common individual [the line manager] who 
they may not get on with I guess, or respect” (I7).
5.2.2.2 Intra-team conflict
However, the interviews revealed that team 
relationships were not always cohesive:
I don't think there was a high level of morale. 
There wasn't a very unified performance. 
Perhaps behaviours weren't as positive or 
strong in terms of teamwork and pulling 
together and delivering, people are getting 
more isolated and independent in their 
work and behaviour… people were getting 
frustrated with those that weren't actually 
delivering, there is a link also in terms 
of behaviour in those individuals being 
disruptive to the team putting additional 
pressure on those ones who were trying to be 
supportive (I7).
This toxic mix of distrust towards the team’s manager, 
coupled with within-team discontent was considered to 
have provided the foundation for this incident, according 
to some interviewees: “would I be surprised looking 
back at some of the behaviour, the dissatisfaction with 
some of the team members that may have acted and 
done something deliberately? Not fully surprised” (I7).
Fig. 5.2 - Case 2 Timeline
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5.2.3 IMPACT ON THE TEAM
5.2.3.1 Climate of Suspicion
After the incident occurred, team members were 
interviewed within a strong climate of suspicion, as one 
interviewee explained:
So it’s not complacency but there is a 
general feeling here that if you have been 
given one of  these [security passes] you are 
trustworthy, and you all work together and 
we trust each other  and you do each other 
no harm. So, that was shattered. It had quite 
a bad impact on the team,  de-motivational 
because they all felt that they were held guilty 
for something that they hadn't  done (I9).
The previously poor relationships in the team coupled 
with the pervasive taint of suspicion produced a 
heightened level of discontent within the team, as 
another individual reflected: “It was a very difficult 
situation in there anyway, not a happy pleasant 
atmosphere to begin with, and after the incident it 
deteriorated” (I11).
At the same time, a central focus of blame started to 
coalesce around one particular individual:
Now the contentious point here is that… 
people were trying to look for a culprit…
people were  almost making their minds up, 
because we have one awkward person in 
the department at  one point in time, maybe 
it was them…[but] there was no evidence 
anywhere (I9).
A number of individuals considered this suspicion as 
unfair scapegoating that ultimately contributed to this 
individual’s decision to exit the organisation:
I don't think it was fair. Without any evidence 
it was just a suspicion, because he was not 
the  flavour of the month kind of thing… he'd 
never been happy from sort of the time of the  
incident…he was real close to depression 
and all that sort of thing (I10).
Another commented that upon leaving the organisation, 
the individual concerned: “was very critical of the 
way he was treated and his management…he got the 
impression that it was…a personal feel and no one 
else” (I11).
5.2.3.2 Injustice
There was consensus across interviewees on the need 
for a thorough investigation of the incident in this 
security critical context. For example one individual 
noted: “As an employee, I recognise the importance of 
security and assurance… that is part of the terms of who 
you work for, and why you work here. So that's fair and 
reasonable” (I7). Nonetheless, an important outcome 
for the team was the collective sense of injustice for 
team members and those working in security. Without 
an admission of accountability, the team felt tainted 
by association with all members receiving a written 
warning. This was clearly a controversial strategy: “I 
think they were all treated badly following the incident. 
How can you give everybody a written warning when 
you don't know who has done it? You don't know what’s 
happened?” (I10).
This decision created a widespread perception of 
distributive injustice against the whole team, and with 
further perceived interpersonal injustice towards more 
than just the one individual under the most suspicion:
I have not been promoted since then…this 
incident came and basically went, not the 
time to  do it. Ok fair enough… So I thought 
ok, I am not going to stay….I moved… which 
was a shame,  because I loved the job. It was 
THE job in the company I wanted to do… if 
they had promoted  me, I would have been 
quite happy to stay there and do that job… 
that was the job I liked, that  was the job I 
wanted. I don't dislike this job but it's just 
not ‘the one’ (I10).
These insights indicate how an insider threat event when 
not managed in a way that is perceived as equitable by 
remaining employees, can pose an ongoing legacy of 
disgruntlement and distrust. This perceived injustice 
increases the risk of further insider threats (Furnham 
and Siegel, 2012).
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5.2.3.3 Anxiety
Following the incident, the sense of injustice was 
coupled with a heightened negative emotional tone 
and a strong sense of anxiety. As one interviewee 
explained: “I was thinking ‘bloody hell’ cos I felt 
conscious and guilty and thinking ‘oh blimey could I 
have made a mistake?’ so you go through your memory 
thinking, ‘no, no…. I had done all of those things [I 
should]’” (I7). Another commented: “It was a really, 
totally unpleasant day, devastating, I would have to 
say the worst point in my career by far” (I9). How 
individuals in the team felt that they were dealt with by 
management also created an emotional legacy:
It made me feel angry as well, surprised, 
shocked, concerned for my job…You expect, 
if you  have messed up and we potentially 
messed up, a sort of, telling off, some sort 
of one-way  discussion on the facts, what 
you should have done, what you didn't do. 
But a telling off for  20 minutes, rant, raised 
voices… is not what you expect (I10).
5.2.3.4 Trust breach
Specifically, individuals clearly experienced distrust 
towards other members of the team following the 
incident, but there was also evidence of a more 
generalised decline in trust towards the organisation. 
For example, one individual reflected that:
I think your balance of trust changes a little 
bit. If I take time anyway naturally to trust 
others I guess it might have heightened that… 
because obviously you are in a position 
where you have got to have that trust, and 
yet you may have been let down by someone 
who you trusted within that team. So I think 
subconsciously, probably so (I7).
5.2.3.5 Change to procedures
In addition to the emotional and psychological impacts 
on team members, tangible changes were made to 
security and general working procedures within the 
team. This was evident in the immediate aftermath of 
the incident: “So it just changed the whole ethos, we 
had cupboards in other areas, they had to be locked, 
and two people had to go there if you wanted to go to 
those. So total utter lockdown” (I9). It also had a lasting 
more positive impact in this respect: “It probably was 
a real wake-up call for us…we have been a lot more 
careful about how we go about things. But also the 
company has tightened up its procedures as well” (I9). 
Indeed following the incident, individuals did note that 
key learning had been derived: “I think in terms of 
sharing and assurance and also working collectively 
as a team …the values of that I think is good for the 
organisation” (I7). Another reflected that this learning 
had been shared across the organisation: “as things 
settled down…I then agreed to go and give talks to 
large groups of people who were quite shocked” (I9).
5.2.4 CASE STUDY 2: CONCLUSION
In conclusion, to illustrate our overall findings we have 
derived a timeline of the triggers which contributed to 
this case of insider threat. 
First, given the suspicion around certain team members 
and counterproductive work behaviour related to the 
team climate, input controls at the recruitment stage are 
unlikely to have helped identify individuals unsuitable 
for the organisation. However, poor adherence to process 
controls around security sensitive tasks appeared to 
have facilitated this incident. Relatedly, intra-team 
conflict and team discontent was clearly a trigger in 
a context where issues were not discussed openly but 
left to fester. Particularly, poor team relations with, and 
distrust towards, the team leader featured heavily in 
mention of potential sabotage. 
Following the incident, a climate of strong suspicion 
surrounding the team and a period of further turbulence 
emerged in which team members either exited or 
moved to other parts of the organisation. However, 
this process was shrouded in rumour and a lack of 
transparency which further exacerbated the distrustful 
climate within the team and perceptions of injustice 
among those involved in the incident; they felt wronged 
by how the incident had been handled by management. 
All of this occurred at a time of ongoing macro-level 
organisational change, including changes to pensions 
and restructuring which was likely to have increased 
feelings of disgruntlement and insecurity amongst 
employees. Critically, this incident provides a potential 
legacy for future insider threat incidents: it created a 
key memory with employees able to recall how they 
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felt at the time of the incident, producing profound 
impacts on the relationship employees still have with 
their colleagues and leaders. 
It is therefore already an anchoring event for some staff 
members (Ballinger and Rockmann, 2010) and remains 
an enduring experience (Morgeson et al., 2015). It is 
important that in cases such as this, problems within the 
team (and with leadership) are discussed transparently 
and fully resolved so as to limit the ongoing legacy of 
injustice and potential further insider threat acts.
5.3 CASE STUDY 3
5.3.1 OVERVIEW
Case Study 3 involved an incident in which an 
employee who had worked at the organisation for eight 
years had been accessing and ‘hoarding’ top secret 
files from the organisation’s network without reason or 
authority to do so. This activity was carried out by the 
individual over a period of seven months. Following 
the last recorded incident, an official investigation was 
launched, which revealed prior warnings about similar 
activities. The perpetrator justified their actions on the 
grounds of ‘natural curiosity’ and after security and 
managerial investigations, this reasoning was accepted. 
This incident can therefore be classified as intentional, 
but not malicious (Nurse et al., 2014). The individual 
apologised for their actions and demonstrated a 
subsequent change in behaviour. A disciplinary 
outcome of ‘gross misconduct’ was found and a final 
written warning was given to the individual.
We interviewed four individuals involved in this case: 
the individual (perpetrator), the group leader, the team 
leader and a security representative. We also consulted 
HR and security documents relating to the incident 
comprising five items: the security and the investigation 
report for this case, the discipline record and the 
formal outcome, and a signed disclosure document. 
The documents record that the individual had been 
warned on three occasions before the incident, and then 
received a final written warning. The hearing identified 
the motivation for the accumulation of this information 
as allowing a “bigger picture” of the organisation to be 
obtained. There is a suggestion that this individual was 
aware of his hoarding actions, but that the content of the 
documents accessed were confined solely to the team 
and were regarded as a form of good team citizenship 
(discussed later). The investigation and hearing reports 
recorded the frequency of the data access which 
offers some support for the compulsive nature of the 
individual’s behaviour - an average 371 accesses each 
month. The outcome file highlighted that the rule that 
had been broken was: “browsing the company’s files or 
folders and/or the disseminating of documents where 
no clear business need or ‘need to know’ exists.” The 
sanction given had two components, a time limited 
warning but also a note of this behaviour to permanently 
remain on the individual’s HR record. There was also 
recorded recognition that the individual’s behaviour 
may revert.
The thematic analysis of this case study is presented 
below.
5.4 PERPETRATOR 
CHARACTERISTICS
5.4.1 INTROVERSION
The perpetrator was discussed as having notable 
characteristics, with interviewees unanimously 
concurring that they were strongly introverted. 
This would manifest in the individual not openly 
communicating with many others in the team, 
consequently meaning their activities were not always 
well known:
He's the most introverted person you will 
ever meet. He does not talk much at all, he's 
the quietest person in the team. He latches 
on to people and that's quite a good thing in 
that he can build relationships with people 
one person at a time… you kind of know that 
he is happy because someone else will say, 
oh, he's happy with what he is doing at the 
moment, because he won't say much (I14).
Further, as with case study 1, this individual was 
considered not to have acted maliciously, but instead 
his actions were attributed to naivety or immaturity: 
“I think this person is good at their job and just in 
this case has just been a bit silly. There was nothing 
malicious in any of this” (I14). This type of immaturity 
is a characteristic of those on the autistic spectrum 
(Soderstrom et al., 2002).
67
FindingS – caSE StudiES
An operational (dis)trust based framework
5.4.2 AUTISTIC SPECTRUM DISORDER 
(ASD)
Indeed there was speculation from those interviewed 
that the individual’s introverted nature may be linked 
to their neurodiversity/ASD: “We have quite a lot of 
shyer types…there’s a lot at that end of the spectrum 
I guess you might say. More introverted, more quiet. 
So there are plenty of people like him” (I12). While 
initially there was a perception that the individual 
was ‘on the spectrum’, a term widely used throughout 
the organisation without an underpinning official 
diagnosis, following the incident, the individual was 
officially diagnosed as being on the autistic spectrum. 
Therefore, these characteristics were conceivably linked 
to his compulsive curiosity about the information held 
in online folders.
5.4.3 CHANGE IN ACCESS
However a crucial trigger for the individual’s behaviour 
appears to have been a change in access provision. 
One interviewee explained: “They were just curious, 
they wanted to learn more and they thought they had 
a legitimate way of accessing it” (I12). Prior to this 
incident, the individual and his team could not access 
this particular kind of information:
Previously we didn't get that sort of 
information, it never came over to our area 
so we never  needed to worry too much 
about it…suddenly you find yourself on 
distribution lists for  documents that are a 
lot more sensitive and… this person starts to 
troll through that  information searching for 
interesting things (I14).
Similarly, another stated that “that's a fault of this 
system that people can just go through it” (I15).
This change in access provision and the ensuing 
hoarding was supported by the perception that the 
individual may have regarded their behaviour to be 
legitimate by means of their professional role and the 
access granted to the area. One interviewee explained:
He kind of half knew what we were on about, 
but he was half shocked if that makes any  
sense... he knew that he had a lot of stuff in 
his folder but I think more the shock was, 
well,  why can't I because I am a researcher…
and that's what I am doing. And again it's his  
perception and  belief that he had the tools 
(I15).
These quotes suggest twin mechanisms of moral 
disengagement (Bandura et al., 1996), including 
displacement of responsibility away from the actions 
of the individual, and the distortion of consequences, 
which serve to reduce the impact of such behaviour 
based on their role related intention. However, it is also 
characteristic of neurodiversity that the individual’s 
self-insight into their actions was reduced (Soderstrom 
et al., 2002).
Fig. 5.3 - Case 3 Timeline
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5.4.3.1  Mixed messages
Nonetheless, it was evident that employees in this 
context were operating in an ambiguous area, with 
inconsistent and unclear rules regarding the accessing 
of information, or exactly how the ‘need to know’ 
principle should be applied. For example, one 
individual stated:
It could well be that when he first started 
the job someone went, right you have got  
clearance… crack on, have a look where you 
want. They might really have just not said to 
him,  every time you go on the folder, this is 
only to be used for X Y Z, it's not here for 
this, it's not  here for that (I15).
Another concurred, stating that clearer communication 
and reinforcement of process controls in this respect 
was needed in the organisation: “People just shouldn't 
just nose around because they can… it was highlighted 
to us during training, but still I think that subtlety can be 
lost” (I12). Particularly for individuals with cognitive 
diversity, it is important that clear, consistent and 
unequivocal messaging is given regarding organisational 
protocol and boundaries. While individual employees 
can experience a lack of clarity on security issues, those 
in leadership roles also commented that messaging 
from HR could also be inconsistent concerning the 
appropriate sanctions and processes for dealing with 
employee behaviour (e.g., I14).
5.4.3.2 Removing the psychological 
barrier
Lastly, according to those privy to the case, online 
access removed a psychological barrier to the 
individual’s activity that in another context would have 
been deemed unacceptable. One interviewee explained:
It can be tempting to view information on 
a computer as different to information in 
the real  world. If you were in someone’s 
office, you wouldn't riffle through someone’s 
desk or cabinet  just to take reports. But on 
a computer somehow, that psychological 
barrier isn't there. I think  that was in the 
case, the problem (I12).
5.4.4 TEAM CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOUR
Another vital trigger in this case was the value in 
accessing this information for the individual concerned, 
by assisting his own and other team members’ 
promotion opportunities. One individual explained, 
as noted in Part 1, that the changes to promotion 
procedures reduced the transparency of the process as 
compared to the previous criteria used:
Under these organisational changes we have 
been through, it's very unclear now. You 
know  it's not obvious to me how anybody in 
the team can get promoted. We still haven't 
got job  descriptions yet…it used to be a 
fairly straightforward recipe (I14).
Thus the individual, as part of their ‘hoarding’ activities 
was in fact providing his colleagues with information 
useful to their progression. One explained:
Oh [the behaviour] it was to help them 
[colleagues] with their promotion board. So 
this other  person had a promotion board 
and had asked had we got any documents 
that talk about our  academic strategy, and 
this person had said yes, I do and emailed it 
to him (I14).
In this way the actions of the team member were 
viewed by their colleagues as a harmless means to 
mitigate an opaque promotion process, and a form of 
team citizenship behaviour on behalf of the perpetrator.
5.4.4.1  Social Positioning
The interview data illustrates that this individual had 
used their informal role – as an information supplier – 
to position themselves as a critical member of the team. 
Through this, the impact of their poor social skills was 
diminished as he became more influential, possessing 
expert and informational power (French and Raven 
1959):
He'd become a person that, if you needed 
something you'd probably turn to him. 
Because he would know where it was in 
the folders… In fact other people going for 
promotion came to see him and said you 
know, could I have a look at this information 
you've built up… So it's probably no surprise 
69
FindingS – caSE StudiES
An operational (dis)trust based framework
that if somebody was getting the information 
inappropriately, it would have been him 
(I14).
A further way this ‘social positioning’ was reinforced 
was through the use of team jokes and ‘banter’ about 
the individual’s information provider role. In hindsight 
the team recognised how it may have encouraged 
these hoarding activities. In combination with the 
individual’s lack of ease in social contexts and their 
highly introverted nature, it was recognised that:
You know the whole jokey thing has egged 
him on a little bit to be that person, to be that 
kind of figure, he knows all the information. 
And so we stopped that, but we should have 
stopped a lot sooner. We should never have 
been accepting those type of jokes sustained 
over years of him working here… ‘egging 
him on’ was probably a slang phrase for 
saying it made him feel part of a team I think. 
You know because he was laughing with 
everybody else, because he's such a quiet 
person you know there was an opportunity 
there for him to have a joke and a laugh with 
people, he would sit there sniggering… I 
think it made him feel like it was normal and 
it was good (I14).
The individual therefore was able to gain power and a 
sense of inclusion in the team beyond what he could 
have achieved by himself due to his limited social 
skills. These two factors must be viewed as significant 
motivators for their behaviour.
5.5 PASSIVE INSIDER THREAT
As in Case 1, colleagues were aware of the individual’s 
previous security breaches but did not report them 
and similar statements to those in Case 1 were made 
by those who worked closely with the individual, that 
such an outcome was not unexpected: “Of anybody in 
the team… I would probably say that it was going to be 
him” (I14).
5.5.1 FEAR OF OVER-REACTION
As with Case 1, a driver of the team’s non-response 
was concern about the security and HR outcomes. One 
colleague reflected that: “the line manager at the time 
said, you know, next time I will be more vigilant, to 
these kind of early warning signs. It can be too easy to 
dismiss them. Not one to cause a fuss” (I12). Concern 
about the potentially disproportionate reactions of 
security and HR was a clear inhibitor to the raising 
of concerns about their colleague’s inappropriate 
behaviour:
When little safety things happen you don't 
mention them because you know there is 
going to  be an overreaction… you can end 
up closing down entire facilities because 
somebody didn't do  their shoelace up or 
something…you tend to think I am not going 
to mention that one, because  it would be an 
over-reaction if people get hold of it (I14).
Another interviewee stated that when the individual 
was first approached about the incident: “He just 
started getting a bit ‘oh I'm in trouble’ and all the 
usual kind of signs… because again, the culture side 
is that once you get a visit from security or HR then 
you are going down the route of going out [the door]. 
That's generally the feeling on site” (I15).
These perspectives again demonstrate disengagement 
mechanisms through the distortion of consequences 
and the displacement of responsibility (Bandura et al., 
1996), as well as trait empathy (Moore et al., 2012), in 
which sympathy lies with the perpetrator rather than the 
organisation. Thus, concern was focused on protecting 
team members from being subject to an organisational 
injustice. In this way the identity of these individuals as 
being part of a team superseded that of the organisation 
as a whole (Searle et al., in press), with members reticent 
about registering concerns about their colleagues to the 
wider organisation.
5.5.2 ATTENDING TO ‘ROUTINE’ 
SECURITY WARNING SIGNS ONLY
Concurrent with their anxiety over disproportionate 
organisational reactions, was acknowledgement that 
employees often attended only to the more typical 
security red flags, such as staying late in the office 
or conducting excessive photocopying. Thus the less 
common, or perhaps more widely accepted, security 
issue was diminished: “Complacency can be an issue 
sometimes as well. People get very used to patterns 
and they forget the reasons behind them” (I12). 
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The inattention to evident warning signs in this case 
suggested a feeling of reduced accountability from 
team members towards insiders who threaten the 
organisation in some way. The attention of staff is 
also focused on a narrow predefined set of activities, 
with evidence showing how cognitive restructuring 
was occurring for some in the team, rather than these 
individuals having a broader and active moral self-
concept (Aquino and Reed, 2002); this is shown in the 
following extract:
if it was a big pile of printed information…I 
would say shred it now, shred it immediately. 
That's one of the warning signs… it [the 
guidance] was watch out for a change, in 
particular, like coming into the office either 
late or very early and this person had done 
neither of those… Folder surfing was never 
a warning sign that we were trained in. 
You know I can't ever remember reading 
anywhere in any document that says if 
somebody is looking through folders, that 
that's a security thing (I14).
5.5.3 VARYING LEADERSHIP STYLES
Another factor which reinforced a ‘blind eye’ to such 
behaviour was the inconsistent approach of various 
team/group leaders to security-breach behaviour. 
This team has had a number of ongoing changes 
with different managers in charge. For instance, one 
individual commented that:
We merged in with another group. We were 
suddenly exposed to a lot more than we 
had  been before... suddenly you have got a 
different boss… and he is far less tolerant of 
sharing  things, that's when it starts to trigger, 
ah yes, I need to warn people that you know, 
just having  a folder full of information might 
not be acceptable (I14).
Coupled with the change of access noted earlier that 
may have freshly stimulated this individual’s curiosity 
into novel material, variable leadership made informal 
security warning signs far less likely to be consistently 
detected and acted upon. This kind of discrepancy 
can again create a particular ambiguity for those 
individuals on the autistic spectrum who require clear 
and consistent rules to follow but it also impacts on 
norms of behaviour within the wider team (Bean and 
Hamilton, 2006).
5.6 IMPACT ON THE 
INDIVIDUAL AND THE TEAM
5.6.1 POST-INCIDENT LEARNING
Following the incident becoming known within the 
team and the fact that the perpetrator had received a 
serious disciplinary for their behaviour, team members 
felt shocked and concerned for their colleague. This 
reflects the level of trait empathy for the perpetrator in 
this team (Moore et al., 2012). As outlined earlier, there 
was a recognition from those around the individual 
that they could have directly or indirectly encouraged 
and condoned the behaviour; a clear sense emerged 
of wanting to support the individual from going any 
further and to desist from the non-malicious but clearly 
unhelpful ‘banter’ that surrounded their activities. 
However, as with the previous two cases, there was 
little open discussion of this incident:
We don't like to tell people about it, you know 
it might embarrass the person. There was 
something in our group brief… and the group 
leader stood up and said, ‘you know there 
has been an incident where someone has 
been sharing information that they shouldn't 
have or something, but not a big thing made 
of it… this incident hasn't been made public. 
There has not been any emails or anything to 
warn people about folder surfing. There has 
been nothing. There haven't been any briefs 
or communications. It's just been left dead 
quiet (I14).
Certainly it is sensible that individuals are not named in 
de-briefs of counterproductive work behaviour or acts of 
insider threat. However, a more transparent discussion 
about the incident would ensure that serious learning 
could be derived for the future, so as to diminish the 
potential for further incidents of this nature from 
occurring. It also might enable employees to reflect 
on their use of moral disengagement mechanisms, 
particularly the diffusion and displacement of 
responsibility. 
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Nonetheless, in addition to the individual taking 
“concrete steps demonstrating that he understands 
what to do in the future” (I12), there was evidence of a 
general change in behaviour within this team following 
the incident. This was linked to both the individual’s 
personal development and to the wider shift in 
organisational culture towards a more open climate: 
“The way that we have been trained now is 
get away from a telling culture and switch to 
an asking culture, so he probably feels more 
involved” (I14).
5.7 CASE STUDY 3: 
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, as with the preceding cases, to illustrate 
our overall findings we have devised a timeline of the 
triggers which led to the insider threat activity in Case 
3. First, we again highlight the limited role of input 
controls here at the time of recruitment which may 
have been an early flag for this incident. Specifically, 
a psychometric test could have identified that this 
individual was on the autistic spectrum much earlier 
in their career, which would have enabled more 
tailored attention and support to be provided and better 
monitoring assigned to his activities. The individual’s 
introverted nature and limited social skills meant that 
any attention from team members, in this case through 
jokes about his ‘hoarding’, served as encouragement.
As in Case 1, colleagues noticed the individual’s 
counterproductive behaviour but did not officially raise 
concerns; first, because of fear of an over-reaction 
from HR and security, and second, because they were 
actively benefiting from the behaviour. A change in 
team composition, new access to security-critical 
online areas alongside varying levels of tolerance 
toward ‘folder surfing’ behaviour were all crucial 
triggers of this incident, particularly for an individual 
who required routine and clear procedures and rules to 
follow.
All of this was occurring at a time of ongoing 
organisational change which provided a context of 
uncertainty around key issues such as progression 
opportunities, further incentivising any routes to gain 
clarity. Certainly there have been strong lessons learnt 
by the individual involved, who seems to have thrived 
since the resolution of the incident. There has likewise 
been significant local learning for the team involved. 
However, as with Case 1 (and to a certain extent Case 
2), there has been limited sharing of further learning 
from the incident across the organisation, particularly 
in terms of the negative perceptions of both HR and 
security. It therefore seems that it would be beneficial 
and important to address many of the issues raised in 
this case on a wider scale in the future.
5.8 PART 2 CONCLUSION
5.8.1 OVERALL CASE STUDY INSIGHTS: 
PERPETRATOR WARNING FLAGS
In conclusion, the three cases of insider threat we 
analysed comprise their own distinct local contexts and 
individual perpetrator characteristics. In this sense, it 
is difficult to generalise across the cases to any great 
extent. Indeed, our study focused on one organisation 
within the security industry and our findings must 
therefore be considered within their particular context, 
rather than as a means to typify insider threat activity 
more generally. Nonetheless, we have identified a 
number of indicators that may suggest that an individual 
could be at higher risk of insider threat activities or at 
least, counterproductive work behaviour. These are as 
follows:
Poor fit. In two of our three cases (we cannot say 
categorically for the third due to the unknown identity 
of the perpetrator) we identified an element of ‘poor 
fit’ among perpetrators. This was in terms of their 
misalignment with organisational goals and objectives; 
their identification with their job role and possession of 
the appropriate skills; their dissimilarity to other team 
members; and in terms of their own identity, either 
personal or professional (or both).
Self-focus. We derived a component of self-focus 
across the perpetrators in the case studies. That is, 
the prioritisation of either personal or work-related 
goals above, or at the expense of, wider organisational 
goals. We found that self-focus can arise in the form of 
disregarding organisational protocol in order to fulfil 
desired objectives or to avoid inconveniencing oneself 
(Cases 1 and 3), through self-preservation actions 
(Cases 1-3), a general lack of appreciation of the impact 
of their behaviour on colleagues or the organisation 
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(Cases 1 and 3), and to proactively sabotage others to 
gain revenge for a perceived injustice (potentially Case 
2).
Immaturity. Relatedly, in two of our cases (1 and 3), the 
perpetrators displayed the trait of immaturity. This was 
evident in their under-appreciation of the consequences 
of their actions, in terms of how they would affect 
themselves, others or the organisation. It was also clear 
in terms of the individuals’ relations with other team 
members, where they would need support with basic 
work tasks or behave dependently on others (Case 1), 
or where they fulfil the role of a junior member.
Emotional instability. We found that in at least one 
case (Case 1) the perpetrator possessed an element 
of emotional instability or mental health issues. This 
contributed to the decision making and behaviour 
involved in the insider threat activity, we contend, 
through depleting the individual’s capacity to function 
at work and thus their conscientiousness.
Individual vulnerabilities. An issue which links 
closely to the traits outlined above is the issue of 
individual vulnerabilities. We found these fell into 
two main categories – those related to particular 
social difficulties and those related specifically to 
ASD/neurodiversity. We found that in at least two 
cases, the perpetrators displayed some difficulties in 
interacting with their team members. We found that 
these individuals were to some extent socially isolated 
and when attempts were made to form relationships, 
this often created problems e.g., inappropriate topics 
of conversation with colleagues (Case 1) and boundary 
failures (Cases 1 and 3).
Further, in Case 3, we found that CWB can actually be 
used as a form of currency in relationship building, i.e., 
through information sharing with others which violated 
organisational protocol. Individuals with identified 
neurodiversity issues exhibit many of these same issues 
in addition to more specific problems of compulsive/
hoarding behaviour (Case 1) and an inability to fully 
appreciate the impact of their actions on others (Cases 
1 and 3).
In addition, we found that in all of the cases we 
studied, at least some of the warning flags around 
perpetrators were known to colleagues and managers, 
but that various factors impacted on whether these were 
reported at an early stage and addressed or whether they 
were left to escalate to the types of incidents outlined in 
our three case studies (passive insider threat). We deal 
with this issue in our next two sections, Discussion and 
Conclusions.
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6. DISCUSSION
This report has identified the factors underlying 
actual and potential insider threat in our case study 
organisation during a context of organisational change. 
Our analysis reveals that both active and passive 
threat and various types of CWB are evident in the 
organisation. Both the case studies and the survey 
identified those who breach security in different ways. 
We found examples of perpetrators whose CWB was 
known prior to a threat event and yet this knowledge 
was not shared. We also discovered examples of team 
and managerial distrust, which discouraged citizenship 
behaviour and even bred revenge behaviour. In both 
ways, the capacity and resilience of the organisation to 
handle insider threat is reduced. Critically, our results 
show that such outcomes were often an unforeseen 
consequence of the existing ‘need to know’ security 
culture and in part, the perceived heavy-handedness of 
HR and security teams, with whom staff feel reluctant 
to share their concerns about others. The reasons for 
this reluctance are complex.
First, individuals do not want to create problems for 
others whom they like and so minimise their potential 
consequences and turn a blind eye, becoming a passive 
threat themselves. 
Second, they are anxious about the personal impact 
of reporting during an ongoing period of change and 
uncertainty; they do not want to make themselves more 
vulnerable to managerial attention and so do not voice 
their concerns, again becoming passive threats through 
their inaction. 
Third, employees believe that reporting issues is 
something done by leaders and therefore not in their 
job description. This is a rule-focused organisation, 
which historically attracts those with a preference for 
authority and structure, namely the ex-military, police 
or civil service. 
Further, the organisation’s science and technology focus 
make it attractive to another group of rule-followers, 
namely those on the autistic spectrum. Accordingly, 
the organisation has a strong sense of hierarchy and as 
a result, the detection and reporting of security issues 
can easily be pushed up the organisation, becoming a 
matter for leaders. Indeed, more insidiously, employees 
watch and learn from certain leaders who they witness 
undertaking CWB, especially acts of withdrawal and 
interpersonal aggression; individuals work in contexts 
with informal norms that make it tacitly acceptable to 
break certain rules. 
Lastly, given the level of security clearance individuals 
must obtain to gain employment at this organisation, 
there is evidence of the ‘dark side’ of trust at work, 
where individuals are considered trustworthy due to 
their membership of the organisation, this can create 
complacency among teams and further discourage the 
sharing of concerns about others’ behaviours.
6.1 INSIDER THREAT 
TYPOLOGIES
Our report shows four types of perpetrator who are 
potential insider threats for this organisation. While our 
case studies included two in the top category, the other 
types are also apparent through results from the survey 
and additional interviews:
Omitters - Those who undertake CWB through an 
incapacity to effectively self-regulate their actions, 
depleting their capacity to function fully at work. They 
often lack appreciation of the consequences of their 
actions. They unintentionally breach rules and put the 
organisation at risk through their reduced capacity 
to curb obsessive tendencies (pattern detecting and 
hoarding tendencies - Case 3), or by virtue of being 
psychologically overwhelmed (depression, home-work 
overspill - Case 1). These individuals require help 
from others around them to detect these omissions, to 
support them to reduce the potential insider threat risk 
they present.
Slippers - Those who occasionally undertake single acts 
of CWB, such as taking home ‘on-site only’ documents, 
and being rude and aggressive towards others (survey). 
These are temporary behaviours, but they are important 
as impact on others’ work experiences. If the individual 
is senior, these behaviours can become amplified and 
viewed as the norm by their subordinates.
Retaliators -Those who deliberately undertake small 
acts designed to deliberately harm the organisation. 
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These individuals feel angry at the organisation and 
therefore feel justified in their actions. They comprise 
two forms: the passive withdrawer, who reduces 
their effort, co-operation and attention on the tasks 
they are doing, leaving early or arriving late, having 
extended breaks or lunches, taking unnecessary sick 
leave (survey); they may also deviate from the formal 
rules and so put themselves and others at risk; or 
the active revenger, an individual who deliberately 
overwhelms organisational systems with unnecessary 
volumes of paperwork, or specific acts of revenge 
and aggression against key actors (Case 2, context 
interviews and survey). Over time, if unchallenged and 
uncorrected both of these forms create new norms of 
transgressive behaviour, causing anxiety and worry to 
their victims and incurring additional costs and risks 
for the organisation. They can go on to undertake more 
serious actions. If these individuals are senior, their 
actions reduce the perceived fairness and safety of the 
organisation, institutionalising CWB. They become 
distrusted by others which reduces their capacity 
to effectively manage and lead others. Their lack of 
integrity can trigger moral disengagement among 
others.
Serial Transgressors - These individuals undertake 
a wide array of categories of CWB as a matter of 
routine. Their actions have remained unchecked or 
unchallenged, which undermines the authority of 
management and increases the security risks of those 
they work with (Case 1 and survey). Such individuals 
are abetted by a passive group-level response to CWB, 
or by managers who are in the retaliator category.
Further these threats are potentially increased through 
the following four key factors:
6.1.1 INEFFECTIVE OR INCONSISTENT 
USE OF ORGANISATIONAL CONTROL 
SYSTEMS
Case study analysis revealed an ineffective or 
inconsistent use of organisational control systems in this 
organisation. These include input controls, specifically 
recruitment processes that did not detect poor job and 
organisational fit for job applicants (Case 1). Further 
examples include late or inconsistent support for those 
with mental health concerns (Case 1), which affects 
their capacity to function effectively and safely in their 
role. We also found little attention towards detecting 
and supporting autistic spectrum (ASD) employees in 
a tailored manner, especially when working in contexts 
with ongoing organisational change. Vetting, while 
critical to the entry of employees to this organisation, 
may also make staff both complacent that other 
employees do not engage in CWB, or anxious about 
the impact of reporting CWB for themselves or others. 
Daily security reminders are a further input control tool 
that may have little more than assurance value for this 
organisation. Rather than making security matters more 
salient, employees respond habitually and potentially 
mindlessly to security messages that need to be clicked 
through to unblock their access to the IT system.
Output control issues were manifest in two ways. First 
was a perceived lack of communication regarding 
changes to HR policies. Specifically, new and adapted 
roles and their associated access restrictions were not 
clarified across the organisation, which was found to 
impact on the CWB activities of some employees. 
ASD staff in particular require transparency about any 
changes that are made to their role. Similarly, changes to 
progression processes were not sufficiently addressed, 
which was a factor that instigated insider threat in Case 
3, as searches for information resulted in unauthorised 
access. Second, performance-management systems 
do not draw attention to self-serving individuals who 
prioritise either personal or work-related goals above, 
or at the expense of, wider organisational goals. Again 
such omissions were factors in insider threat Cases 1 and 
2. We found examples where organisational protocol 
was disregarded in order to fulfil desired objectives 
or to avoid inconveniencing oneself (Cases 1 and 3); 
self-preservation actions (Cases 1-3) were undertaken 
with little appreciation of the impact of their behaviour 
on colleagues or the organisation (Case 1 and 3); 
and proactive sabotage was tentatively identified as a 
means of revenge for a perceived managerial injustice 
(potentially Case 2). There were also examples in the 
survey of staff knowingly deviating from organisational 
rules and procedures, and of theft.
6.1.2 UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
OF SECURITY CULTURE
Our analysis identified some unintended consequences 
of the security culture. First, to some extent there is a 
fear-focused security climate, emerging first from the 
anxiety around initial security vetting, but then further 
intensified in the negative experiences (or at least the 
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perception of negative experiences) of those who raised 
security concerns. As a result, levels of speaking-up are 
curbed through a false sense of high trust derived from 
initial vetting, accompanied by the second mechanism 
– the strong need to know culture, which constrained 
attention towards other co-workers’ behaviour. Direct 
and indirect exposure (e.g., through storytelling among 
teams) to the negative consequences of whistleblowing, 
coupled with a lack of confidence in organisational 
reporting systems (specifically perceptions of 
inappropriately harsh HR or security sanctions towards 
perpetrators), reduces the willingness of employees to 
raise concerns (e.g., Cases 1 and 3).
6.1.3 MORAL DISENGAGEMENT AND 
PASSIVE INSIDER THREAT
Moral disengagement was a factor in individual level 
CWB, but also a further type of organisational risk - 
passive group level insider threat (case studies 1-3). 
Linked to the aforementioned ‘speak-up’ concerns, 
many of those working with perpetrators showed signs 
of disengagement in the face of others’ evident rule 
breaches. The operation of strong formal hierarchies 
combined with their reporting concerns induced the 
triggering of forms of moral disengagement including 
displacement and diffusion of responsibility e.g., 
‘it’s not my job to monitor people’, and distortion 
of the consequences, e.g., ‘it’s not really a big deal’. 
Passive threat was also triggered when individuals felt 
psychologically close to, and protective of, perpetrators, 
making them less likely to flag their inappropriate 
behaviour. Passive threat was found to intensify when 
colleagues could directly or indirectly benefit from a 
perpetrator’s actions, or if they felt partly responsible 
for these CWB (e.g., Case 3).
6.1.4 STAFF DISSATISFACTION ABOUT 
CHANGES
Finally, there is dissatisfaction among staff following 
the ongoing changes in this organisation. There is a 
sense of aggrievement towards Plan B and its senior 
management concerning the types of changes occurring 
both currently and in the recent past, the adequacy of 
the communication employees receive about changes 
and their ability to direct change. Novel and defining 
changes including restructuring and pensions remove 
individuals’ previously high job security and upset 
many individuals’ personal goals and future financial 
security. This is especially the case for longstanding 
employees who have been prevented from taking 
voluntary redundancy. While the pension dispute 
has since been officially resolved, at the time of data 
collection for this study, dissatisfaction with pension 
changes was evident among staff and recounted as 
having a pernicious impact on some staff in terms of 
engagement and job satisfaction.
Results from the survey revealed two clear groups – 
those who feel secure and content in their employment, 
and those who were anxious and tired. 33% of 
employees who completed the survey indicated that 
they had at least occasionally undertaken CWB, 
with incivility and teasing the most common form of 
transgression. Research indicates that those who are 
disengaged from their organisation are less concerned 
about the potential harm to their organisation from 
insider threat and that they may also feel morally 
justified in passively or actively seeking redress from the 
organisation through undertaking such behaviour. We 
found evidence that the organisation (or management) 
had inadvertently provoked insider threats (e.g., Case 
2) through unaddressed discontent within teams.
The potential outcome is that despite the many positive 
elements of this organisation’s general and security-
specific culture, the resilience of the organisation 
towards change and towards insider threat is limited.
6.2 IMPROVING THE 
MANAGEMENT OF CWB
The organisation, like many others, has traditionally 
viewed threats and security risks as something 
emanating from outside the walls of the organisation. 
There is now a growing acknowledgement of the need 
to consider internal sources of threat. In particular, 
there needs to be more awareness of how insider threat 
risk can become raised where changes are perceived 
as unnecessary and delivered in seemingly unfair 
ways which reduce certainty and breach trust. In this 
high-stakes context, risk potential is increased through 
long-standing and disengaged staff who are displeased 
with the organisation’s actions, causing their active 
retaliation and disruption; or through more passive 
forms of resistance or omission. Exposure to the 
activities of disengaged or depleted staff can spread to 
other employees, either as the targets for transgression 
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or through witnessing others’ poor treatment. The net 
effect of all of this is to normalise CWB to some extent, 
with some who consider CWB counter to their values 
deciding to exit the organisation. Thus, the capacity of 
the organisation to push-back against CWB becomes 
diminished through the formation of these different 
harm chains.
More attention is required towards the active and 
passive behaviour of all organisational members, 
which reach well beyond the ‘typical’ security flags 
of excessive photocopying, staying late and so on. 
However, it is important that this change does not 
undermine relationships within the organisation and 
simply transfer the anxiety and fear to those on the 
inside. Instead, there is considerable merit in shifting 
to a welfare-focused security reporting system that 
emphasises the importance and value of reporting 
unusual or counterproductive behaviour as a means of 
looking out for staff. This is likely to increase reporting, 
and to be of real value in the retention of technical 
expertise. The proposed shift to a welfare-focused 
security system has particular value to the ASD and 
military staff groups, whom evidence suggests can have 
poorer mental health outcomes (Cassidy et al., 2014). 
Further, the limited capacity of those with mental 
health issues and ASD to quickly and effectively cope 
with change increases the risk of these individuals 
becoming unintentional insider threats. The resilience 
of the overall organisation might therefore be enhanced 
through such a shift.
6.2.1 KNOWING HOW CWB 
DEVELOPS DURING CHANGE
A further way that this organisation and others may 
become more resilient to handling insider threats is to 
be aware of the different mechanisms that encourage 
the development of CWB. From our analysis, we 
propose the following, which may be applicable to 
other contexts:
6.2.1.1 Psychological contract breach – 
leaders and injustice
The most universal impact of organisational changes 
arises from the violation to the psychological contract 
of employees ( Aselage and Eisenberger, 2003; Kickul 
and Lester, 2001; Zhao et al., 2007). Psychological 
contract breach is likely, however, to be more enduring 
in this context or others, where there is frequent 
changes of top management. As a result, there is 
cynicism towards top leaders, and reduced confidence 
in their capacity to simply remain in post long enough 
for employees to have faith in their ability to deliver on 
past or future objectives (Bankins, 2015). In this way, a 
crucial route to repairing breached trust is removed and 
so repair is likely to be difficult to achieve (Bachmann 
et al., 2015; Dirks et al., 2011; Kramer and Lewicki, 
2010). Critically, employees’ experience of change in 
this organisation has included all forms of injustice – 
related to processes, people, information and outcomes. 
Research shows perceived injustice is an important 
precursor for CWB (Jensen et al., 2010; Jones and 
Martens, 2009).
6.2.1.2  Negative emotional climate – 
normalisation of CWB
A second factor contributing to CWB is the pervasive 
negative emotional climate found in this context. The 
speed and frequency of change impacts on organisational 
trust, through raising questions about the competence 
of the organisation and its leaders and about how much 
the organisation values the welfare of its employees 
(affective trust) who continually experience change 
and its often negative effects. As a result, cynicism 
and disengagement emerges and the presence of this 
attitude reduces organisational commitment and 
citizenship behaviour. However, coupled with some 
level of incivility and hostility that is either directly or 
vicariously experienced within this workplace, a cycle 
of interpersonal aggression is being formed (Ferguson 
and Barry, 2011). Importantly, this normalises CWB, 
which is more evident in some departments than other. 
Working in hostile environments depletes individuals’ 
coping resources (Fox et al., 2001; Spector and Fox, 
2005), and causes emotional exhaustion, which is an 
antecedent of CWB (Bolton et al., 2012). Through 
this route both one-off ‘slippers’ and more regular 
‘omitters’ emerge. Concurrently, employees fail to 
notice and raise concerns about transgressive actions. 
Further exposure to CWB is likely to insidiously cause 
incivility to become more widespread (Ferguson and 
Barry, 2011). The mechanism for such a progression 
is through shifts in cognitions in the form of moral 
disengagement which allows employees to excuse 
their wrongdoing (Fida et al., 2015) and justify their 
retaliation behaviour (Tripp et al., 2007).
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6.2.1.3 Specific impacts on specific 
groups
That said, individuals do not experience change in a 
uniform fashion, instead, it is important to identify 
categories for whom the impact and strength of change 
is likely to be different (Morgeson et al., 2015; Searle 
et al., in press). From our study, we have derived three 
distinct sets of employees who may be particularly 
affected by organisational change and thus vulnerable to 
consequent CWB, through slightly different but related 
mechanisms. One group is long-standing employees 
who have experienced transitions in recent years, 
shifting from one type of organisation into another 
with different values and often, reduced work benefits. 
As a result, these employees’ initial identity has been 
negatively altered which makes them at risk for CWB 
(Aquino and Douglas, 2003; Jones, 2009). Those 
with long tenure are more likely to feel trapped into 
remaining in an organisation where their final reward is 
now significantly reduced, but redundancy options often 
not available. This is a special form of psychological 
contract breach, which appears to punish those who 
have been loyal and committed to the organisation and 
which impacts on long-term personal goals. CWB in all 
its forms may be likely as this group seeks to retaliate 
against the organisation as a whole, or towards those 
they view as responsible (Bies and Tripp, 1996; 1998; 
Aquino et al., 2006; Tripp et al., 2007). A critical factor 
underlying such behaviour are key negative emotions 
- anger and frustration (Fox et al., 2001; Spector and 
Fox, 2002; 2005; Samnani et al., 2013), that are also 
linked to CWB. Clearly such experiences are likely to 
trigger the need for sensemaking (Maitlis et al., 2013; 
Steigenberger, 2015). Where organisational leaders 
devote time and attention towards communicating 
how previous organisational values are enduring in 
new contexts, and long-serving staff are valued, such 
transitions are likely to be less dramatic and thus 
produce fewer negative emotions. Further where job 
satisfaction remains high, the decline into CWB is 
likely to be less marked (Fida et al., 2015).
A second defined group are put at risk due to the 
inconsistency and ambiguity that change causes. 
Being a STEM context, this workplace is likely to 
have significant numbers of employees with ASD/
neurodiversity (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Baron-
Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004; Ruzich et al., 2015). 
Importantly, these individuals’ capacity to handle 
change is likely to be limited, but their preference 
for routine, order and clarity can be the anathema of 
change. For those with ASD the impact of change is 
likely to be more pronounced and negative, exacerbated 
by the poor and imprecise use of communication about 
change, which may also create a sense of informational 
injustice (Jones, 2009), a further amplifier of CWB. 
Vital in ameliorating the adverse impact of change is 
the interventions of colleagues, managers and those 
with specific employee skills e.g., HR, counsellors and 
change managers (Fida et al., 2015; Kurtessis et al., 
2015).
78
concLuSion and rEcommEndationS
Assessing and mitigating the impact of organisational change on counterproductive work behaviour
7. CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 PUSH FACTORS
In conclusion, we have identified three types of ‘push’ 
factors from our data which appear potentially relevant 
to a broad range of organisations, i.e., factors which 
push individuals towards acting counterproductively 
themselves, or push them away from reporting the 
CWB of others. They are:
7.1.1 INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
Perceived injustice and integrity breach from the 
organisation and its leaders. Such a perception is a 
strong motivator of both active and passive insider 
threat behaviour, or at least in reducing citizenship 
behaviour towards the organisation. It is particularly 
likely following organisational change.
Psychological closeness. When individuals feel 
empathy towards perpetrators, they appear less likely 
to flag their inappropriate behaviour. This is intensified 
if the perpetrator is assisting them in some way in their 
work or they feel partly responsible for the perpetrator’s 
actions.
Goal alignment. Accordingly, where there is a value 
to the perpetrators transgressive actions for other 
individuals, their reporting is less likely. This can occur 
through an active sharing in their gains, or through 
their efforts providing information that can reduce 
uncertainty during change.
7.1.2 TEAM MATTERS
The negative experiences of those who speak up. 
This involves either direct or indirect knowledge 
(or perceptions) of the negative consequences of 
whistleblowing. In this organisation, these experiences 
are centred on a lack of confidence in organisational 
systems; namely, the perception of inappropriately 
harsh sanctions from HR or security towards 
perpetrators. Given the level of vetting employees must 
obtain and maintain throughout their employment in 
this organisation, anything which may jeopardise this 
for self or others is often avoided entirely.
Fig. 7.1 Overall recommendations and core skills for 
managers: FOCAL
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A feeling of anxiety in the team. When individuals 
around the perpetrator are worried or uncertain about 
their working lives, and the consequences speaking 
up about CWB will have directly for them, they are 
less inclined to register concerns about potential harm 
to the organisation. This was the case, for example, 
in Case 2 where there was clear discontent among 
the team, and where there were wider organisational 
events occurring, such as restructuring, which occupied 
individuals’ thinking.
Local CWB culture. Contexts in which 
counterproductive work behaviour are the norm reduce 
the capacity of individuals to discern right from wrong. 
This is especially likely where the decline into CWB 
occurs over a longer period of time and so the individual 
is less likely to be aware that it has occurred.
Moral disengagement. When individuals around 
the perpetrator feel able to morally disengage from 
the CWB behaviour they witness, they are less likely 
to speak out. There are seven mechanisms through 
which this can arise. Here evidence was found of a 
Displacement or diffusion of responsibility which is 
cultivated by strong formal hierarchies, e.g., “It’s not 
my job to monitor him”, or, for example, through a 
Distortion of the consequences, e.g., “It’s not really a big 
deal”. Other mechanisms include Moral justification, 
e.g., “Doing my job well is more important that helping 
my colleague”, Euphemistic labelling, e.g., “Well, they 
are on the spectrum”, or Advantageous comparison, 
e.g., “My not stepping in is tiny compared to other’s 
behaviour with this person”. Further mechanisms 
include Dehumanization and Attribution of blame, e.g., 
“If you employ people like that, what do you expect?” 
These mechanisms are critical in the creation and 
maintenance of passive insider threat.
7.1.3 ORGANISATIONAL CLIMATE
Negative leadership behaviour. When leaders behave 
in ways that are perceived to undermine employees, 
there is a disincentive to speak up about CWB and 
limited confidence that employee concerns will be 
dealt with appropriately.
Organisational distrust. In workplaces with some 
level of distrust towards the motivations and intentions 
of leaders across the organisation as a whole, individual 
employees tend to feel aggrieved. This makes them less 
concerned about potential harm to the organisation or 
even to regard the organisation or management as having 
provoked insider threats. Though we have limited trust 
survey scores in this study, there is a sense throughout 
the interviews of a sense of aggrievement or at least 
apathy following organisational changes, such as 
pension changes, industrial disputes and restructuring.
Low confidence in systems. In contexts where there 
are ineffective or inconsistently applied systems and 
policies, employees have reduced confidence in the 
capacity of the organisation to deal with their concerns. 
They therefore seek to diminish the severity of the 
consequences of not speaking out.
7.2 PULL FACTORS
On the other hand, there are three corresponding 
positive ‘pull’ factors, which support citizenship 
behaviour and enable others to speak up about CWB. 
These are as follows:
7.2.1 INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
Changes to routine observed behaviour. These 
actions are typically included in insider threat training 
and in checklists (such as excessive photocopying or 
a change in working patterns). Critically, these are 
unambiguous and so the individual is aware of and 
sensitised to such activities being important.
Lack of identification or empathy with perpetrators. 
When perpetrators exhibit behaviour or traits that 
make it difficult for colleagues to empathise with a 
perpetrator, e.g., incivility, individuals may be more 
likely to report their CWB.
Perceived intention to harm. Where the type of action 
breaches a perceived (and often unspoken) acceptable 
threshold of behaviour, e.g., ‘overstepping the mark’, an 
individual is more likely to report the actions of another. 
Such events trigger a moral emotion, such as anger or 
disgust, making it more likely that action individuals 
are provoked to report others.
Moral identity. In contrast to moral disengagement, 
when individuals feel a strong moral responsibility in 
the workplace that involves them looking out for the 
organisation and its members, they are more likely to 
avoid CWB themselves and to report others’ CWB. 
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Moral identity can be fostered through the modelling of 
leaders, and through a trustworthy wider organisational 
climate.
7.2.2 TEAM MATTERS
Feelings of support and security in speaking out. 
CWB reporting is increased in contexts in which 
individuals see this type of reporting as something that 
is the norm and where they feel confident that it is safe 
to raise their concerns. Positive examples and stories 
are important means of transmitting the acceptability 
of reporting.
7.2.3 ORGANISATIONAL CLIMATE
Policies applied consistently. In contexts characterised 
by high levels of justice and trustworthiness, where 
individuals trust that their concerns will be dealt with 
in a measured and fair way, employees are happier to 
share these concerns with management. This of course 
extends to the general behaviour of an organisation’s 
management and not just to security and HR personnel.
Active and consistent communication about key 
changes. In contexts where there is frequent, coherent 
and participative communication about any changes 
that are occurring, particularly the necessity for change, 
individuals feel that they better understand these 
changes and are a valued part of the organisation.
Safe places and methods for reporting. Individuals 
are likely to report their concerns where there are 
multiple simplified routes to report. These should 
include face to face systems as well as cyber and other 
anonymised means.
We have produced some wider recommendations 
from our study. While further research in different 
organisational contexts is required, from consultation 
and feedback with a wide array of practitioners, the 
following recommendations appear likely to be useful 
for most organisations undergoing organisational 
change:
Be fair & consistent with HR procedures and managing 
people during times of change and stability. This will 
leave employees more resilient to the turbulence of 
organisational change and trusting in the vision that the 
projected change outcome.
Organisational Citizenship: Make reporting CWB 
part of your organisation’s employee welfare approach 
which involves shared responsibilities. By creating an 
organisational value system in which reporting CWB 
or unusual activities among colleagues is considered a 
protective rather than punitive measure for the potential 
perpetrator and others around them, reporting is likely 
to be increased. A key enabler in this approach is that 
all employees consider it their responsibility to report 
concerns, rather than solely managers, HR or security 
staff. Another is that good practice security norms must 
be made explicit and clear to all staff, rather than based 
on assumptions of understanding. The process for 
reporting concerns should also be made clear and easy 
for staff as well as confidential and non-discriminatory.
Communicate change initiatives transparently, 
consistently, regularly and collaboratively. Engage 
staff of all levels at an early stage in change initiatives. 
Early dialogue and collaboration with individuals on 
change projects will enable them to feel more in control 
of their working life, less vulnerable, and will reduce 
the sense of unpredictability change provokes.
Lead by example. Leaders act as role models for the 
organisation, demonstrating acceptable behaviours 
and morals which act as guides for employees in their 
everyday lives. When leaders consistently demonstrate 
concern for their employees and the kinds of citizenship 
behaviours which engender trust, employees build up 
resilience in the face of change.
Assess your various individual, local (team) and 
organisational environments for their vulnerabilities 
& tailor change initiatives accordingly. Change has 
different impacts on different individuals. This is due 
to both individual differences and an individual’s 
particular vulnerabilities, as well as the particular 
dynamics and challenges existent in any given team. 
Impact assessments should be conducted prior to 
change instigation which enables the identification 
of the particular support mechanisms which may be 
required across an organisation.
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